Bridge Dependencies
AggLayer (LxLy)
The AggLayer LxLy unified bridge (PolygonZkEVMBridgeV2) links Ethereum to AggLayer chains such as Katana. Assets are escrowed in the L1 bridge and a wrapped representation is minted on the destination. Katana additionally uses "Vault Bridge" tokens (e.g. vbUSDC) that deposit the escrowed asset into yield vaults, so a bridge exploit or a fault in that vault can strand or impair the remote backing — holders are exposed to both.
PolygonZkEVMBridgeV2 is an upgradeable proxy: its implementation is swappable by a ProxyAdmin (0x0f99…CC4a) owned by a 3-day TimelockController (0xEf14…A4EF), under the Polygon Protocol Council (13 members, 7/13 for standard changes). Because the bridge holds the escrowed L1 funds, a malicious or compromised upgrade could reach them — the timelock is the normal-path warning window, but the Council's emergency route (10/13) can bypass the delay.| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | Yearn yvUSD | direct | Transport | AggLayer LxLy + Vault Bridge USDC (vbUSDC) | Katana yvUSDC Compounder wraps USDC into vbUSDC |
| Flex | indirect | Transport | Collateral is yvUSD | yvUSD has strategy that bridges funds to Katana. Protocol doesn't use bridges |
| Spectra Finance | indirect | Transport | vbUSDC MetaVault on Katana | A live MetaVault on Katana holds Vault Bridge USDC, the MetaVault share itself is not bridged, but its backing sits behind the AggLayer bridge |
Axelar
Axelar is a Cosmos-SDK proof-of-stake chain whose validators observe source chains and sign approvals for the destination-chain AxelarGateway. Security is the validator set itself: AxelarAuthWeighted accepts a message once a stake-weighted quorum of the current operator set has signed it, so a compromise of that quorum — or of the gateway's upgrade path — forges messages. There is no per-integration verifier configuration to inspect the way LayerZero exposes a DVN set, so an Axelar row's real protection comes from whatever quorum the consuming protocol layers on top (e.g. Centrifuge's 2-of-2 MultiAdapter). Axelarscan listed 49 bonded validators out of 151 registered at the August 20, 2026 check.
AxelarGateway 0x4F44…56A5 is an upgradeable proxy — implementation() is 0x99B5…4098 and governance() is the Axelar InterchainGovernance address 0x7Acb…2525, driven by cross-chain proposals from the Axelar chain. mintLimiter() 0xCC94…EC68 can pause token flows. Message authentication is delegated to authModule() 0xE3B8…8AD0 (AxelarAuthWeighted).| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centrifuge JAAA | direct | Mints native | Axelar GMP (2-of-2 MultiAdapter) | Axelar is the second leg on JAAA's four highest-supply remote chains. Mint authority: Spoke 0xEC35…25aB, governed by Centrifuge Root — 48h timelock 0x7Ed4…368f. |
Chainlink CCIP
Chainlink's cross-chain interoperability protocol. Two layers: message verification is Chainlink-operated and not protocol-configurable (a committing DON plus an independent Risk Management Network that can halt a lane), comparable to Circle's CCTP attesters. Token movement runs through a token pool the protocol itself deploys and owns — burn/mint or lock/release — where the per-protocol risk lives: the owner sets per-lane rate limits, supported lanes, and who can change them. So the model column reflects the pool mechanism, and the real protocol knobs are rate limits and pool ownership rather than a verifier quorum.
| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apyx apxUSD | direct | Bridged | Chainlink CCIP (LockReleaseTokenPool; Base + BNB Chain) | TokenAdminRegistry maps apxUSD to pool Pool and remote-token CCIP admin: 3-of-6 Safe 0xf986…3cE2. |
| Bedrock uniBTC | direct | Mints native | Chainlink CCIP (BurnMintTokenPool; 14 lanes) | TokenAdminRegistry maps uniBTC to pool |
| Centrifuge JAAA | direct | Mints native | Chainlink CCIP (2-of-2 MultiAdapter, new chains only) | CCIP is the second leg on Centrifuge's newer chains, one of which carries live supply. Reading Mint authority: Spoke 0xEC35…25aB, governed by Centrifuge Root — 48h timelock 0x7Ed4…368f. |
| Maple (syrupUSDC) | direct | Bridged | Chainlink CCIP (LockReleaseTokenPool) | LockReleaseTokenPool holds ~13% of supply on mainnet, backing bridged syrupUSDC on Base/Arbitrum/Solana Pool owner: Maple governance contract 0x4483…9449. |
| Fluid (PST) | indirect | Mints native | PST collateral (Chainlink CCIP BurnMintTokenPool) | Fluid accepts Huma PST as collateral. Ethereum PST |
Circle CCTP
Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol moves native USDC by burning on the source chain and minting on the destination, gated by Circle's attestation service — a 2-of-2 signature quorum whose attesters are both Circle-operated and swappable by Circle. Canonical CCTP removes third-party lock-and-mint bridge risk, but the trust assumption reduces to Circle's availability and attestation finality.
