Apyx

Contract Addresses

Core Contracts (Ethereum)

Contract	Address	Type
apxUSD (Proxy)	0x98a878B1CD98131b271883b390F68d2c90674665	ERC-20, UUPS Proxy
apxUSD (Implementation, current)	0xdd71fd677fde2ed2579a3c45204f41a11016ccb4	ApxUSD (upgraded)
apyUSD (Proxy)	0x38eeb52f0771140d10c4e9a9a72349a329fe8a6a	ERC-4626 Vault, UUPS Proxy
apyUSD (Implementation, current)	0xfd616567ecc1607f61073951a1e822f7315bb112	ApyUSD. Set May 27, 2026 (block 25188571) via 0x4e5b…696d. Adds burnWithAssets, denyList, feeWallet, redeemForMinAssets, getCCIPAdmin.
AccessManager	0xe167330e2eac88666de253e9607c6d9ae0ca2824	OpenZeppelin AccessManager
MinterV0	0x2c36e1adfaa80ee0324b04cc814f5207bb7ba76e	Mint Strategy (EIP-712)
ApxUSDRateOracle (Proxy)	0xa2ef2e7bf32248083e514a737259f3785ea8d37d	Curve Pool Oracle, UUPS Proxy
ApxUSDRateOracle (Implementation, current)	0x26ea4a9099b4da41b2d0e7e9874a29104d8bb17f	Rate oracle (upgraded)
LinearVestV0	0x0d62b4cc02b4b51ed19ddf41d7a7979cf394c99f	Yield Vesting (~17-day linear)
YieldDistributor	0xdbca79adc13a0fa6f921d5cf5b3fae2b8a739c2a	Distributes yield to vesting
AddressList	0x2c271ddf484ac0386d216eb7eb9ff02d4dc0f6aa	Whitelist/Deny List. Wired into apxUSD, apyUSD, and UnlockToken — see Deny List under Centralization.
UnlockToken	0x93775e2dfa4e716c361a1f53f212c7ae031bf4e6	apyUSD Unlock Token (unlockingDelay() = 1,728,000s = 20 days)
Fee Wallet	0x6F93635F2A1C19b4F7f1BD9BA655F6A073C629Dc	Recipient of the apyUSD unlocking fee (apyUSD.feeWallet()); admin-settable via setFeeWallet.
CommitToken (apxUSD)	0x17122d869d981d184118b301313bcd157c79871e	CT-apxUSD
CommitToken (LP)	0xdfc3cf7e540628a52862907dc1ab935cd5859375	CT-apxUSDUSDC
OrderDelegate	0x5c697433e214b1a6d7a2ddd4cdca1505c98f75f1	Minting Delegate
Mint Pass-Through	0xcca1af4d4afccc113d7682fbec1c5888f9b7f7b8	Apyx-controlled hop contract: asset() returns apxUSD; authority() returns the Apyx AccessManager. Balance is currently 0 apxUSD.

Cross-Chain Contracts

Contract	Address	Type
apxUSD (Base)	0xd993935e13851dd7517af10687ec7e5022127228	Base deployment of apxUSD
apyUSD (Base)	0x2c271ddf484ac0386d216eb7eb9ff02d4dc0f6aa	Base deployment of apyUSD
Base AccessManager	0x8AFDE6a90d2396A64eB97e8E69e7548289f78A1D	AccessManager returned by Base token authority()
apxUSD (BNB Chain)	0x6b3788fd6604bbf03c5378d24e57bb334baad4af	BNB Chain apxUSD representation; ~2.44M supply at the August 1 snapshot; getCCIPAdmin() returns the Guardian Safe
Ethereum CCIP LockReleaseTokenPool	0x0e9cA42Bc60bE25F9A67f52173067Cc0Bb405BB5	Escrows canonical apxUSD and maps CCIP routes to Base and BNB Chain remote tokens

Bridge / interoperability: Apyx uses Chainlink CCIP with a lock/release model on Ethereum. The Ethereum TokenAdminRegistry maps apxUSD to the LockReleaseTokenPool above. Its onchain getSupportedChains() includes Base selector 15971525489660198786, BNB Chain selector 11344663589394136015, and a third selector whose live deployment status remains TODO. getRemoteToken maps the first two selectors to the Base and BNB Chain token addresses listed above. Canonical apxUSD is escrowed on Ethereum; remote tokens are bridged representations. The pool and the BNB token's getCCIPAdmin() are controlled by the Guardian Safe.

Governance & Multisig Contracts

Contract	Address	Configuration
Admin Safe (current)	0xabdd8c8ee69e5f5180eb9352aeffc5ceead65e96	4-of-6 Gnosis Safe, current holder of ADMIN_ROLE (0 exec delay). Granted 2026-03-20.
Guardian/Upgrader Safe (former Admin)	0xf9862efc1704ac05e687f66e5cd8c130e5663ce2	3-of-6 Gnosis Safe. No longer holds ADMIN_ROLE. Now holds: role 24 (UPGRADER, 3-day exec delay), role 21 (PAUSER, 0 delay), role 22 (UNPAUSER, 4-hour delay), role 7 (YIELD_OPERATOR, 0 delay).
Operations Safe	0x37b0779a66edc491df83e59a56d485835323a555	3-of-6 Gnosis Safe. No AccessManager roles.
Third-Party Safe	0x81f5d98ea5acf65640ce8bb68aa8449b7c304c50	2-of-3 Gnosis Safe, holds ~0.65M apxUSD.

Liquidity Contracts

Contract	Address	Type
Curve apxUSD/USDC Pool	0xe1b96555bbeca40e583bbb41a11c68ca4706a414	CurveStableSwapNG
Uniswap V4 Pool Manager	0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90	Uniswap V4 singleton holding ~5.07M apxUSD — the primary remaining Ethereum spot venue. The balance aggregates all pools and includes out-of-range positions, so it is an upper bound on inventory rather than executable depth.

Onchain Backing References

Contract	Address	Type
STRCX (Strategy PP Variable xStock)	0x1aad217b8f78dba5e6693460e8470f8b1a3977f3	Tokenized STRC preferred share (Payward / xStocks line). Total supply 1,662,890; Apyx Operations Safe holds 582,774 (~35%) — partial onchain visibility into the STRC component of apxUSD backing.

On-Chain Verification (Etherscan, August 1, 2026)

All core contracts are verified on Etherscan:

Contract	Etherscan Name	Verified	Proxy
apxUSD	ERC1967Proxy → ApxUSD (impl)	Yes	Yes (UUPS)
apyUSD	ERC1967Proxy → ApyUSD (impl)	Yes	Yes (UUPS)
AccessManager	AccessManager	Yes	No
MinterV0	MinterV0	Yes	No
ApxUSDRateOracle	ERC1967Proxy → ApxUSDRateOracle (impl)	Yes	Yes (UUPS)
LinearVestV0	LinearVestV0	Yes	No

All contracts compiled with Solidity 0.8.30 using OpenZeppelin v5.5.0.

