Origin OUSD
Score Breakdown
| Category | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Audits & Historical | 20% | 1.50 |
| Centralization & Control | 30% | 2.17 |
| Funds Management | 30% | 2.25 |
| Liquidity Risk | 15% | 3.00 |
| Operational Risk | 5% | 1.00 |
| Final Score | 2.12 / 5.0 | |
Overview
Origin Dollar (OUSD) is a rebasing stablecoin backed 100% by USDC. Holders' wallet balances automatically increase as yield accrues, without staking, locking, or manual compounding. Smart contracts must opt in to receive rebased yield; those that don't forfeit rewards to standard holders, amplifying returns for participants. An ERC-4626 wrapper (wOUSD) is available for DeFi composability, appreciating in value instead of rebasing.
OUSD generates yield through three strategies:
- Morpho Lending on Ethereum (~$4.15M, ~65.9% of TVL): deposits USDC into a Morpho Vault V2 that routes into a MetaMorpho vault and on into Morpho Blue markets
- Curve AMO (~$1.08M, ~17.1% of TVL): Algorithmic Market Operations providing liquidity in the Curve OUSD/USDC pool, earning trading fees and CRV incentives
- Cross-Chain Strategy, Base (~$1.07M, ~17.0% of TVL): bridges USDC via Circle CCTP to Base, where the remote leg deposits into a local Morpho Vault V2 stack
A fourth strategy, the HyperEVM cross-chain leg, is still approved on the vault but holds only ~$28. Its funds were withdrawn between September 28 and October 1, 2026 (master-strategy WithdrawRequested transactions 0x8aa9c4d3b5e9bb3bd96ad579fa4f19cec7e5d95802ea9cfc022b34e2c1ddc5a8, 0xcd3d995a1527ee0ff47e80cd222adef69c8247826864560a1269c643ca750806, 0x07551c923226fb1a1087a52daac9719f515038ac4ebd47424dce2452efa11a2d).
Every strategy except the Curve AMO ends in Morpho lending markets, so ~82.9% of TVL is USDC supplied to Morpho Blue on Ethereum and Base. ~74.6% of TVL is lent against Origin's own OETH and superOETHb.
Collateral was simplified from multi-stablecoin (USDT, DAI, USDC) to USDC-only via governance proposal in November 2025.
- Launch Date: September 18, 2020 (relaunched January 5, 2021 after November 2020 hack)
- Performance Fee: 20% (2,000 bps), minted to the
trusteeAddress, now the FeeSplitter contract0xbbE561181D831e2a0fAd54C2c27F159a20B60464 - Total Value: ~$6.30M (vault
totalValue()= 6,298,052.94 at block 26372721) - OUSD Supply: ~6,289,354 OUSD, so the backing ratio
totalValue() / totalSupply()is 100.14%
Links:
Risk Summary
Key Strengths
- Onchain xOGN governance with a ~5-day total cycle, a self-administered 48h Timelock, a cancel-only GOV multisig, and no admin backdoor on mainnet; this is the same governance as the audited Origin ARM
- 9 OUSD-specific audits by top firms (OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits, Sigma Prime, Solidified, Certora formal verification) + $1M Immunefi bounty; the February 2026 Sigma Prime review covered both the current vault implementation and the cross-chain CCTP design
- ~5.8 years clean track record since the January 2021 relaunch, with lessons learned from the 2020 hack
- Standard minting always requires a USDC collateral deposit, so it is permissionless and fully backed; backing ratio is 100.14%
- AMO minting constrained by the 99.8% solvency state check, the pool-balance-improvement modifier, and a governance-controlled whitelist that still contains only the Curve AMO
- Rebase is rate-limited by construction: supply only ratchets up, never above
totalValue(), capped at ≈7.87% APR and 2% per rebase - All six Morpho vaults are now held by Yearn multisigs with 3-day timelocks on market and adapter changes (the V2 fee setters remain untimelocked but rate-capped and gate-restricted), and Origin's Strategist Safe can veto pending curator actions on each of them as guardian or sentinel; the HyperEVM EOA configuration flagged in August 2026 is gone
- The HyperEVM leg and its RedStone-priced markets were wound down, leaving only two chains in the dependency set
Key Risks
- ~75% of TVL is credit exposure to Origin's own LSTs. USDC is lent against OETH (Ethereum, ~63% of TVL) and superOETHb (Base, ~12%) in Morpho markets whose oracles hard-assume a 1:1 ETH peg. A depeg produces bad debt without first producing liquidations, and one EOA borrower holds 72.5% of the Ethereum market's debt at a ~1.48 health factor.
- Morpho concentration and depth. ~82.9% of TVL routes through Morpho Blue. The Ethereum OETH market alone holds ~63% of TVL at 87.9% utilization, where OUSD is 39% of supply and only ~$1.22M is withdrawable on demand.
- Remote-leg governance bypasses the DAO. An Origin 5-of-8 Safe can upgrade either remote strategy through a 48h Timelock without an xOGN vote, and no independent party can cancel. An upgraded remote could keep that leg's funds (~$1.07M on Base) and feed an uncapped forged balance into mainnet vault accounting, inflating
totalValue(), enabling rate-capped unbacked rebases, and blinding the AMO solvency check, however little that leg holds. Separately, the Base 2-of-3 Morpho curator can set a 5%/yr management fee with no delay, capped at ≈$146/day and payable only to gate-whitelisted addresses. - AMO
mintForStrategy()can mint OUSD without direct backing, bounded by the strategy-level solvency check; the historical vault-level cap is deprecated - Strategist (2-of-8 multisig) has broad untimelocked operational power: AMO operations, strategy allocation, vault parameters, pause controls, remote-strategy deposits/withdrawals, and yield delegation (
delegateYield/undelegateYieldcan redirect any account's rebase yield) - Single collateral dependency on USDC (Circle), a centralized stablecoin with freeze capability
- Thin and non-independent exit depth: the Curve pool holds ~$479K of USDC and is 99.9% AMO-owned; vault idle only covers the queue reserve; only ~$1.90M (~30% of TVL) is reachable without waiting on borrowers or a bridge; redemptions flow through an async queue with no onchain upper bound on claim time
- TVL ~$6.30M, ~98% below the $298M peak, which is small enough that a single large redeemer dominates the exit path
Critical Risks
- None identified. All critical gates pass. OUSD is governed by an onchain DAO plus a 48h timelock, its contracts are source-verified, and reserves are fully readable onchain. No EOA or fewer-than-three-signer Safe holds an uncapped path to material loss. The one untimelocked path held by fewer than three signers, the Base curator's management fee, is rate-capped at 5%/yr and payable only to whitelisted addresses.
