Bridge Dependencies

The AggLayer LxLy unified bridge (PolygonZkEVMBridgeV2) links Ethereum to AggLayer chains such as Katana. Assets are escrowed in the L1 bridge and a wrapped representation is minted on the destination. Katana additionally uses "Vault Bridge" tokens (e.g. vbUSDC) that deposit the escrowed asset into yield vaults, so a bridge exploit or a fault in that vault can strand or impair the remote backing — holders are exposed to both.

	Protocol Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Yearn yvUSD	direct	Transport	AggLayer LxLy + Vault Bridge USDC (vbUSDC)	Katana yvUSDC Compounder wraps USDC into vbUSDC 0x53E8…a765e and bridges to Katana
	Flex	indirect	Transport	Collateral is yvUSD	yvUSD has strategy that bridges funds to Katana. Protocol doesn't use bridges
	Spectra Finance	indirect	Transport	vbUSDC MetaVault on Katana	A live MetaVault on Katana holds Vault Bridge USDC, the MetaVault share itself is not bridged, but its backing sits behind the AggLayer bridge

Chainlink's cross-chain interoperability protocol. Two layers: message verification is Chainlink-operated and not protocol-configurable (a committing DON plus an independent Risk Management Network that can halt a lane), comparable to Circle's CCTP attesters. Token movement runs through a token pool the protocol itself deploys and owns — burn/mint or lock/release — where the per-protocol risk lives: the owner sets per-lane rate limits, supported lanes, and who can change them. So the model column reflects the pool mechanism, and the real protocol knobs are rate limits and pool ownership rather than a verifier quorum.

	Protocol Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Apyx apxUSD	direct	Bridged	Chainlink CCIP (LockReleaseTokenPool; Base + BNB Chain)	TokenAdminRegistry maps apxUSD to pool 0x0e9c…5BB5 (LockReleaseTokenPool 1.6.1). Canonical apxUSD is escrowed on Ethereum; getRemoteToken maps the configured Base route to 0xd993…7228 and the BNB Chain route to 0x6b37…d4af Pool and remote-token CCIP admin: 3-of-6 Safe 0xf986…3cE2.
	Centrifuge JAAA	direct	Mints native	Chainlink CCIP (2-of-2 MultiAdapter)	MultiAdapter forwards a message only after matching delivery through both LayerZero V2 and Chainlink CCIP. Compromising either messaging path alone cannot forge a JAAA mint, although MultiAdapter/admin or Spoke vulnerabilities could bypass the quorum. Mint authority: Spoke 0xEC35…25aB, governed by Centrifuge Root — 48h timelock 0x7Ed4…368f.
	Maple (syrupUSDC)	direct	Bridged	Chainlink CCIP (LockReleaseTokenPool)	LockReleaseTokenPool holds ~13% of supply on mainnet, backing bridged syrupUSDC on Base/Arbitrum/Solana Pool owner: Maple governance contract 0x4483…9449.
	Fluid (PST)	indirect	Mints native	PST collateral (Chainlink CCIP BurnMintTokenPool)	Fluid accepts Huma PST as collateral. Ethereum PST 0x22ae…d4c7 is minted by CCIP pool 0xBE77…0D3d, whose only configured remote chain is Solana; a CCIP compromise could mint unbacked PST against Fluid positions

Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol moves native USDC by burning on the source chain and minting on the destination, gated by Circle's attestation service — a 2-of-2 signature quorum whose attesters are both Circle-operated and swappable by Circle. Canonical CCTP removes third-party lock-and-mint bridge risk, but the trust assumption reduces to Circle's availability and attestation finality.

	Protocol Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Gauntlet gtUSDa	direct	Transport	CCTP V2	Bridges USDC across Base/Arbitrum/Optimism to Morpho
	Origin OUSD	direct	Transport	CCTP V2	Cross-chain strategies bridge ~42% of TVL to Base and HyperEVM
	Yearn yvUSD	direct	Transport	CCTP V2	Bridges USDC to Arbitrum and Base; Katana uses AggLayer separately
	Flex	indirect	Transport	Collateral is yvUSD	yvUSD has strategy that bridges funds to Base. Protocol doesn't use bridges

Generic cross-chain messaging. Tokens bridge via the OFT / OFT-Adapter standard; security depends on the configured DVN (Decentralized Verifier Network) set and the token's mint/burn authority on each chain. The Route Security column shows the DVN quorum for the specific route named below the badge — how many independent verifiers must attest a message before it executes — where a 1-of-1 is a single point of failure (the configuration behind the April 2026 rsETH incident). LayerZero configuration is directional and can differ by route; a badge must not be read as protocol-wide coverage. Values are read onchain from the named route's receive-side ULN config, and the badge links to that receive-side OApp.