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

Audit History

#	Firm	Date	Scope	Report
1	Quantstamp	Feb 2026	APX USD Stablecoin	Certificate
2	Zellic	Mar 2026	Apyx Stablecoin	Report (PDF)
3	Certora	Mar 2026	apxUSD (formal verification)	Report / PDF

Notes:

• Certora: Published March 3, 2026. 14 total findings: 1 High severity (fixed and confirmed), 4 Medium, 9 Low/Informational. Notable: M-01 flagged the backing model as entirely trust-based with no onchain verification. Repo tag audit/2026-01-19-certora confirms.
• All three audits are now publicly verifiable. The Apyx docs audits page lists all three with direct links.

Reserve Attestations

Period	Report Dates	Opinion Date	Latest Attested Assets	Standard / Opinion	Link
March 2026	March 24 and 31	April 14	$52,988,762	AICPA examination; fairly stated in all material respects	PDF section
April 2026	April 9 and 30	May 18	$133,927,390	AICPA examination; fairly stated in all material respects	PDF section
May 2026	May 5 and 31	June 17	$302,457,888	AICPA examination; fairly stated in all material respects	PDF section
June 2026	June 17 and 30	July 22	$193,307,068	AICPA examination; fairly stated in all material respects	PDF section

Notes:

• All four Wolf & Company PDFs were fetched through Chromium/Playwright on August 3, 2026. Each current GitBook link returned HTTP 200, application/pdf, and extractable report text. The reports are Independent Accountant's Reports conducted under AICPA attestation standards to obtain reasonable assurance; Wolf opines that management's asset assertions are fairly stated in all material respects.
• Scope is narrower than proof of solvency: the opinions cover the reported assets' existence, ownership, custody, and valuation at two dates per month. They do not opine on apxUSD liabilities or collateral coverage.
• The April–June reports name Alpaca as the U.S. brokerage holding offchain STRC/SATA. The June 30 report attests $109,512,763 at Alpaca and $83,794,305 of self-custodied onchain STRCx, totaling $193,307,068. The bank/custodian for cash and cash-equivalent balances is not named.
• Four consecutive monthly reports confirm the publication cadence through June. No July report is currently listed; prior opinions were issued 14–22 days after month-end, so July may still be within the observed publication lag.
• Docs mention a cash/short-term Treasuries buffer, but this review did not find a public breakdown of where those cash-equivalent assets are held, whether cash is bank cash, brokerage sweep cash, money-market exposure, Treasury bills/notes, or another instrument, nor maturity/WAM details for the Treasuries component.
• The protocol's target or minimum overcollateralization requirement is not publicly disclosed; Accountable does publicly report the current ratio (92.24% at this snapshot).

Accountable Data Verification

Provider	Mechanism	Status	Evidence
Accountable	Data Verification Network / Proof-of-Reserves dashboard	Live since April 23, 2026; frequency = live; connectors = 3; verifiability = 4	Accountable Dashboard / DVN registry

Notes:

• Accountable's registry lists Apyx as a por integration for ticker apxUSD, with API URL https://api.accountable.apyx.fi/dashboard and dashboard URL https://accountable.apyx.fi.
• Apyx announced that Accountable provides third-party assurance on reserves with near-real-time visibility into outstanding supply, reserve composition, collateral coverage, and cross-platform distribution.
• Live data retrieved through Chromium/Playwright on August 3, 2026 at 11:26 UTC: the API returned $217,035,429.31 of asset reserves against $235,301,450.21 of circulating supply, a 0.922372 collateral ratio and $0.9131 redemption value. The response separately reported $31,929,748.28 of inventory and $44,842,316.33 of protocol-owned liquidity; including those categories produced $293,807,493.92 of total reserves against $312,073,514.82 total supply. Accountable marked the snapshot verifiability = 100 and included Nitro-enclave attestation material.
• The API identities reconcile: asset reserves equal STRC ($183,285,475.70) plus Cash & Equivalents ($33,743,189.09) plus Other ($6,764.52), while circulating supply equals total supply less inventory and protocol-owned liquidity. The displayed collateral ratio is asset reserves divided by circulating supply, rather than all reported reserve categories divided by total supply.
• The remaining methodological limitation is valuation, not availability. The API does not expose source-level timestamps or explain whether STRC/SATA coverage uses last-traded prices, broker/custodian marks, modeled fair values, bid-side liquidation marks, or another source when Nasdaq is closed.

How Accountable works (as understood from public materials):

• Accountable is a third-party data-verification provider. Its system connects to data sources, ingests reserve/liability data, and publishes a dashboard/API for proof-of-reserves or proof-of-solvency reporting.
• Accountable's public DVN registry assigns Apyx verifiability = 4, connectors = 3, and frequency = live. In Accountable's own verification-level model, level 3 is direct connector-based data sourcing, level 4 adds secure-enclave based verification (hardware-level attestation such as SGX/Nitro), and level 5 is zkTLS. Therefore, the Apyx integration should be treated as a live third-party connector/enclave verification system, not as a fully onchain or fully zkTLS-backed proof.
• For Apyx, the live dashboard compares token liabilities/outstanding supply against offchain reserve assets and shows reserve composition and collateral coverage. Its API supply_split currently itemizes Ethereum only, so route-level Base/BNB reconciliation is still not available there.

Trustworthiness assessment:

• Useful and materially better than self-reporting. The live Accountable dashboard and public JSON API are independently inspectable and introduce a data-verification layer between attestations. This is sufficient to clear the framework's unverifiable-reserves gate.
• Not trustless. Accountable does not make the preferred-share collateral onchain, does not by itself enforce minting limits, and does not remove the need to trust the completeness of connected accounts, custody setup, connector configuration, enclave implementation, and Accountable's own operations.
• Not a substitute for formal attestation/audit. The Wolf & Company attestation remains important because it is an examination-level accounting opinion. Accountable is best treated as continuous monitoring evidence.

On-Chain Complexity

The architecture is moderately complex:

• UUPS Proxy Pattern: apxUSD, apyUSD, and ApxUSDRateOracle all use ERC-1967 UUPS upgradeable proxies
• AccessManager: Centralized role-based access control (OpenZeppelin AccessManager) governs all contracts
• Two-Step Minting: EIP-712 signed orders → AccessManager-scheduled execution with rate limiting
• Yield Distribution: YieldDistributor → LinearVestV0 (~17-day linear vesting) → apyUSD vault
• Cooldown Mechanism: UnlockToken contract enforces withdrawal cooldown for apyUSD

Bug Bounty

No active bug bounty program found. Exhaustive search across Immunefi, Sherlock, Cantina, HackerOne, and Safe Harbor yielded no bug bounty listing. This is a notable gap.