- Historical $7.7M hack (November 2020) was on a different codebase; the protocol was completely relaunched with audited contracts.
Full Report
Contract Addresses
Ethereum Mainnet
| Contract | Address | Role / Key facts |
|---|---|---|
| OUSD Token (Proxy) | 0x2A8e1E676Ec238d8A992307B495b45B3fEAa5e86 |
Rebasing ERC-20; governor() = Timelock |
| OUSD Token Implementation | 0xA7B7c59a1705e4a624ea8a4ad8a06f9de22dcc33 |
EIP-1967 implementation slot |
| wOUSD (ERC-4626) | 0xD2af830E8CBdFed6CC11Bab697bB25496ed6FA62 |
Non-rebasing wrapper; holds ~1.81M OUSD (~28.8% of supply) |
| OUSD Vault (Proxy) | 0xE75D77B1865Ae93c7eaa3040B038D7aA7BC02F70 |
Collateral vault; governor() = Timelock |
| OUSD Vault Implementation | 0x82948060c4b72684bededec342350ab344975145 |
OUSDVault; EIP-1967 admin slot is zero (Governable pattern) |
| Curve USDC AMO Strategy | 0x26a02ec47ACC2A3442b757F45E0A82B8e993Ce11 |
Only mint-whitelisted strategy; SOLVENCY_THRESHOLD = 99.8%, maxSlippage = 0.2% (governor-only setter) |
| Morpho V2 Strategy | 0x3643cafA6eF3dd7Fcc2ADaD1cabf708075AFFf6e |
defaultStrategy; receives auto-allocated deposits |
| Cross-Chain Master Strategy (Base) | 0xB1d624fc40824683e2bFBEfd19eB208DbBE00866 |
CrossChainMasterStrategy; reports a cached remoteStrategyBalance |
| Cross-Chain Master Strategy (HyperEVM) | 0xE0228DB13F8C4Eb00fD1e08e076b09eF5cD0EA1e |
Still approved on the vault; balance ~$28 after the September 28 to October 1, 2026 withdrawals |
| OUSD Vault V2 (Morpho Vault V2) | 0xFB154c729A16802c4ad1E8f7FF539a8b9f49c960 |
OUSD-V2; owner and curator are Yearn Security (4/7); 0% fees; Origin Strategist Safe is a sentinel; addAdapter / cap increases on a 3-day timelock; fee setters untimelocked; setAdapterRegistry abdicated; receive-shares gate 0x6704aB7aF6787930c60DFa422104E899E823e657 owned by the mainnet Timelock |
| Morpho Vault V1 Adapter | 0xD8F093dCE8504F10Ac798A978eF9E0C230B2f5fF |
Sole adapter of OUSD-V2; forwards 100% into OUSD-V1 |
| OUSD Vault V1 (MetaMorpho) | 0x5B8b9FA8e4145eE06025F642cAdB1B47e5F39F04 |
OUSD-V1; owner Yearn Security (4/7), curator 0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51 (2/3), guardian = Origin Strategist Safe (2/8) since October 7, 2026, 3-day timelock, 5% fee |
| Morpho Blue | 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb |
Immutable lending primitive underneath both vault layers |
| Curve OUSD/USDC Pool | 0x6d18E1a7faeB1F0467A77C0d293872ab685426dc |
StableSwapNG; ~$1.08M TVL; 99.9% of its LP is the AMO (staked in the gauge) |
| Curve Gauge | 0x1eF8B6Ea6434e722C916314caF8Bf16C81cAF2f9 |
AMO stakes LP here for CRV |
| CoW Harvester | 0xD400341aEfED0BC75176714cFdE82e8BDAA2D3b8 |
Sells CRV / MORPHO into USDC |
| Timelock Controller | 0x35918cDE7233F2dD33fA41ae3Cb6aE0e42E0e69F |
getMinDelay() = 172,800s (48h); self-administered |
| Origin DeFi Governance | 0x1D3fBD4d129Ddd2372EA85c5Fa00b2682081c9EC |
PROPOSER + EXECUTOR + CANCELLER on the Timelock |
| GOV Multisig (5/8, cancel-only) | 0xbe2AB3d3d8F6a32b96414ebbd865dBD276d3d899 |
CANCELLER on the Timelock; governor() of the FeeSplitter |
| Strategist / Guardian (2/8) | 0x4FF1b9D9ba8558F5EAfCec096318eA0d8b541971 |
strategistAddr() on the vault and both remote strategies; guardian / sentinel on all six OUSD Morpho vaults |
| FeeSplitter (trustee) | 0xbbE561181D831e2a0fAd54C2c27F159a20B60464 |
Non-upgradeable FeeSplitter; became trusteeAddress in Timelock tx 0x715cec2789d71459af239f6d2f242836e46fdaf4c468bb89b319bf635c395120; operationsBps = 0, so 100% of fees go to the harvester 0x637C509383Ec7Da55C19a3Dbf3227C1Bb8A89151 (HarvestingEIP1271) to buy OGN |
| Operator (EOA) | 0x739212d5bAfE6AAC8Be49a60B7d003bD41DBf38b |
operatorAddr() on the vault and operator() on both cross-chain strategy pairs; can call rebase(), relay CCTP messages, and push cross-chain balance updates |
| xOGN Governance Token | 0x63898b3b6Ef3d39332082178656E9862bee45C57 |
Staked OGN voting power |
| USDC (Collateral) | 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 |
Sole vault asset (getAllAssets()) |
| OETH/USDC Market Oracle | 0xE8aDfF9117151fb5ad7313873780b87cC56EEDB0 |
BASE_FEED_1 = Chainlink ETH/USD, QUOTE_FEED_1 = Chainlink USDC/USD, no vault or second feed |
| Chainlink ETH/USD | 0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419 |
Base feed of the OETH/USDC Morpho market oracle |
| Chainlink USDC/USD | 0x8fFfFfd4AfB6115b954Bd326cbe7B4BA576818f6 |
Quote feed of the same market oracle |
| Legacy Oracle Router | 0x36CFB852d3b84afB3909BCf4ea0dbe8C82eE1C3c |
No longer wired in; the vault's price provider slot is _deprecated_priceProvider |
Base
| Contract | Address | Role / Key facts |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-Chain Remote Strategy | 0xB1d624fc40824683e2bFBEfd19eB208DbBE00866 |
Same address as the mainnet master; implementation 0xaa8af8db4b6a827b51786334d26349eb03569731 (CrossChainRemoteStrategy); governor() = Base Timelock |
| Base Timelock | 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f |