0xB43a…9F65 and attesterManager 0xc16b…95a.| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gauntlet gtUSDa | direct | Transport | CCTP V2 | Bridges USDC across Base/Arbitrum/Optimism to Morpho |
| Origin OUSD | direct | Transport | CCTP V2 | Cross-chain strategies bridge ~42% of TVL to Base and HyperEVM |
| Yearn yvUSD | direct | Transport | CCTP V2 | Bridges USDC to Arbitrum and Base; Katana uses AggLayer separately |
 | D2 HYPE++ | indirect | Transport | Nested dgnHYPE strategy routes USDC to HyperCore via CCTP | dgnHYPE operational EOA |
| Flex | indirect | Transport | Collateral is yvUSD | yvUSD has strategy that bridges funds to Base. Protocol doesn't use bridges |
Free Tunnel
Third-party bridge framework (TunnelContract behind DelayedERC1967Proxy) in which offchain proposers submit cross-chain mint/burn requests and a threshold of executor signatures authorizes execution. Where the tunnel contract holds a token's MINTER_ROLE, the executor quorum is a native-supply mint path.
| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bedrock uniBTC | direct | Mints native | Free Tunnel (TunnelContract; 3-of-4 executors) | Tunnel proxy |
LayerZero
Generic cross-chain messaging. Tokens bridge via the OFT / OFT-Adapter standard; security depends on the configured DVN (Decentralized Verifier Network) set and the token's mint/burn authority on each chain. The Route Security column shows the DVN quorum for the specific route named below the badge — how many independent verifiers must attest a message before it executes — where a 1-of-1 is a single point of failure (the configuration behind the April 2026 rsETH incident). LayerZero configuration is directional and can differ by route; a badge must not be read as protocol-wide coverage. Values are read onchain from the named route's receive-side ULN config, and the badge links to that receive-side OApp.
EndpointV2 is immutable; each OFT adapter is owned by the protocol (see per-row owners).| Protocol Token | Type | Model | DVN | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Across Protocol | direct | Transport | 3-of-3Ethereum→Arbitrum (USDT0 reserve transport) | LayerZero OFT (USDT0 route) | Across's deployed Arbitrum adapter maps Ethereum USDT to the USDT0 OFT messenger for HubPool→SpokePool rebalancing; the assessed V2 LP token is not itself bridged, and other assets use separate transports |
| Cap stcUSD | direct | Bridged | 3-of-3Ethereum→Katana (mint side) | LayerZero OFT Adapter ("LayerZero vault") | Adapter Adapter owner: 24h Timelock 0xD823…29ab. |
| Centrifuge JAAA | direct | Mints native | 4-of-510 chains→Ethereum (native-mint side) | LayerZero V2 (2-of-2 MultiAdapter) | Spoke Mint authority: Spoke 0xEC35…25aB, governed by Centrifuge Root — 48h timelock 0x7Ed4…368f. |
| f(x) Protocol fxUSD | direct | Bridged | 4-of-6Base→Ethereum (escrow-release side) | LayerZero V2 OFT Adapter (Ethereum ↔ Base) | Ethereum adapter Ethereum adapter owner: 6-of-9 Safe 0x26B2…7BbF. Base OFT owner: 3-of-4 Safe 0x44E4…D6d2. |
| InfiniFi | direct | Bridged | 4-of-4Ethereum→Katana (siUSD mint side; iUSD verified separately with the same quorum) | LayerZero OFT Adapters (siUSD + iUSD) | siUSD adapter Adapter owner: 4-of-8 Safe 0x8060…400c. |
| Midas mHYPER | direct | Mints native | 4-of-4Katana→Ethereum (native-mint side) | LayerZero OFT Adapter (MidasLzMintBurnOFTAdapter) | Adapter holds M_HYPER_MINT_OPERATOR_ROLE (mint has no onchain backing check) and the burn role Adapter owner: 1-of-3 Safe 0xB608…7E89. |