Historical Track Record

• Time in Production: apxUSD proxy deployed February 18, 2026 (block 24481772). In production for ~164 days as of August 1, 2026. Over 5 months.
• GitHub Repository: apyx-labs/evm-contracts — public Foundry repo. Contains all core contract source code, comprehensive test suite (invariant tests, audit-remediation tests), Slither CI. No license specified.
• TVL History: Not tracked by DeFi Llama. Listed on CoinGecko. Based on onchain data (August 1, 2026):
  • Ethereum apxUSD totalSupply: ~312.07M (supply cap 750M)
  • Base supply: ~9.77M apxUSD and ~0.57M apyUSD
  • BNB Chain supply: ~2.44M apxUSD
  • apyUSD vault totalAssets: ~180.91M apxUSD
  • Curve pool: ~$11.9K nominal at par; the Guardian Safe's LP balance is 0
  • Guardian/Upgrader Safe: ~2.54M apxUSD + ~2.38M apyUSD + ~2.0M USDC
  • Operations Safe: ~1 apxUSD, 0 apyUSD, ~0.9 USDC, holds 582,774 STRCX (~35% of all STRCX supply) as onchain backing
  • Third-Party Safe: ~0.65M apxUSD
• Supply History: ~13M at launch → ~67M on March 26 → ~175M on April 19 → ~306.86M on May 7 → ~524.66M peak (late May/June) → ~312.07M on August 1. The ~212M contraction from peak was executed through onchain burn/burnFrom calls and reflects the redemption wave that followed the June depeg. The mint/redeem pipeline is no longer onchain-asymmetric: burns are now observable onchain rather than settled exclusively offchain.
• Incidents: One material incident — the June 2026 depeg (below). No exploit, realized custody loss, or smart-contract failure was identified. The live Accountable snapshot now reports 92.24% asset-reserve coverage of circulating supply, so dollar-par solvency should not be inferred.
• Peg Stability: Broken since early June 2026 and not recovered. apxUSD trades at $0.881 as of August 1 (−11.9%). Note that the Curve pool's get_virtual_price() (1.0049) is not a peg measure — it is a cumulative LP-share accumulator that only rises with fee accrual and cannot fall during a depeg. Peg quality must be read from market price, not virtual price.

June 2026 Depeg

The protocol's first major stress event, documented by Apyx in a post-mortem published June 8, 2026. Prices below are DefiLlama daily marks for 0x98a878B1…4665.

Date	Event	apxUSD
Late May 2026	BTC falls ~30% in a month, ~20% in a week. STRC declines from par to $90.38 — its largest drawdown on record.	~$1.00
~Jun 1–3	apxUSD trades below NAV; deepest wicks occur overnight while Nasdaq is closed.	$0.90
Jun 1–5	Guardian Safe withdraws ~88% of its Curve LP (40,890,164 → <10,000,000 by block 25252968).	~$0.90
Jun 8	Post-mortem published. Partial recovery as redemptions are processed.	~$0.96
Jun 15	Apyx 2.0 announced — redemption value and total collateralization model.	~$0.96
Jun 26–29	Second leg down; daily low $0.749 (−25%).	$0.75
Jul 6	Guardian Safe's remaining Curve LP goes to 0 (block 25474518).	~$0.88
Aug 1	Discount persists; 8+ weeks without recovery to par.	$0.881

Root causes (Apyx's own accounting, in the post-mortem):

1. Collateral shock — STRC, the majority of the backing basket, fell to $90.38 as BTC sold off. Apyx notes STRC is ~80% retail-held, which thinned liquidity into the decline.
2. Overnight/weekend liquidity gap — the deepest dislocations occurred while US equity markets were closed. The protocol could neither sell STRC nor confidently bid apxUSD without knowing where STRC would open. This is the structural TradFi/DeFi mismatch flagged as an inferred stress path in the prior assessment; it materialized as described.
3. Transparency dashboard displayed an incorrect NAV — a bug in the STRCX pricing feed caused the public dashboard to show a higher NAV than the team's internal figures. Users transacted against wrong reserve data during the most critical window. Apyx also notes the Accountable dashboard grouped POL and inventory into "Cash & Equivalents," which led external analysts to misread collateral composition.
4. Operational plumbing — mint/redeem is manual by design (multisig, time delays, daily caps); the coordination required exceeded what the setup could deliver at the pace of the event.
5. POL withdrawal — the Guardian Safe removed the bulk of the only permissionless exit venue during the drawdown (see Protocol-Owned Liquidity).

What held: Apyx states that the protocol remained solvent throughout and that reserves exceeded the market value of circulating supply. The current Accountable API is retrievable and reports a 92.24% asset-reserve ratio, consistent with redemption below par rather than full dollar backing; it does not retroactively prove every reserve mark during the June event. Independently observable outcomes are narrower: the apyUSD/apxUSD redemption rate did not decline; the unlock window remained active; and the apyUSD/apxUSD Morpho market saw no STRC-driven liquidations because its oracle is the redemption rate rather than spot or DEX price. Apyx also reports that redemptions were processed proportionally across the asset basket.

Why it has not recovered: no deep onchain pool remains for arbitrage, direct apxUSD redemption is permissioned and priced at redemption value, and the separate apyUSD exit can take up to 20 days. Apyx 2.0's explicit redemption-value model means the market prices forward STRC drawdown risk into apxUSD rather than treating $1 as a floor. STRC itself traded around $84 (−16% below par) by July 1, 2026.

Ethereum apxUSD Supply Distribution

Snapshot at block ~25,660,831 (August 1, 2026), supply ~312.07M:

Holder	Balance (Aug 1)	% of Supply (Aug 1)
Guardian/Upgrader Safe (0xf986…3ce2)	~2.54M apxUSD	~0.8%
Curve Pool (apxUSD/USDC)	~10,742 apxUSD	<0.01%
Uniswap V4 PoolManager	~5.07M apxUSD	~1.6%
apyUSD Vault (totalAssets)	~180.91M apxUSD	~58.0%
Admin Safe (4-of-6)	0	0%
Operations Safe	~1 apxUSD (holds 582,774 STRCX)	<0.01%
Third-Party Safe	~0.65M apxUSD	~0.2%
Other (Pendle, users, bridge/token-pool accounts, etc.)	TODO — holder-level reconciliation incomplete	TODO

Notes: the apyUSD vault row is totalAssets(), which includes apxUSD held directly by the vault plus vested apxUSD claimable from LinearVestV0 — it is not purely a token balance. The Curve pool was drained by the Guardian Safe in two stages: ~88% of the LP between June 1 and June 5, 2026, and the remainder by July 6 (LP balance 40,890,164 → 0).

Base apxUSD totalSupply is ~9,768,204, Base apyUSD totalSupply is ~568,119, and BNB Chain apxUSD supply is ~2.44M as of August 1; these are not included in the Ethereum holder percentages above. The BNB token and Ethereum LockReleaseTokenPool route are verified onchain, but a full cross-chain liability-versus-escrow reconciliation remains TODO because Accountable's current supply_split itemizes Ethereum only.

Funds Management

Minting & Redemption

Minting apxUSD: Permissioned, no onchain collateral required. Minting creates tokens without any backing asset transfer in the transaction. The ApxUSD.mint() function only checks that the caller has the authorized mint role and that totalSupply does not exceed supplyCap — then calls _mint(to, amount). No transferFrom, no collateral deposit, no onchain proof of backing. The collateral relationship is offchain and is checked after the fact through Accountable's live feed and Wolf's periodic examination reports rather than enforced atomically at mint.

Minting uses EIP-712 structured data signing via MinterV0 with onchain safeguards including per-order limits, rate limits, execution delay, and nonce-based replay protection.