getMinDelay() = 172,800s (48h); PROPOSER + EXECUTOR + CANCELLER = Origin Base Safe; EXECUTOR also held by the Strategist Safe; TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE held only by itself (the deployer's admin role was renounced at block 19592753). Full role history checked: an earlier executor Safe 0x28bce2eE5775B652D92bB7c2891A89F036619703 was replaced by the Strategist Safe at block 24827166 |
| Origin Base / HyperEVM Safe (5/8) | 0x92A19381444A001d62cE67BaFF066fA1111d7202 |
Same eight signers as the mainnet GOV multisig; proposer on both remote-chain Timelocks |
| OUSD Vault V2 (Morpho Vault V2) | 0x2Ba14b2e1E7D2189D3550b708DFCA01f899f33c1 |
OUSDb-V2; owner 0xFEaE2F855250c36A77b8C68dB07C4dD9711fE36F (4/7, six of seven signers shared with Yearn Security), curator 0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51 (2/3); Origin Strategist Safe is a sentinel; addAdapter / cap increases on a ~3-day timelock; management / performance fee setters untimelocked (fee shares limited to the gate whitelist) |
| Morpho Vault V1 Adapter | 0xFE4ccb1f0d9634F3191cA45B7f3413c4ca85086E |
Sole adapter; forwards 100% into OUSDb-V1 |
| OUSD Vault V1 (MetaMorpho) | 0x581Cc9a73Ec7431723A4a80699B8f801205841F1 |
OUSDb-V1; owner and curator as above, guardian = Origin Strategist Safe 0x4FF1b9D9ba8558F5EAfCec096318eA0d8b541971 (2/8), 3-day timelock, 5% fee |
| USDC (Base) | 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 |
CCTP destination asset |
HyperEVM
| Contract | Address | Role / Key facts |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-Chain Remote Strategy | 0xE0228DB13F8C4Eb00fD1e08e076b09eF5cD0EA1e |
Same address as the mainnet master; checkBalance() ≈ 28 USDC; governor() = HyperEVM Timelock |
| HyperEVM Timelock | 0x77121911A387c9e4Eae46345E0f831A6da8a1364 |
getMinDelay() = 172,800s (48h), set in tx 0xee0a923181435246d98c6719935135655d2ff64c2b1a44be0c4f5e852138f3d0 on November 17, 2026; PROPOSER + EXECUTOR + CANCELLER = Origin 5/8 Safe 0x92A19381444A001d62cE67BaFF066fA1111d7202; EXECUTOR also held by the Strategist Safe; CANCELLER also held by deployer EOA 0x58890A9cB27586E83Cb51d2d26bbE18a1a647245 |
| OUSD Vault V2 (Morpho Vault V2) | 0xE90959cbE7E56b5eBFF9AD12de611A4976F2d2B1 |
OUSDh-V2; owner 0x518C21DC88D9780c0A1Be566433c571461A70149 (4/7, same signer set as Yearn Security), curator 0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51 (2/3); Origin Strategist Safe is a sentinel; setReceiveAssetsGate and setAdapterRegistry abdicated |
| Morpho Vault V1 Adapter | 0xF912d9489DEc1593D888eb680a4074f84c44413c |
Sole adapter; forwards 100% into OUSDh-V1 |
| OUSD Vault V1 (MetaMorpho v1.1) | 0x0fb7e41A0A85Eb0BcA55172b73942cc6685e2B2E |
OUSDh-V1; owner as above, curator 2/3, guardian = Origin Strategist Safe, timelock() = 3 days; ~28 USDC of assets |
| Morpho Blue (HyperEVM) | 0x68e37dE8d93d3496ae143F2E900490f6280C57cD |
Lending primitive |
| USDC (HyperEVM) | 0xb88339CB7199b77E23DB6E890353E22632Ba630f |
CCTP destination asset |
Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures
OUSD has been audited extensively across its lifecycle. Key OUSD-specific audits:
| # | Date | Firm | Scope | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dec 2020 | Trail of Bits | OUSD (pre-relaunch) | Report |
| 2 | Dec 2020 | Solidified | OUSD (pre-relaunch) | Report |
| 3 | Oct 2021 | OpenZeppelin | Origin Dollar | Report |
| 4 | Jun 2022 | OpenZeppelin | Origin Dollar Governance | Report |
| 5 | Oct 2022 | OpenZeppelin | Origin Dollar Convex | Report |
| 6 | Apr 2023 | OpenZeppelin | OUSD Dripper & Uniswap Strategy | Report |
| 7 | Dec 2024 | Certora | Formal Verification (OUSD) | Report |
| 8 | Dec 2024 | OpenZeppelin | Origin OUSD | Report |
| 9 | Feb 2026 | Sigma Prime | OUSD Upgrade Security Assessment v2 | Report |
The February 2026 Sigma Prime review is the one that matters for the current architecture. It covered both the vault upgrade (rebase mechanism, strategy management, yield distribution) and the cross-chain CCTP strategies. Its findings dealt with CCTP fee handling, remote-balance timestamp tracking, and finality-threshold validation. The newest audit in the security repository (yAudit, September 2026) covers the Origin WETH ARM, not OUSD.
Origin Protocol maintains 30+ audit reports across all products in their security repository. They have a continuous auditing agreement with OpenZeppelin to review 100% of smart contract changes.
The non-upgradeable FeeSplitter that became the trustee in October 2026 only routes performance fees and never holds user deposits. It has no external audit in the security repository. It shipped through origin-dollar PR #2988 with internal Origin review and unit and fuzz tests, and was deployed in PR #3008.
Smart Contract Complexity: High. The system uses an upgradeable proxy pattern (EIP-1967), a rebasing token with non-standard ERC-20 behavior, AMO minting, and four approved strategies, including two cross-chain legs driven by CCTP messaging. Each Morpho leg nests three vault layers deep (strategy → Morpho Vault V2 → adapter → MetaMorpho → Morpho Blue markets).