	Protocol Token	Type	Model	DVN	Integration	Details
	Across Protocol	direct	Transport	3-of-3Ethereum→Arbitrum (USDT0 reserve transport)	LayerZero OFT (USDT0 route)	Across's deployed Arbitrum adapter maps Ethereum USDT to the USDT0 OFT messenger for HubPool→SpokePool rebalancing; the assessed V2 LP token is not itself bridged, and other assets use separate transports
	Cap stcUSD	direct	Bridged	3-of-3Ethereum→Katana (mint side)	LayerZero OFT Adapter ("LayerZero vault")	Adapter 0x983a…4137 escrows ~26.1M stcUSD (~38% of the ~68.3M supply). Katana runs a native OFT at the same vanity address 0x8888…8888 Adapter owner: 24h Timelock 0xD823…29ab.
	Centrifuge JAAA	direct	Mints native	4-of-56 chains→Ethereum (native-mint side)	LayerZero V2 (2-of-2 MultiAdapter)	Spoke 0xEC35…25aB holds mint authority on JAAA; MultiAdapter requires both LayerZero and CCIP, while the LayerZero leg requires Deutsche Telekom + Canary and 2-of-3 P2P/Nansen/Nethermind Mint authority: Spoke 0xEC35…25aB, governed by Centrifuge Root — 48h timelock 0x7Ed4…368f.
	InfiniFi	direct	Bridged	4-of-4Ethereum→Katana (siUSD mint side; iUSD verified separately with the same quorum)	LayerZero OFT Adapters (siUSD + iUSD)	siUSD adapter 0x5f21…c3c0 escrows siUSD and iUSD adapter 0xdd1c…3005 escrows iUSD; both mint native OFTs on Katana. Neither adapter holds RECEIPT_TOKEN_MINTER, so they cannot mint native supply Adapter owner: 4-of-8 Safe 0x8060…400c.
	Midas mHYPER	direct	Mints native	4-of-4Katana→Ethereum (native-mint side)	LayerZero OFT Adapter (MidasLzMintBurnOFTAdapter)	Adapter holds M_HYPER_MINT_OPERATOR_ROLE (mint has no onchain backing check) and the burn role Adapter owner: 1-of-3 Safe 0xB608…7E89.
	Paxos USDG	direct	Mints native	3-of-3Solana→Ethereum (inbound mint path)	LayerZero V2 OFT (OFTWrapper)	OFTWrapper is Supply Controller SC3 with 45M USDG mint capacity (~521 USDG/sec refill) — the bridge can mint native USDG. Configured peers: Solana, X Layer, Ink, Arbitrum, and Robinhood Chain (added ~July 2026, now 9.5% of supply) Adapter owner: Paxos Operations MPC wallet 0x3Af3…024B.
	Re (reUSD)	direct	Mints native	2-of-2Arbitrum→Ethereum (inbound)	LayerZero OFT (ReMintBurnAdapter)	ReMintBurnAdapter holds a live cross-chain mint path on reUSD; active on Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, BNB; 2.5M/24h rate limit Adapter owner: 3-of-5 Safe 0x8eec…fBaD.
	Sky USDS	direct	Bridged	2-of-2Avalanche→Ethereum (inbound; Solana route also 2-of-2)	LayerZero V2 OFT Adapter (Solana + Avalanche only)	Minor route: LayerZero handles only Solana + Avalanche (~48.7M locked, <0.7% of mainnet USDS supply) and does not hold wards on USDS. The bulk of USDS/sUSDS bridges via native rollup bridges — see the Native Rollup Bridges row Adapter owner: Sky PauseProxy 0xBE8E…98FB (Chief + 48h GSM).
	Fluid (rsETH)	indirect	Bridged	4-of-4via rsETH OFT Adapter (Arbitrum↔Ethereum)	rsETH market exposure	Inherits rsETH's LayerZero OFT Adapter model rsETH adapter owner: 3-of-6 Safe 0xCbcd…29A1.
	Fluid (sUSDai)	indirect	Mints native	3-of-3Ethereum→Arbitrum (canonical sUSDai mint side)	sUSDai collateral (USD.AI OAdapter)	OAdapter 0xffB2…7f24 burns and mints sUSDai on both chains; its authenticated receive path can mint canonical Arbitrum sUSDai. Fluid held ~96% of the Ethereum OToken supply at the Jul 22 check. The 10M/hour limiter is outbound-only and does not cap _credit on a forged inbound message Adapter owner: 3-of-3 Safe 0x5F0B…841F.
	KernelDAO hgETH	indirect	Bridged	4-of-4rsETH OFT Adapter (Arbitrum↔Ethereum); Kelp docs confirm 4-of-4 on the L2 mint path	Wraps rsETH (Kelp DAO)	rsETH bridges via OFT Adapter 0x85d4…8Ef3, which escrows 46,254 rsETH (~9.6% of supply) — it cannot mint native rsETH rsETH adapter owner: 3-of-6 Safe 0xCbcd…29A1.

Each rollup's own canonical bridge — the OP Stack StandardBridge (Base, Optimism, Unichain), the Arbitrum Nitro gateway, and equivalents. L1 tokens are escrowed and minted 1:1 on the L2, secured by the rollup's proof system and Ethereum rather than an external validator set or attestation service. That makes it the lowest added third-party trust of any bridge class here — no separate verifier network to trust. The main residual risk is upgradeability: the bridge contracts can be upgraded, so a malicious or faulty upgrade by their admin is the primary path by which escrowed funds could be moved or minted.

	Protocol Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Sky USDS	direct	Bridged	OP Stack + Arbitrum Nitro canonical bridges (SkyLink)	Primary USDS/sUSDS cross-chain route: ~$0.45B USDS + ~812M sUSDS escrowed on L1 and minted 1:1 on Base, Optimism, Unichain (OP Stack) and Arbitrum (Nitro). No bridge holds wards on USDS. LayerZero carries only Solana + Avalanche (<0.7% of mainnet USDS supply)