Minting roles (verified onchain August 1, 2026):

• MinterV0 (0x2c36e1adfaa80ee0324b04cc814f5207bb7ba76e): Holds MINT_STRAT_ROLE (role 1) with 60-second execution delay, and a newer role 4 (mint path for mint(address,uint256,uint256)) with 4-hour execution delay.
• Current Admin Safe (0xabdd8c8ee69e5f5180eb9352aeffc5ceead65e96): Holds ADMIN_ROLE with 0 execution delay. Because getRoleGrantDelay(ROLE_MINT_STRAT) and getTargetAdminDelay(apxUSD) are both non-trivial, the admin cannot instantly create a new minter path without running into role-grant or target-admin-delay timelocks (see Governance section).

General users acquire apxUSD through secondary markets (Curve, Uniswap).

Minting apyUSD: Permissionless -- any user can deposit apxUSD into the ERC-4626 vault to receive apyUSD. No KYB/KYC required (certain jurisdictions restricted via frontend).

Redeeming apyUSD → apxUSD: Uses UnlockToken contract with:

1. User requests redemption (exchange rate locks at this point)
2. Cooldown of up to 20 days (UnlockToken.unlockingDelay() = 1,728,000s; no yield accrual during cooldown)
3. User claims assets after cooldown

• apyUSD.unlockingFee() = 1e15 (0.1%), paid to the Fee Wallet and settable by the admin via setUnlockingFee. The post-mortem describes the user-facing schedule as a 3-to-20-day window with a fee declining linearly from 3.5% to 0.1%; only the 0.1% terminal fee is readable onchain, and the declining schedule could not be located in the UnlockToken or apyUSD ABIs — TODO: identify where the early-exit fee is computed.
• Adding assets to existing request resets the cooldown
• Only one pending request at a time
• redeemForMinAssets(uint256,uint256,address) on the current implementation lets a redeemer set a minimum-assets bound, i.e. redemption output is not guaranteed to be a fixed rate at claim time.

Redemption value (Apyx 2.0): Following the June depeg, Apyx announced a redemption-value and total-collateralization model (June 15, 2026). Redemption is priced off protocol-computed redemption value rather than an implicit $1, which means whitelisted redeemers can be paid below par when collateral marks are below par. This is a design change to the exit path and a contributor to why the market prices apxUSD below $1 rather than treating par as a floor. TODO: the onchain enforcement point for redemption value was not identified in this review; the mint/redeem path for apxUSD remains permissioned and largely offchain.

Accessibility

• apxUSD deposits (into Morpho, Curve, etc.): Permissionless
• apxUSD minting/redemption: Permissioned (whitelisted entities only)
• apyUSD deposits: Permissionless
• apyUSD redemptions: Permissionless but subject to the unlock cooldown (up to 20 days) and to the deny list
• Geographic restrictions: US, EU, EEA, and sanctioned jurisdictions restricted

Collateralization

• Backing: Offchain preferred shares from publicly-traded DAT companies (STRC, SATA on Nasdaq), plus a documented cash/short-term Treasuries buffer. Although Apyx describes the design as overcollateralized, Accountable's August 3 snapshot reports 92.24% asset-reserve coverage of circulating supply and a $0.9131 redemption value.
• Collateral quality: Variable-rate perpetual preferred shares. These are equities (not stablecoins or crypto assets). They sit subordinated to debt obligations in the capital structure. The preferred shares have dividend adjustment mechanisms that theoretically stabilize their price near par value.
• Cash & equivalents: Apyx docs state that the backing includes cash and short-term Treasuries as a liquidity/volatility buffer, but do not publicly specify the exact instruments, allocation, maturity profile, account type, bank/broker/custodian, or whether any portion is held as bank cash, brokerage sweep cash, money-market exposure, Treasury bills/notes, or another cash-equivalent instrument. No CEX custody for this buffer is described in the docs reviewed.
• Custody: Docs describe collateral as held in third-party prime brokerage accounts with multi-party MPC key management. The April–June Wolf reports name Alpaca as the U.S. brokerage holding offchain STRC/SATA; the bank/custodian for cash and cash-equivalent balances remains unnamed.
• Onchain verification: Partial. The bulk of backing remains offchain (STRC and SATA preferred shares held in prime brokerage). The Apyx Operations Safe (0x37b0…a555) holds 582,774 STRCX (0x1aad…77f3), the Payward-issued tokenized version of STRC (xStocks line, custodied 1:1 against the underlying preferred shares). This is ~35% of all onchain STRCX supply and represents the only directly verifiable portion of apxUSD's reserves. Marking it is no longer straightforward: at $100 par it covers ~$58M (~19% of the 312.07M supply), but STRC has not traded at par since May — it fell to $90.38 during the June drawdown and was around $84 (−16%) by July 1, which puts the same holding nearer ~$49M (~16%). The remaining ~84% depends on offchain STRC, SATA, and cash buffer attestations.
• Off-chain verification:
  • Four downloadable Wolf & Company examination reports cover March–June 2026. Playwright fetched each current GitBook PDF with HTTP 200 and valid extractable content. Conducted under AICPA attestation standards, the opinions cover asset existence, ownership, custody, and valuation, but not liabilities or overall collateral coverage.
  • Accountable Proof-of-Solvency dashboard launched after the April 19 assessment; Accountable's public API was retrieved through Chromium/Playwright on August 3. It reports $217.04M asset reserves against $235.30M circulating supply (92.24%), with verifiability = 100 and Nitro-enclave attestation material.
  • Underlying shares are publicly-traded and priced transparently on Nasdaq — which also means reserve marks move with a volatile equity, as June demonstrated.