Bug Bounty
- Platform: Immunefi, live since November 22, 2021; program last updated November 7, 2026
- Maximum Payout: $1,000,000 for a critical smart-contract report, capped at 10% of directly affected funds, with a $50,000 minimum for critical findings with a financial impact. Payouts are made directly by Origin.
- Scope: OUSD Token, wOUSD, OUSD Vault, the Curve AMO strategy, and the cross-chain master and remote strategies are listed (70 assets in scope)
- Track record: 40 paid reports totalling $139.2K
- Safe Harbor: Offered through Immunefi's Safe Harbor page under the Security Alliance (SEAL) Safe Harbor Agreement. Recovered funds go to the program vault
0x82e0cE4255597cbA08273E0305de40C318F5117E(a 1/1 Safe) within six hours. The Safe Harbor reward is still listed as "TBD". KYC not required for bug-bounty payouts. - Link: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/originprotocol/information/
Historical Track Record
- Launched: September 18, 2020 (~6.1 years in production)
- Relaunched: January 5, 2021 (after November 2020 hack, with fresh audits)
- November 17, 2020: OUSD Flash Loan Reentrancy Attack ($7.7M loss):
- Attack: Exploited missing input validation in
mintMultiple()and lack of reentrancy protection. Attacker used a malicious ERC-20 contract to re-enter the mint function, inflating OUSD supply without depositing backing collateral. - Impact: 11,809 ETH + 2,249,821 DAI stolen (~$7.7M), including $1M+ from Origin founders/employees.
- Resolution: Deposits immediately disabled. $1M bounty offered for fund recovery. All existing OUSD balances reset to zero upon relaunch.
- Compensation: Users <=1,000 OUSD received 100% in newly minted OUSD. Users >1,000 OUSD received 25% OUSD + 75% in OGN tokens (1-year lock, 25% interest). Founders received no compensation.
- Source: PeckShield Root Cause Analysis, rekt.news
- Attack: Exploited missing input validation in
- Post-relaunch incidents: None in ~5.8 years since relaunch
- TVL history: Peak $298.2M (January 1, 2022), all-time low $4.90M (November 12, 2024). Current TVL is ~$6.30M onchain and $5.70M as tracked by DeFiLlama. Over the last 90 days DeFiLlama TVL ranged from $5.47M (October 4, 2026) to $6.33M (October 22, 2026), with no single-day cliff. It is roughly flat against the $5.71M of August 31, 2026.
- Price stability: Post-relaunch peg maintained within a few basis points of $1.00. Minor deviation to $0.9671 in March 2022. The Curve pool's EMA oracle (
price_oracle(0)= 1.000154 OUSD per USDC) marks OUSD at ~$0.9998, consistent with the pool's OUSD-heavy 56/44 balance. - Team: Origin Protocol since 2017. Founded by Josh Fraser & Matthew Liu. CEO: Rafael Ugolini. Backed by Pantera Capital, Founders Fund.
Funds Management
Strategy Allocation (vault totalValue() = 6,298,052.94 USDC at block 26372721):
| Strategy | Balance (USDC) | % of TVL | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morpho V2 (Ethereum) | 4,149,617 | 65.89% | Morpho Vault V2 → MetaMorpho → Morpho Blue (OETH/USDC, cbBTC/USDC) |
| Curve USDC AMO | 1,078,045 | 17.12% | Curve OUSD/USDC pool + gauge staking |
| Cross-Chain (Base) | 1,070,363 | 17.00% | CCTP to Base → Morpho Vault V2 stack |
| Cross-Chain (HyperEVM) | 28 | 0.00% | Wound down September 28 to October 1, 2026; still an approved strategy |
| Vault (idle, net of queue) | 0 | 0.00% | Raw vault USDC 14, fully reserved by the withdrawal queue's queued − claimed of 14; vaultBuffer = 0 |
Reward tokens (CRV, MORPHO) are sold via CoW Protocol into USDC and returned to the vault, where they are distributed to holders via rebase.
Where the Morpho Legs Actually Sit
Each Morpho leg is three contracts deep. The strategy holds shares of a Morpho Vault V2, which holds a single MorphoVaultV1Adapter. The adapter holds shares of a MetaMorpho (Vault V1), which supplies Morpho Blue markets. Only the outermost layer is named after OUSD; the risk lives in the innermost markets. Positions are computed as supplyShares × totalSupplyAssets / totalSupplyShares from Morpho Blue position() / market().
| Chain | Morpho Blue market | LLTV | OUSD exposure | OUSD share of market | Market utilization | Oracle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | OETH / USDC (0xb8fef900b383db2dbbf4458c7f46acf5b140f26d603a6d1829963f241b82510e) |
86% | ~$3,946,500 (~95.1% of the leg) | 39.1% of $10.09M supplied | 87.9% ($8.87M borrowed, ~$1.22M free) | Chainlink ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD |
| Ethereum | cbBTC / USDC (0x64d65c9a2d91c36d56fbc42d69e979335320169b3df63bf92789e2c8883fcc64) |
86% | ~$204,200 (~4.9% of the leg) | 0.06% of $339.0M supplied | 89.8% (~$34.7M free) | Chainlink BTC/USD |
| Base | superOETHb / USDC (0x67a66cbacb2fe48ec4326932d4528215ad11656a86135f2795f5b90e501eb538) |
77% | ~$753,200 (~70.3% of the leg) | 95.2% of $791K supplied | 90.3% (~$77K free) | Chainlink ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD |
| Base | cbXRP / USDC (0xd4a903dc6d949519060c7707f9604fdc9772c046e05c2e3a8fce0bd7196e4109) |
62.5% | ~$317,500 (~29.7% of the leg) | 0.5% of $66.3M supplied | 88.0% (~$7.99M free) | Chainlink XRP/USD |
| Base | cbBTC, WETH, wstETH, cbETH markets | 77–86% | None | 0% | 89–90% | Chainlink |
| HyperEVM | WHYPE / kHYPE markets | 62.5% | ~$28 | dust | n/a | RedStone |
Three consequences follow directly from this table.