| Paxos USDG | direct | Mints native | 3-of-3Solana→Ethereum (inbound mint path) | LayerZero V2 OFT (OFTWrapper) | OFTWrapper is Supply Controller SC3 with 200M USDG / 24h mint capacity (2,315 USDG/sec refill), raised from 45M in four steps between March and June 2026 — the bridge can mint native USDG to any address ( Adapter owner: Paxos Operations MPC wallet 0x3Af3…024B. |
| Re (reUSD) | direct | Mints native | 2-of-2Arbitrum→Ethereum (inbound) | LayerZero OFT (ReMintBurnAdapter) | ReMintBurnAdapter holds a live cross-chain mint path on reUSD; active on Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, BNB; 2.5M/24h rate limit Adapter owner: 3-of-5 Safe 0x8eec…fBaD. |
| Sky USDS | direct | Bridged | 2-of-2Avalanche→Ethereum (inbound; Solana route also 2-of-2) | LayerZero V2 OFT Adapter (Solana + Avalanche only) | Minor route: LayerZero handles only Solana + Avalanche (~48.7M locked, <0.7% of mainnet USDS supply) and does not hold Adapter owner: Sky PauseProxy 0xBE8E…98FB (Chief + 48h GSM). |
| Fluid (rsETH) | indirect | Bridged | 4-of-4via rsETH OFT Adapter (Arbitrum↔Ethereum) | rsETH market exposure | Inherits rsETH's LayerZero OFT Adapter model rsETH adapter owner: 3-of-6 Safe 0xCbcd…29A1. |
| Fluid (sUSDai) | indirect | Mints native | 3-of-3Ethereum→Arbitrum (canonical sUSDai mint side) | sUSDai collateral (USD.AI OAdapter) | OAdapter Adapter owner: 3-of-3 Safe 0x5F0B…841F. |
| KernelDAO hgETH | indirect | Bridged | 4-of-4rsETH OFT Adapter (Arbitrum↔Ethereum); Kelp docs confirm 4-of-4 on the L2 mint path | Wraps rsETH (Kelp DAO) | rsETH bridges via OFT Adapter rsETH adapter owner: 3-of-6 Safe 0xCbcd…29A1. |
Merlin BTC Bridge (BTCLayer2Bridge)
Merlin Chain's bridge mints M-BTC against BTC deposited on Bitcoin L1 and processes redemptions back to Bitcoin. M-BTC mint/burn is restricted to the configured bridge contract, so bridge administration, relayer keys, and custody/signing are the trust boundary behind M-BTC's peg.
unlockTokenAdmin relayers can trigger mint/unlock.| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bedrock uniBTC | indirect | Mints native | M-BTC reserve exposure (~21.3% of uniBTC reserves) | uniBTC does not bridge through Merlin itself, but ~21.3% of reported uniBTC reserves were M-BTC on August 8, 2026 (Bedrock statistics dashboard), and Bedrock's Merlin reserve wallet |
Native Rollup Bridges
Each rollup's own canonical bridge — the OP Stack StandardBridge (Base, Optimism, Unichain), the Arbitrum Nitro gateway, and equivalents. L1 tokens are escrowed and minted 1:1 on the L2, secured by the rollup's proof system and Ethereum rather than an external validator set or attestation service. That makes it the lowest added third-party trust of any bridge class here — no separate verifier network to trust. The main residual risk is upgradeability: the bridge contracts can be upgraded, so a malicious or faulty upgrade by their admin is the primary path by which escrowed funds could be moved or minted.
| Protocol Token | Type | Model | Integration | Details | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sky USDS | direct | Bridged | OP Stack + Arbitrum Nitro canonical bridges (SkyLink) | Primary USDS/sUSDS cross-chain route: ~$0.45B USDS + ~812M sUSDS escrowed on L1 and minted 1:1 on Base, Optimism, Unichain (OP Stack) and Arbitrum (Nitro). No bridge holds |