Provability

• apxUSD backing: Offchain. The attestation page publishes four downloadable Wolf & Company examination reports for March–June 2026. The reports were independently fetched and read: they provide reasonable assurance over reported asset existence, ownership, custody, and valuation at two dates per month. They do not test token liabilities or express an opinion on collateral coverage.
• Reserve reporting failed during the stress event. Apyx's own post-mortem records that the public transparency dashboard displayed an inflated NAV throughout the June drawdown, caused by a bug in the STRCX pricing feed, and that the team's internal admin dashboard carried different, more accurate numbers. The Accountable dashboard separately grouped protocol-owned liquidity and inventory into "Cash & Equivalents," which Apyx says led multiple external analysts to misread collateral composition. The proof-of-reserves surface was wrong precisely when holders most needed it — this is the single strongest argument against treating the reporting stack as reliable.
• Accountable data verification: Accountable's DVN registry lists an Apyx/apxUSD Proof-of-Reserves dashboard live since April 23, 2026 (frequency = live, connectors = 3, registry verification level 4). The public API was retrieved through Chromium/Playwright and returned a fresh, internally reconcilable snapshot with verifiability = 100 plus Nitro-enclave attestation material. This is meaningful transparent verification and clears the critical gate. It does not make the reserve assets onchain or eliminate valuation/model risk, particularly given the June NAV incident and the absence of source-level freshness metadata in the response.
• apyUSD exchange rate: Calculated onchain via ERC-4626 standard (convertToAssets()/convertToShares()). The exchange rate is not directly admin-set and does not use the manually-set ApxUSDRateOracle. It is derived from totalAssets() / totalSupply(), where totalAssets() includes apxUSD held directly by the apyUSD vault plus vested apxUSD available from LinearVestV0. Anyone can verify this onchain. Current rate: ~1.405 apxUSD per apyUSD (totalAssets ~180.91M / totalSupply ~128.75M). This rate held through the June drawdown — LinearVestV0 ingests only realized dividends and never references STRC market price, so the ratchet did not reverse. Note that a stable apyUSD/apxUSD rate says nothing about the USD value of apxUSD itself.
• Yield distribution: Semi-programmatic. Authorized operators/admins can initiate the amount of apxUSD yield sent into YieldDistributor/LinearVestV0; there is no onchain oracle that independently verifies the offchain dividend amount before it is distributed. Once apxUSD is deposited into LinearVestV0, vesting is programmatic (~17-day linear), and the apyUSD vault pulls vested yield, increasing totalAssets() and therefore the ERC-4626 exchange rate. This means the PPS formula is onchain-verifiable, but the correctness of the yield amount relative to real offchain dividends remains trust/attestation-based.
• Rate oracle: The ApxUSDRateOracle is manually set by a role-0 caller via setRate(). Currently 1.000000. No onchain price feed, no TWAP, no staleness check. Crucially, getTargetFunctionRole(oracle, setRate) is 0 (ADMIN_ROLE) and getTargetAdminDelay(oracle) is 0 — the current Admin Safe can change the oracle rate instantly with no timelock. Used by the Curve StableSwap-NG pool for pricing.
• Cross-chain supply: apxUSD and apyUSD trade on Base, and apxUSD is also live on BNB Chain. The Ethereum CCIP LockReleaseTokenPool maps both remote token addresses and escrows canonical apxUSD. This adds a bridge/infrastructure dependency: remote liquidity and cross-chain supply accounting depend on CCIP operation, token-pool/admin configuration, and escrow remaining reconciled to remote supply. Accountable's API currently itemizes Ethereum only in supply_split, so full route-by-route reconciliation remains TODO.

Liquidity Risk

Primary Exit Mechanisms

For the Morpho collateral use case, the relevant question is: how can liquidators exit an apxUSD position?

1. Curve StableSwap-NG Pool: apxUSD/USDC pool, drained — ~$11.9K nominal TVL. Non-functional as an exit path.
2. Uniswap V4: ~5.07M apxUSD sits in the PoolManager singleton. This is the largest observed Ethereum spot venue for apxUSD, but the singleton balance is an upper bound on inventory, not executable depth: it aggregates all pools and includes out-of-range concentrated-liquidity positions. Depth at a given slippage is materially lower and was not independently measured in this review.
3. Direct apxUSD Redemption: Available only to whitelisted entities and priced at redemption value rather than par (Apyx 2.0). This permissioned/manual primary-market process is distinct from apyUSD's onchain 20-day UnlockToken cooldown; no fixed apxUSD cooldown was verified. It is not a general exit path.
4. Pendle: PT-apxUSD positions provide some additional secondary market activity.

Liquidity Assessment

• Exit quality is now demonstrated, not modelled. apxUSD has traded 11–25% below par continuously since early June. Holders wanting out have taken that discount for eight weeks; the discount has not arbitraged away because there is no deep pool to arbitrage into and the redemption path is gated and permissioned.
• Curve is gone: ~$29M → ~$11.9K, a 99.96% reduction. The pool 0xe1b9…a414 holds ~10,742 apxUSD and ~1,108 USDC against an LP totalSupply of ~11,701.
• Supply-to-liquidity: ~312M supply against ~5.07M of Uniswap V4 inventory is a ~61× ratio on the most generous reading of depth; the effective ratio is worse.
• Do not read the Curve virtual price as peg health. get_virtual_price() = 1.0049 is a cumulative fee accumulator, monotonically non-decreasing, and would have kept rising through the entire depeg. Use market price.
• Morpho context: effective third-party exit depth for liquidators is critically thin. A liquidator forced to unwind a meaningful apxUSD position onchain today has no venue that can absorb it near par.

Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) Concentration

The concentration risk flagged at the prior assessment materialized, and the timing matters: the Guardian Safe pulled its liquidity as the peg broke, not after it stabilized.

Guardian Safe LP balance on the Curve pool, read at block:

Block	Date	LP balance
25200000	May 29, 2026	40,890,163
25252968	Jun 5, 2026	<10,000,000
25260000	Jun 6, 2026	4,817,606
25440000	Jul 1, 2026	4,817,606
25474518	Jul 6, 2026	0

• ~88% of the position was removed between June 1 and June 5 — the same days apxUSD first traded to $0.90 and the post-mortem's "deepest wicks" occurred. The remaining tranche was withdrawn July 6.
• Apyx's post-mortem gives the rationale: with Nasdaq closed the protocol "could not confidently bid apxUSD" without knowing where STRC would open, and defending a price above realizable NAV would have burned cash. That is a coherent treasury decision — but the effect on users is that the only permissionless exit was withdrawn at the moment of maximum need, and the report scores the effect, not the intent.
• The withdrawal required no protocol permission: Curve remove_liquidity has no admin gate, no timelock, and no AccessManager involvement. A 3-of-6 Safe transaction was sufficient, and the same is true of any future venue Apyx seeds.
• Implication for liquidators: the ~$29M of Curve depth previously cited as a liquidity strength no longer exists and was never third-party depth to begin with. Onchain exit capacity is Uniswap V4 inventory plus whatever Pendle offers. Any future POL should be treated as withdrawable at the issuer's discretion when it is most needed.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

Apyx uses an OpenZeppelin AccessManager v5 (0xe167330e2eac88666de253e9607c6d9ae0ca2824) for centralized role-based access control across all contracts. Governance was restructured on 2026-03-20/21.

Role assignments (verified onchain August 1, 2026):

Role ID	Label (inferred)	Current Holder(s)	Execution Delay
0	ADMIN_ROLE	Admin Safe 4-of-6 (0xabdd8c8ee69e5f5180eb9352aeffc5ceead65e96)	0 seconds
1	MINT_STRAT	MinterV0	60 seconds
4	MINT_STRAT (new path)	MinterV0	14,400 seconds (4 hours)
7	YIELD_OPERATOR	Guardian/Upgrader Safe 3-of-6	0 seconds
21	PAUSER	Guardian/Upgrader Safe 3-of-6	0 seconds
22	UNPAUSER	Guardian/Upgrader Safe 3-of-6	14,400 seconds (4 hours)
24	UPGRADER (apxUSD, apyUSD)	Guardian/Upgrader Safe 3-of-6	259,200 seconds (3 days)
31	(distributed to 6 new-Admin-Safe owners + former Admin Safe)	multiple	0 seconds

Global AccessManager parameters (verified onchain):

• minSetback = 432,000 seconds (5 days): minimum delay before any role-delay reduction takes effect.
• expiration = 604,800 seconds (7 days): scheduled operations expire after 7 days.
• getRoleGrantDelay(ADMIN_ROLE) = 604,800 seconds (7 days).
• getRoleGrantDelay(role 24 UPGRADER) = 604,800 seconds (7 days).
• getTargetAdminDelay (delay for AccessManager-admin operations changing a target's config) = 259,200 seconds (3 days) on apxUSD, apyUSD, MinterV0, YieldDistributor, LinearVestV0, AddressList, UnlockToken; 0 seconds on the Rate Oracle and on the AccessManager itself.