Origin's own LSTs back ~75% of OUSD. ~$3.95M is lent against OETH on Ethereum and ~$753K against superOETHb on Base, together ~74.6% of OUSD's TVL. Both markets price collateral as Chainlink ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD, with no OETH/ETH or superOETHb/ETH feed: the Ethereum oracle 0xE8aDfF9117151fb5ad7313873780b87cC56EEDB0 reads BASE_FEED_1 = ETH/USD and QUOTE_FEED_1 = USDC/USD, and the Base oracle 0xFEa2D58cEfCb9fcb597723c6bAE66fFE4193aFE4 is the same design. They hard-assume a 1:1 peg to ETH. An OETH depeg would not trigger liquidations; it would silently convert those positions into bad debt carried by OUSD.
The Ethereum OETH market's borrowing is concentrated in one account. EOA 0xa122687285dc5012141055a801045f069112e7c6 owes ~$6.43M, 72.5% of the market's $8.87M debt, against 4,960.6 OETH (~$11.03M at the oracle's $2,224/ETH). That is 58.3% LTV, a health factor of ~1.48, and liquidation at an oracle ETH price near $1,508. The next borrower, 0x86d888c3fa8a7f67452ef2eccc1c5ee9751ec8d6, owes ~$1.41M at 24.1% LTV. Eleven distinct accounts made 33 Borrow calls in this market over the last 275K blocks. OUSD is the market's largest supplier (39%). A liquidation of the top position would need ~4,960 OETH to clear through secondary liquidity.
Origin's own AMO is the Curve pool. The AMO holds 1,074,872 of the pool's 1,075,763 LP tokens (staked in the gauge), 99.9% of the OUSD/USDC pool. The "secondary DEX liquidity" that backstops OUSD's peg is OUSD's own capital.
Accessibility
- Minting: Permissionless. Anyone can call
mint()by depositing USDC; the vault mints equivalent OUSD 1:1. RequiressafeTransferFromof USDC, so OUSD cannot be minted without depositing collateral. - AMO Minting: The Curve AMO strategy can call
mintForStrategy()to mint OUSD without direct user-deposited backing (see AMO Minting Analysis below). Only governor-whitelisted strategies can use this function. - Redemption: Async withdrawal queue, a two-step process:
requestWithdrawal(amount)burns OUSD immediately and enqueues a withdrawal (NFT-like request ID).claimWithdrawal(id)/claimWithdrawals(ids[])pays out USDC afterwithdrawalClaimDelay(600s = 10 minutes minimum, verified onchain) AND when the queue's claimable liquidity has caught up to the request. There is no onchain upper bound on claim time. If the queue is ahead of deposits and strategy withdrawals, a claim can wait indefinitely. The strategist, or anyone permissionlessly viaallocate()/addWithdrawalQueueLiquidity(), must supply USDC to advance the queue.
- Queue state:
withdrawalQueueMetadata()reports lifetime cumulative counters:queued= 4,173,105,claimable= 4,173,105, andclaimed= 4,173,091 USDC across 216 requests since launch. The outstanding balance isqueued − claimed= 14 USDC, all of it claimable and matched by the vault's 14 USDC idle. Any larger request depends on someone pulling funds from strategies. - DEX Swaps: Instant exits via Curve OUSD/USDC pool (~$1.08M TVL, ~$479K USDC side).
- Fees: 20% performance fee (2,000 bps), no deposit/withdrawal fees.
AMO Minting Analysis
Can OUSD be minted without backing? Yes, through the AMO mechanism, but with constraints:
mintForStrategy()allows whitelisted strategies to mint OUSD without depositing collateral. Currently only the Curve USDC AMO strategy (0x26a02ec47ACC2A3442b757F45E0A82B8e993Ce11) is whitelisted;isMintWhitelistedStrategyis false for the other three strategies.- Adding strategies to the mint whitelist requires governance (xOGN vote + 48h timelock).
- Solvency check: After every AMO operation (
mintAndAddOTokens,removeAndBurnOTokens,removeOnlyAssets),_solvencyAssert()verifies thattotalVaultValue / totalOUSDSupply >= 99.8%(SOLVENCY_THRESHOLD). This is a state check, not a per-call allowance, so it caps cumulative AMO-driven value loss at the gap between current backing (100.14%) and 99.8%, about 0.34% of supply (~$21K). - Pool balance check: The
improvePoolBalancemodifier ensures one-sided operations (mint-and-add or remove-and-burn) must improve the Curve pool's balance. Sequential operations in the same direction are prevented. maxSupplyDiff: Set to 5% (checked during redemptions); if supply exceeds backing by >5%, redemptions revert.- Historical minting cap (
netOusdMintForStrategyThreshold) has been deprecated. There is no vault-level per-strategy cap. Protection relies on the strategy-level solvency check.
Risk assessment: AMO-minted OUSD enters the Curve pool (not free circulation). It can only be obtained by someone swapping USDC for it, at which point it becomes backed. The strategist (2-of-8 multisig) can trigger AMO operations without governance vote. The 99.8% solvency threshold bounds the cumulative loss. maxSlippage (0.2%) can only be changed by the governor.
Collateralization
- The vault's only asset is USDC (
getAllAssets()returns a single entry), and OUSD is minted 1:1 against it. Backing ratiototalValue() / totalSupply()= 100.14%. - What backs OUSD in practice is not idle USDC but lending claims: ~82.9% of TVL is USDC supplied to Morpho Blue markets on Ethereum and Base, and ~17.1% is an AMO LP position in the Curve OUSD/USDC pool.
vaultBuffer= 0, and raw idle USDC (14) only covers the 14 USDC queue reserve. - Collateral behind those lending claims is Origin's own OETH and superOETHb (~74.6% of TVL), cbXRP (~5.0%), and cbBTC (~3.2%). Every market is over-collateralized at the LLTVs above, but the OETH and superOETHb markets rely on oracles that assume a hard 1:1 peg to ETH. A single EOA's position accounts for 72.5% of the Ethereum OETH market's debt.
- No debt, leverage, or liquidation mechanics exist in the OUSD vault itself; the leverage sits with the third-party borrowers on the other side of the Morpho markets.
- The Base cross-chain strategy holds ~17.0% of TVL; these funds require a CCTP round trip before they can settle an Ethereum redemption.
Provability
vault.totalValue()returns the sum of strategy balances plus vault USDC, minus the withdrawal-queue reserve (queued − claimed). The same is true ofvault.checkBalance(asset). Raw vault USDC and the queue reserve must be inspected separately to reconstruct each component.ousd.totalSupply()lives on the OUSD token, not on the vault. The vault parametermaxSupplyDiff(5%) and the AMOSOLVENCY_THRESHOLD(99.8%) compare these two sources at redemption / AMO time.- Rebase calculated programmatically:
rebasingCreditsPerTokendetermines each holder's share of rebased yield. - The vault holds no oracle. The current implementation's price-provider slot is
_deprecated_priceProvider, and neitherVaultCorenorVaultAdminreads a price anywhere; with a single 1:1 asset there is nothing to price. Chainlink still matters, but one layer down, inside the Morpho market oracles. - Cross-chain balances are cached, not live.
CrossChainMasterStrategy.checkBalance()returnslocal USDC + pendingAmount + remoteStrategyBalance.remoteStrategyBalanceis a value pushed from the remote chain over CCTP messaging.MAX_BALANCE_CHECK_AGE(1 day) only makes the master ignore an ordinary balance message that is already older than a day when it arrives. Transfer confirmations skip that check, and the stored value never expires:checkBalance()keeps returning the last accepted balance however old it is, and no last-update timestamp is stored onchain. The last accepted updates before the snapshot were at blocks 26366640 (Base) and 26366609 (HyperEVM), both about 20 hours earlier. The value is also uncapped: whatever balance an authenticated message from the peer strategy reports is written straight intoremoteStrategyBalance(see Critical Permission Paths). At the snapshot the Base cache read 1,070,362.53 against a live remotecheckBalance()of 1,070,504.38 (Δ ~$142, 0.013%), andpendingAmountwas zero on both masters. About 17.0% of reported TVL is a message, not a read. - Full verification requires walking two chains and four contract layers per leg. Everything is onchain and permissionlessly readable; nothing is attested offchain.
Liquidity Risk
- Primary exit: Async withdrawal queue via
requestWithdrawal()→claimWithdrawal(). OUSD is burned at request time. USDC is paid only after (a)withdrawalClaimDelayof 10 minutes AND (b) queue claimable liquidity has advanced past the request. There is no onchain upper bound on wait time; the effective wait depends on how quickly strategies return USDC. - Queue backlog: 14 USDC outstanding (
queued − claimed), all of it claimable, across 216 lifetime requests.queuedandclaimableare running lifetime totals, not a live backlog. - Instant on-Ethereum liquidity is the binding constraint. The Ethereum Morpho position is $4.15M, but ~$3.95M of it sits in the OETH/USDC market, which is 87.9% utilized and has only ~$1.22M of free liquidity, all of which OUSD would have to share with the market's other suppliers. The ~$204K cbBTC position is fully withdrawable. Adding the Curve pool's USDC side (~$479K), with vault idle fully reserved for the queue, roughly $1.90M (~30.2% of TVL) is reachable without waiting on borrowers or a bridge.
- DEX liquidity: Curve OUSD/USDC pool (
0x6d18E1a7faeB1F0467A77C0d293872ab685426dc) holds 600,382 OUSD + 478,562 USDC (~$1.08M, 56/44 OUSD-heavy).get_dy(0,1, 100k OUSD)= 99,959 USDC (−0.04%),get_dy(0,1, 300k)= 299,680 (−0.11%),get_dy(0,1, 500k)= 474,770 (−5.05%, the USDC side is nearly exhausted). 99.9% of the pool's LP is Origin's own AMO, so this depth is not independent third-party liquidity. - Vault buffer:
vaultBuffer= 0 and raw idle USDC is 14. Queue advancement depends on the strategist pulling from strategies (withdrawFromStrategy/withdrawAllFromStrategies), on the permissionlessaddWithdrawalQueueLiquidity(), or on new deposits auto-allocating. - Cross-chain assets: ~$1.07M (~17.0% of TVL) on Base. The cbXRP portion (~$318K) is liquid at the remote end. The superOETHb portion (~$753K) is not: OUSD supplies 95% of that market, which is 90.3% utilized with only ~$77K free. Everything returning to Ethereum needs a CCTP round trip (minutes to hours) on top.
- No priority mechanism: first-come-first-served queue ordering.
- Same-value assets (USD stablecoins) mitigate price impact risk during any waiting period.
- Legacy OUSD/3CRV pool: ~13,428 OUSD + ~14,505 3CRV (~$28K), effectively deprecated.
Centralization & Control Risks
Governance
Governance Structure: Identical to Origin ARM, with the same xOGN governance, Timelock, and multisig. See Appendix: Contract Architecture for full diagram.
Timelock Roles (verified via hasRole() at the snapshot block):
| Role | Origin DeFi Governance | GOV Multisig (5/8) |
|---|---|---|
| PROPOSER | ✓ | ✗ |
| EXECUTOR | ✓ | ✗ |
| CANCELLER | ✓ | ✓ |
- Timelock is self-administered (TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE held by itself)
- Total time from proposal to execution: ~5 days minimum (24h voting delay + 48h voting + 48h timelock)
- No backdoor: only Origin DeFi Governance can propose/execute on mainnet
- Between August 31 and November 8, 2026 the Timelock executed 9 calls and scheduled none that remain pending. The two OUSD-relevant calls are both in tx
0x715cec2789d71459af239f6d2f242836e46fdaf4c468bb89b319bf635c395120, which pointedsetTrusteeAddresson the OUSD and OETH vaults to the FeeSplitter. The other calls target other Origin products. There were no upgrades of the OUSD token, vault, or strategy proxies.
Multisig thresholds (getThreshold() / getOwners()): GOV Multisig 5-of-8; Strategist / Guardian 2-of-8 (same eight signers on Ethereum, Base, and HyperEVM); Origin remote-chain Safe 5-of-8 (same eight signers as the GOV Multisig). Safe modules are enabled only on the Strategist Safe (four on Ethereum, one on Base) and the GOV Multisig (one), all driven by the operator EOA and limited to fixed calls (see Critical Permission Paths); no Safe in the control path has a guard.