Effective upgrade delays (verified via canCall):

• upgradeToAndCall on apxUSD / apyUSD: must be called by role 24 holder → 3-day execution delay (only the Guardian/Upgrader 3-of-6 Safe can initiate).
• upgradeToAndCall on the Rate Oracle: restricted to ADMIN_ROLE → 0-second delay (current 4-of-6 Admin Safe can upgrade instantly).
• setRate on the Rate Oracle: ADMIN_ROLE → 0-second delay.
• pause on apxUSD / apyUSD: role 21 holder → 0-second delay (Guardian Safe can pause instantly).
• unpause on apxUSD / apyUSD: role 22 holder → 4-hour delay.

Multisig Details:

• Current Admin Safe (4-of-6): Sole holder of ADMIN_ROLE (0-sec delay). Can change roles and config (subject to 3-day target-admin-delay on most targets and 7-day role-grant delay), upgrade the rate oracle instantly, and set the oracle rate instantly. Currently holds 0 apxUSD.
• Guardian/Upgrader Safe (3-of-6, former Admin): Retains roles 7, 21, 22, 24. Sole entity that can actually initiate proxy upgrades on apxUSD/apyUSD (subject to 3-day delay). Can pause instantly. Holds ~2.54M apxUSD, ~2.38M apyUSD, ~2.0M USDC.
• Operations Safe: 3-of-6 Gnosis Safe. No AccessManager roles.
• Deployer EOA: ADMIN_ROLE was properly revoked shortly after initial grant.

Key concerns:

• Admin-Safe-to-Upgrader-Safe separation prevents the 4-of-6 current Admin Safe from unilaterally upgrading the core stablecoin contracts without waiting through timelocks: it would have to either (a) schedule a setTargetFunctionRole change on apxUSD/apyUSD (3-day target-admin-delay), or (b) grant role 24 to a new address (7-day role-grant delay) and then still wait the 3-day execution delay. This is a substantial improvement over the prior zero-delay configuration.
• The Rate Oracle remains a centralization gap. ADMIN_ROLE can upgrade the oracle and call setRate() with zero delay. A compromised 4-of-6 could manipulate the Curve pool's reported exchange rate, though the Curve pool uses the oracle only for pricing and does not hold redeemable backing.
• Admin Safe and Guardian Safe share most signers (the 6 new-Admin-Safe owners plus the former Admin Safe appear together as members of role 31), limiting independence.
• apyUSD implementation history (Upgraded(address) events on the proxy): block 24495109 → 0x1c40…531e; block 24770480 (Mar 30, 2026, tx 0xd2d6…6eee) → 0x2085…cacf; block 25124599 (May 18, 2026, tx 0x064b…d441) → 0x6f4d…3173; block 25188571 (May 27, 2026, tx 0x4e5b…696d) → current 0xfd61…b112. Four upgrades in ~3.5 months, two of them nine days apart, on a contract holding the majority of circulating apxUSD. Every upgrade routed through the Guardian Safe under the 3-day execution delay — the timelock is functioning as designed, but the cadence means the code holding user funds is not stable.

Deny List

The canonical apxUSD token, the current apyUSD implementation, and the redemption queue all read the same deny list:

• apxUSD.denyList() → 0x2c271ddF…F6AA (AddressList); the ERC-20 transfer hook rejects transfers involving denied addresses
• apyUSD.denyList() → 0x2c271ddF…F6AA (AddressList)
• UnlockToken.denyList() → same AddressList
• All three references are admin-settable via setDenyList, and the AddressList is itself governed by the AccessManager

This is a user-level freeze path across the assessed stablecoin, yield vault, and redemption queue. A listed address can be prevented from transferring apxUSD and blocked from the apyUSD exit path while its principal remains in the system. List-content changes are not rate-limited or protected by a user-visible timelock. Combined with apyUSD's up-to-20-day unlock cooldown and permissioned apxUSD redemption, this concentrates meaningful transfer and exit discretion in the admin path. No evidence was found that the deny list has been used punitively; the risk is the capability itself.

Programmability

• apxUSD: Standard ERC-20 with no onchain exchange rate (it's a 1:1 stablecoin). Minting is permissioned and programmatically rate-limited.
• apyUSD exchange rate: Calculated onchain via ERC-4626 (totalAssets / totalSupply). Programmatic, no admin input needed for the rate itself. Admins/operators cannot directly type in an arbitrary apyUSD exchange rate without changing onchain assets/share supply or upgrading contracts.
• Yield distribution: Semi-manual. Authorized operators/admins deposit apxUSD into YieldDistributor → LinearVestV0 → apyUSD vault pulls vested yield. The yield vesting is programmatic (~17-day linear), but the initial deposit amount is admin/operator initiated and is not verified by an onchain dividend oracle.
• Rate oracle: Manually set by ADMIN_ROLE with 0-second execution delay. The setRate() function has no automation, no TWAP, no staleness check, and no onchain price feed.
• Minting: Two-step process (request → execute). Execution delay is 60 seconds via role 1, or 4 hours via role 4. To bypass via role self-grant, the Admin Safe would hit a 7-day role-grant delay or a 3-day target-admin-delay for function-role reconfiguration.

External Dependencies

Dependency	Type	Criticality	Impact of Failure
Offchain preferred shares (STRC, SATA)	Collateral backing	Critical	All value derives from offchain equity holdings. Dividend cuts, issuer default, or custody failure would impair backing
MPC Custody Providers	Asset custody	Critical	Compromise or failure of custody could lead to loss of collateral. Multi-party MPC mitigates single-point risk
STRC (Strategy Inc)	Majority collateral, single issuer	Critical	Concentration in one issuer's preferred stock. STRC's record drawdown to $90.38 in June, and ~$84 by July, transmitted directly into the apxUSD market price
Curve StableSwap-NG	Former primary liquidity venue	Low	Pool drained (~$11.9K TVL). No longer a meaningful exit path
Uniswap V4	Primary remaining Ethereum spot venue	High	Largest observed Ethereum spot inventory for non-whitelisted users (~5.07M apxUSD), but singleton balances overstate executable depth
Gnosis Safe	Multisig infrastructure	High	All governance actions flow through Safe multisigs
Ethereum L1 + CCIP	Canonical settlement and cross-chain transport	High	Canonical apxUSD and escrow are on Ethereum; Base and BNB Chain representations depend on CCIP route and pool configuration

Key dependency risk: The protocol has a critical dependency on offchain assets and custody that cannot be verified onchain, concentrated in a single issuer's preferred stock. The rate oracle is manually set with no automated price feed or fallback mechanism. Ethereum spot liquidity is concentrated in Uniswap V4 after Apyx withdrew its Curve POL; remote supply adds CCIP and cross-chain reconciliation risk.

Operational Risk

• Team Transparency: Public. Six founding contributors are named on the Apyx website, most with extensive crypto and TradFi backgrounds. Five currently hold C-suite roles at DeFi Development Corp. (Nasdaq: DFDV):

  • Joseph Onorati — CEO of DFDV. Former CSO at Kraken (8 years), founded a crypto market-making/HFT firm, former CEO of CaVirtEx (Canada's first Bitcoin exchange). Master's in Economics (monetary theory).
  • Parker White, CFA — COO & CIO of DFDV. Former Director of Engineering at Kraken (6 years). Background in bond trading and portfolio management (~$2B AUM). Active in DeFi since 2021.
  • John Han, CFA — CFO of DFDV. Former CFO of a unicorn L1 blockchain company, VP of Finance at Binance, Head of Strategic Finance at Kraken. Previously at Goldman Sachs equity research.
  • Dan Kang (DK) — CSO of DFDV. Former Head of Strategy at Kraken (3 years). Background as a long-short equity analyst (7 years), formerly at Morgan Stanley and Snap. Mathematics degree from Columbia.
  • Pete Humiston — CMO of DFDV. In crypto full-time since 2018. Former Sales & Trading at Jefferies. Focus on research, content, and marketing.
  • Dawson Reid — Founding contributor. 9 years at Kraken across full engineering stack. 15+ years of software engineering experience, in crypto since 2013.

  The team has strong overlap with DFDV, which is also Apyx's first institutional investor. This dual role (team members = investor executives) is a notable concentration of interest.

• Fundraising: Raised $3M across two rounds at a $300M valuation. "No VCs, by design." First institutional capital from DFDV.

• Documentation: Adequate. Main docs, FAQ, and audits page are functional. Documentation has been updated since launch.

• Legal Structure: Preference Capital (BVI) Ltd. and affiliates, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Explicitly disclaims being a "marketplace facilitator, broker, financial institution or creditor." Liability capped at $100 per user. US, EU, EEA geo-blocked.

• Incident Response: Not formally documented. The Admin Safe can pause the protocol immediately. No Guardian or independent cancellation mechanism.

• Code Availability: Contracts verified on Etherscan and open-sourced on GitHub (apyx-labs/evm-contracts). Full Foundry project with source and tests. No license specified.

• Points Program: "Pips" points program active with various multipliers (5x for holding apxUSD, 10x for committing, up to 16x for Curve LP). This may attract mercenary capital.

Monitoring

apxUSD Token Monitoring

• apxUSD contract: 0x98a878B1CD98131b271883b390F68d2c90674665
  • Monitor totalSupply() for unexpected minting events
  • Alert: If supply increases by >5M in 24 hours (supply ~312M against a 750M cap; unbacked mint is a top-tier risk here, so the threshold stays tight while supply is contracting)
  • Monitor Transfer events for large movements (>$500K)
  • Monitor Paused/Unpaused events
  • Monitor mints (Transfer with from = 0x0) and track the destination. Alert (Critical): if a mint destination is anything other than the documented pass-through 0xcca1af4d, or if the pass-through forwards anywhere other than the Guardian Safe.
  • Monitor burns (Transfer with to = 0x0) — the redemption pipeline now settles onchain, so burn volume is a usable proxy for redemption pressure.

Peg Monitoring

apxUSD is currently depegged; these are the primary user-impact signals.

• Market price (CoinGecko / DefiLlama / GeckoTerminal, not Curve get_virtual_price() — see Liquidity Assessment)
  • Alert (Critical): price below $0.97 (currently breached at $0.881)
  • Alert (Critical): any further leg down >3% in 24 hours
  • Alert: recovery above $0.99 sustained for 7 days — this is the signal that would justify an upward reassessment
• STRC and SATA market prices — collateral marks transmit directly into apxUSD. Track distance from $100 par (STRC ~$84 as of July 1).
• Overnight and weekend windows: the deepest June dislocations occurred while Nasdaq was closed and STRC marks were stale. Monitor apxUSD price, Uniswap V4 inventory, and Accountable price timestamps through weekends and US market holidays until Apyx's stated overnight-liquidity arrangements are verifiable onchain.
• Public NAV vs. onchain reality: the June incident was a pricing-feed bug that inflated the published NAV. Cross-check the Accountable/transparency dashboard NAV against independently computed STRCX marks rather than trusting the published figure.

Mint Pass-Through Monitoring

• Pass-through contract: 0xcca1af4d4afccc113d7682fbec1c5888f9b7f7b8
  • Monitor all apxUSD inflows and outflows
  • Alert: If outflow destination is not the Guardian Safe (would indicate fresh mints routed somewhere else)
  • Alert: If authority() ever returns an address other than the Apyx AccessManager (0xe167…2824)

Rate Oracle Monitoring

• ApxUSDRateOracle: 0xa2ef2e7bf32248083e514a737259f3785ea8d37d
  • Monitor RateUpdated events -- any rate change should be investigated
  • Alert: If rate deviates from 1.0 by >1%
  • Alert: If rate deviates from 1.0 by >5% (critical)
  • Monitor for proxy upgrade events (Upgraded)

Liquidity Venue Monitoring

• Curve Pool: 0xe1b96555bbeca40e583bbb41a11c68ca4706a414
  • Pool holds ~$11.9K. Monitor for LP redeployment or new liquidity inflows — a rebuild here is a positive signal worth catching early.
  • Monitor the pool balance ratio (apxUSD vs USDC sides) for directional pressure. Do not alert on get_virtual_price(); it is a fee accumulator and cannot detect a depeg.
  • Alert: if the Guardian Safe adds LP to this pool or seeds any new venue
• Uniswap V4 PoolManager — the only remaining onchain venue:
  • Monitor 0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90 apxUSD balance (~5.07M tokens)
  • Alert (Critical): if the PoolManager apxUSD balance drops below 2.5M tokens (~50% of current inventory). Note this is a token balance, not a USD figure, and it overstates executable depth.
  • Alert (High): any large apxUSD withdrawal from the PoolManager attributable to the Guardian Safe — this is the same action that removed the Curve exit in June

Governance Monitoring

• Admin Safe (4-of-6, current): 0xabdd8c8ee69e5f5180eb9352aeffc5ceead65e96

  • Monitor for owner/signer changes and threshold modifications
  • Alert: Immediately on any signer replacement or threshold change
  • Monitor all Safe transaction executions (role grants, rate oracle calls)

• Guardian/Upgrader Safe (3-of-6): 0xf9862efc1704ac05e687f66e5cd8c130e5663ce2

  • Monitor Safe transactions — this is the sole initiator of apxUSD/apyUSD proxy upgrades (3-day delayed)
  • Alert: On any scheduled upgrade operation

• AccessManager: 0xe167330e2eac88666de253e9607c6d9ae0ca2824

  • Monitor RoleGranted, RoleRevoked, TargetFunctionRoleUpdated, TargetAdminDelayUpdated, RoleGrantDelayChanged events
  • Monitor OperationScheduled / OperationExecuted / OperationCanceled events for pending admin ops during their delay window
  • Alert: On any role change or delay-parameter change