Privileged Roles:
| Role | Who | Timelock? | Powers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governor (owner) | Timelock → xOGN governance | ~5 days | Upgrade proxy, approve/remove strategies, add/remove from mint whitelist, setAutoAllocateThreshold, setMaxSupplyDiff, setWithdrawalClaimDelay, setTrusteeFeeBps (≤50%), setTrusteeAddress, setStrategistAddr, setOperatorAddr, governanceRebaseOptIn; AMO setMaxSlippage (≤5%); master-strategy setFeePremiumBps (≤30%), setMinFinalityThreshold, setOperator |
| Remote-strategy governor | Base Timelock (48h) / HyperEVM Timelock (48h), both driven by the Origin 5/8 Safe | 48h | Upgrade the remote strategy proxies; setFeePremiumBps, setMinFinalityThreshold, setOperator, transferToken (unsupported assets only) on the remote side |
| Strategist | 2-of-8 Safe 0x4FF1b9D9ba8558F5EAfCec096318eA0d8b541971 |
None | Vault (all onlyGovernorOrStrategist): depositToStrategy / withdrawFromStrategy / withdrawAllFromStrategy / withdrawAllFromStrategies (approved strategies only), setVaultBuffer, setDefaultStrategy (approved strategies only), setRebaseRateMax, setDripDuration, pauseCapital / pauseRebase, unpauseCapital / unpauseRebase, rebase. Curve AMO: mintAndAddOTokens / removeAndBurnOTokens / removeOnlyAssets. Both remote cross-chain strategies: deposit / depositAll / withdraw / withdrawAll (recipient forced to the strategy itself). OUSD Token: delegateYield(from, to), undelegateYield(from), which can redirect rebase yield of any account to any other account without that account's consent. Guardian / sentinel on all six OUSD Morpho vaults (can revoke pending curator actions). |
| Operator | EOA 0x739212d5bAfE6AAC8Be49a60B7d003bD41DBf38b |
None | rebase() on the vault; relay() and sendBalanceUpdate() on the cross-chain strategies; FeeSplitter distribute(); operator of the Strategist and GOV Safe modules (fixed calls only, see Critical Permission Paths). Bounded: _rebase() only ratchets supply upward, never above totalValue(), and is capped by rebasePerSecondMax and a 2% per-rebase ceiling. relay() only forwards Circle-attested messages from the peer strategy address. |
| Trustee | FeeSplitter 0xbbE561181D831e2a0fAd54C2c27F159a20B60464 (governor = GOV Multisig 5/8) |
None | Receives the 20% performance fee; split between operations wallet and OGN buyback is governor-only, capped at 50% operations, currently 0% |
Key Risks:
- AMO minting without timelock: The Strategist can trigger AMO mint/burn operations, constrained by the strategy-level 99.8% solvency check. The vault-level AMO minting cap (
netOusdMintForStrategyThreshold) is deprecated (function reverts onchain). - Yield delegation without timelock:
delegateYield/undelegateYieldon the OUSD token areonlyGovernorOrStrategist. The strategist can redirect the rebase yield of any account (including smart contracts holding OUSD) to an arbitrary recipient. This affects yield, not principal balances. SevenYieldUndelegatedevents and noYieldDelegatedevents were emitted between August 31 and November 8, 2026. - Strategy reallocation without timelock: The strategist can move all vault funds to/from any approved strategy (
withdrawAllFromStrategies,setDefaultStrategy,depositToStrategy). This is bounded by the governor-approved strategy list, and both remote legs on that list are upgradeable by the Origin 5/8 Safe through 48h Timelocks, so funds routed there are only as safe as that path. - Rebase rate cap without timelock:
setRebaseRateMaxlets the strategist cap the rebase APR, and a misconfiguration could strand yield.rebasePerSecondMaxis currently 2,496,362,574 (≈7.87% APR).
Critical Permission Paths and Weakest Link
A material loss here means loss of the USDC backing OUSD. The inventory covers the OUSD token, vault, all four strategies (mainnet and remote sides), the six Morpho vaults, and the timelocks and Safes above them, including the modules enabled on those Safes.
| Capability and target | Current holder / control path | Safeguards | Assets exposed |
|---|---|---|---|
upgradeTo on OUSD token, vault, and the four mainnet strategy proxies; approveStrategy, addStrategyToMintWhitelist, setStrategistAddr |
Timelock 0x35918cDE7233F2dD33fA41ae3Cb6aE0e42E0e69F ← Origin DeFi Governance (xOGN) |
24h voting delay + 48h vote + 48h Timelock (5 days); GOV Multisig 5/8 can cancel | All ~$6.30M |
upgradeTo on the Base remote strategy proxy 0xB1d624fc40824683e2bFBEfd19eB208DbBE00866 |
Base Timelock 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f ← Origin 5/8 Safe 0x92A19381444A001d62cE67BaFF066fA1111d7202 (proposer, executor, sole canceller) |
5-of-8 + 48h; no independent canceller, and no xOGN vote | Funds: ~$1.07M (17.0%). Accounting: all of OUSD, as on HyperEVM below |
upgradeTo on the HyperEVM remote strategy proxy 0xE0228DB13F8C4Eb00fD1e08e076b09eF5cD0EA1e |
HyperEVM Timelock 0x77121911A387c9e4Eae46345E0f831A6da8a1364 ← same Origin 5/8 Safe |
5-of-8 + 48h; no xOGN vote; cancellers are the same Safe and deployer EOA 0x58890A9cB27586E83Cb51d2d26bbE18a1a647245 |
Funds: ~$28 now (up to MAX_TRANSFER_AMOUNT = 10M USDC per CCTP transfer if re-funded). Accounting: all of OUSD. An upgraded remote can send a balance report for any amount; the mainnet master authenticates only the source domain and sender and writes the value into remoteStrategyBalance uncapped. On a mainnet fork at Ethereum block 26322936, a forged $100M report was accepted and lifted vault totalValue() from $6.45M to $106.4M |
Enable a new market on OUSD-V1 (submitCap → acceptCap), then reallocate into it |
Curator 0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51 (2/3; owner Yearn Security 4/7 also holds curator powers); allocators EOA 0x50B75d586929Ab2F75dC15f07E1B921b7C4Ba8fA, EIP-7702 account 0x75a1253432356f90611546a487b5350cef08780d, PublicAllocator, EmergencyAllocator |
3-day timelock() on cap increases; guardian (Origin Strategist Safe) and owner can revoke; allocators can only move funds between markets that already have caps |
~$4.15M (65.9%) |
addAdapter / cap increases on OUSD-V2 |
Curator Yearn Security 0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0 (4/7) |