Supply & Holder Monitoring

• Monitor Guardian/Upgrader Safe (0xf9862efc1704ac05e687f66e5cd8c130e5663ce2) balance and movements (apxUSD, apyUSD, USDC, and LP tokens of any venue)
• Monitor Operations Safe (0x37B0779A66edc491df83e59a56D485835323a555) STRCX balance — the only directly-onchain-verifiable portion of apxUSD backing (582,774 STRCX, ~$49–58M depending on STRC's distance from par)
  • Alert (Critical): Any STRCX transfer out of the Operations Safe, especially to non-Apyx counterparties (would represent a reduction in onchain reserves)
  • Alert (High): STRCX balance drops by >5% in 24 hours
• Monitor Third-Party Safe (0x81f5d98ea5acf65640ce8bb68aa8449b7c304c50) balance
• Monitor MinterV0 for mint execution events
• Monitor the AddressList (0x2c271ddf484ac0386d216eb7eb9ff02d4dc0f6aa) for deny-list additions — a listed address can be blocked from transferring apxUSD and from the apyUSD exit path
• Alert: If apxUSD supplyCap changes from current 750M

Accountable Proof-of-Reserves Monitoring

• Dashboard: https://accountable.apyx.fi/
• Public JSON API: https://api.accountable.apyx.fi/dashboard. Fetch this endpoint directly or through a browser context; the frontend host's /dashboard route is not the JSON endpoint.
• Registry entry: https://dvn.accountable.capital/v1/stats should continue to list name = apyx, ticker = apxUSD, frequency = live, connectors = 3, and verifiability = 4.
• Alert: If the Accountable dashboard/API becomes unavailable, stale, degraded, or removed from the DVN registry.
• Alert: If connector count or verifiability level decreases.
• Ratio calculation: Recompute asset coverage from (STRC + Cash & Equivalents + Other) / (total_supply - inventory - pol) rather than trusting the rounded collateralization field. August 3 baseline: 217,035,429.31 / 235,301,450.21 = 92.2372%.
• Alert (Critical): Coverage below 100% on two consecutive newer reports; Alert (High) below 105% or on a material shift toward less liquid/non-public assets. Re-polling the same ts must not confirm a critical condition.

Chainlink CCIP / Base / BNB Chain Monitoring

• Base apxUSD: 0xd993935e13851dd7517af10687ec7e5022127228
• Base apyUSD: 0x2c271ddf484ac0386d216eb7eb9ff02d4dc0f6aa
• BNB Chain apxUSD: 0x6b3788fd6604bbf03c5378d24e57bb334baad4af
• Ethereum LockReleaseTokenPool: 0x0e9cA42Bc60bE25F9A67f52173067Cc0Bb405BB5
• Monitor Chainlink CCIP status for Ethereum/Base and Ethereum/BNB routes, remote token supply, token-pool configuration, remote-token mappings, and escrow-versus-remote-supply reconciliation.
• Alert: If either route is paused, rate-limited, reconfigured, or if Base/BNB supply changes without a matching lock/release accounting path.

Monitoring Frequency

Category	Frequency	Priority
apxUSD market price / peg	Real-time	Critical
Rate oracle changes	Real-time	Critical
Proxy upgrade events	Real-time	Critical
Uniswap V4 PoolManager apxUSD inventory	Real-time	Critical
Guardian Safe LP token balance (POL withdrawal or redeployment)	Real-time	Critical
Operations Safe STRCX balance (onchain reserves)	Real-time	Critical
Mint pass-through 0xcca1af4d outflow destination	Real-time	Critical
Accountable PoR dashboard freshness / registry status	Real-time	Critical
Chainlink CCIP / Base + BNB supply reconciliation	Real-time	Critical
AccessManager role changes	Real-time	Critical
Admin Safe transactions	Real-time	Critical
Guardian Safe transactions (Safe-level)	Real-time	Critical
STRC / SATA distance from par	Daily (market hours)	High
Deny-list additions (AddressList)	Real-time	High
Curve pool balance ratio	Every 6 hours	High
apxUSD supply changes	Every 6 hours	High
apxUSD supplyCap increases	Real-time	High
Large holder movements	Daily	Medium

Reassessment Triggers

• Peg-based: Reassess upward if apxUSD sustains above $0.99 for 30 days without Apyx-seeded liquidity being the venue of record. Reassess downward on any new leg below $0.75, or if the discount widens past 15% for a sustained period.
• Attestation cadence: Reassess when the July 2026 Wolf examination report is published. Also reassess if reports stop appearing, links break, the engagement standard or scope changes, or an opinion begins reconciling liabilities and collateral coverage in addition to assets.
• Redemption mechanics: Reassess if the Apyx 2.0 redemption-value calculation is enforced onchain in an identifiable contract, if the deny list is used against a non-sanctions counterparty, if setUnlockingFee or unlockingDelay change, or if apxUSD redemption is opened beyond the whitelist. The first three would support raising Programmability from 3.5 to 4.0; the last would be a material improvement to Liquidity.
• Accountable verification: Reassess if the dashboard/API becomes unavailable or stale, the collateral ratio crosses a material threshold, Accountable removes or downgrades the Apyx registry entry, connector count decreases, or verifiability level decreases.
• Cross-chain / CCIP: Reassess if Chainlink CCIP Ethereum/Base or Ethereum/BNB transfers are paused or impaired, token-pool/admin configuration changes materially, remote apxUSD/apyUSD supply diverges from Ethereum escrow accounting, or Apyx migrates to a different bridge provider.
• Governance-based: Reassess on any ownership/threshold change to either multisig, any change to targetAdminDelay or roleGrantDelay on AccessManager, any rate-oracle change (upgrade or setRate), or any further apxUSD/apyUSD implementation upgrades.
• Time-based: Reassess in 1 month (early September 2026).
• Supply/TVL-based: Ethereum supply is ~312.07M. Reassess if it exceeds 500M again (toward the 750M cap), if the supply cap changes, if Base or BNB Chain apxUSD supply grows materially without clear CCIP escrow reconciliation, or if the Uniswap V4 PoolManager apxUSD balance drops below 2.5M tokens.
• Liquidity-based: Reassess if a durable third-party venue appears (the condition that would most improve the Liquidity score), if Curve TVL recovers above $1M, if Apyx launches a new primary pool, or if Uniswap V4 apxUSD inventory falls materially.
• POL movement-based: Reassess if the Guardian/Upgrader Safe deploys LP into any new or existing venue — and treat any such deployment as withdrawable, per June.
• Collateral-based: Reassess if STRC or SATA moves more than 10% further from par, if issuer dividend policy changes, or if basket composition shifts materially between issuers.
• Market-stress based: Reassess if BTC falls >10% in 1 hour or >20% in 24 hours and STRC/SATA prices, Accountable collateral coverage, or apxUSD peg quality deteriorate. Reassess urgently if this happens over a weekend/holiday while STRC/SATA marks are stale and apxUSD sells off before Nasdaq trading reopens — this is the exact sequence that produced the June depeg.
• Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, unplanned oracle change, or any further NAV/reserve-reporting error.
• Bug bounty: Reassess if a bug bounty program is launched.