3-day timelock; sentinel (Origin Strategist Safe) can revoke; setAdapterRegistry abdicated |
~$4.15M |
Same curator paths on OUSDb-V1 / OUSDb-V2 (new markets / adapters) |
Curator 2/3 Safe, owner 0xFEaE2F855250c36A77b8C68dB07C4dD9711fE36F (4/7) |
3-day timelocks; Origin Strategist Safe is guardian / sentinel | ~$1.07M |
setManagementFeeRecipient + setManagementFee on OUSDb-V2 0x2Ba14b2e1E7D2189D3550b708DFCA01f899f33c1 (management fee accrues on assets, not on interest) |
Curator 2/3 Safe 0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51 |
No timelock on either selector (neither is abdicated), so the sentinel cannot revoke. The fee is capped at 5%/yr (MAX_MANAGEMENT_FEE). Fee shares mint only to addresses the abdicated receiveSharesGate 0xB6AEa13581E8dF678a461884CE71584B4e827cfb whitelists; its owner is the Base Timelock. The whitelist (every setIsWhitelisted call traced) holds the OUSD remote strategy, the OGN token contract 0x7002458B1DF59EccB57387bC79fFc7C29E22e6f7, and a legacy Origin strategy proxy 0x1743658b284a843b47f555343dBB628d46D0C254 governed by EIP-7702 account 0xDba474FeF81bc7475f70e28DFC12410f032A83Db. The curator cannot pay itself. |
Rate-capped: on a fork at Ethereum block 26322936, a 5% fee to the OGN contract cost the OUSD position $146.51/day (≈$53K/yr, ~0.8% of OUSD TVL per year), while a fee to the curator Safe cost nothing |
Same fee selectors on OUSD-V2 (Ethereum) and OUSDh-V2 (HyperEVM) |
Yearn Security 4/7 (Ethereum); curator 2/3 Safe (HyperEVM) | No timelock; 5%/yr cap; receive-shares gates owned by the mainnet Timelock and the HyperEVM Timelock whitelist the OUSD strategy and 0x…dEaD |
Ethereum: rate-capped, held by a 4/7 Safe. HyperEVM: dust |
Reallocate between approved strategies; AMO mint/burn; remote deposit / withdraw |
Strategist 2/8 Safe | No timelock. Funds can only move between governor-approved strategies and back to the vault or the remote strategy itself. AMO cumulative loss is bounded by the _solvencyAssert() state check (≈0.35% of supply at current backing). Cannot cause a material loss alone, but can route funds into the HyperEVM leg |
Not material alone |
delegateYield / undelegateYield on OUSD |
Strategist 2/8 Safe | None | Yield only, not principal |
pauseCapital / pauseRebase |
Strategist 2/8 Safe | None | Liquidity only (blocks exits) |
rebase, relay, sendBalanceUpdate |
Operator EOA | rebase capped at ≈7.87% APR / 2% per call, never above totalValue(); relay requires a Circle attestation and the peer strategy as sender; balance updates are computed onchain on the remote side |
Not material |
Safe modules: on the Strategist Safe, AutoWithdrawalModule 0x90d588fc0eC3DB9c4b417dB4537fE08e063D2ae5, ClaimStrategyRewardsSafeModule 0x1b84E64279D63f48DdD88B9B2A7871e817152A44, CurvePoolBoosterBribesModule 0x6320Db7a3c1B95fD5684DC725C2cda9B82Fa20Fa, and MerklPoolBoosterBribesModule 0x6241f5e4ad5af39ef3aE54801E0AE431e0B70369 on Ethereum, plus MerklPoolBoosterBribesModule 0xf6B23291bF4993832b92A05c67d5f43eF3287C6a on Base; on the GOV Multisig, CollectXOGNRewardsModule 0x046750A8106461d9826a8Ab32890B23753A5245e |
Operator EOA (OPERATOR_ROLE on every module, alongside the Safe); each Safe holds its modules' admin role |
Modules execute without Safe signatures, but each hard-codes its call (CALL, never DELEGATECALL). AutoWithdrawalModule can only call withdrawFromStrategy on the Morpho V2 strategy for the withdrawal-queue shortfall, so funds return to the vault. The others only claim strategy rewards, run pool-booster bribe campaigns (the Curve module calls operator-added booster addresses with the fixed manageCampaign selector and at most 0.01 ETH each), or collect xOGN rewards into Origin's rewards source. No Safe guards are set, and the Base and HyperEVM remote-chain Safes, Yearn Security, and the curator Safes have no modules |
Not material: liquidity timing and Safe ETH only |
Performance-fee routing (FeeSplitter split, recipients); setPerformanceFee / setPerformanceFeeRecipient on the three Vault V2s (no timelock) |
GOV Multisig 5/8; V2 curators | Fee-only; Morpho caps the V2 performance fee at 50% of interest; recipients limited by the same share gates | Yield only |
Weakest credible path to material loss: a remote-strategy upgrade on Base or HyperEVM. The Origin 5-of-8 Safe proposes upgradeTo on a remote strategy through that chain's Timelock and executes it 48 hours later. The upgraded contract can keep the USDC that leg holds or later receives (~$1.07M on Base, ~$28 on HyperEVM), and it can send the mainnet master a balance report for any amount. CrossChainMasterStrategy._processBalanceCheckMessage checks only the nonce and message age, and _handleReceivedMessage checks only the source domain and peer address, so the forged value becomes part of vault totalValue() (fork-confirmed with a $100M report). The leg's own balance does not limit the accounting effects:
- Unbacked supply:
rebase()mints the phantom surplus as OUSD at up torebasePerSecondMax(≈7.87% APR on rebasing supply, smoothed over the 7-day drip), and 20% of it goes to the FeeSplitter as fees. Unbacked OUSD then redeems against real USDC. - Blinded safety checks: the AMO's 99.8%
_solvencyAssert()and the vault's 5%maxSupplyDiffboth read the inflatedtotalValue(), so neither would stop losses while the forged balance stands. - Masked losses: real losses elsewhere, such as Morpho bad debt, would not show in
totalValue().
The path needs five of eight Origin GOV signers and a 48h delay, but no xOGN vote. The Base Timelock's only canceller is the same Safe, and the HyperEVM Timelock adds only the deployer EOA, so the 48 hours are a detection window rather than a veto. Exiting within the window is partial: ~30% of TVL is reachable instantly on Ethereum, and on Base the cbXRP portion can be pulled back over CCTP, but only ~$77K of the ~$753K superOETHb portion is withdrawable. The HyperEVM Timelock has required 48h since tx 0xee0a923181435246d98c6719935135655d2ff64c2b1a44be0c4f5e852138f3d0 (November 17, 2026). Because the holder is a 5-of-8 Safe behind a 48h delay, the critical gate does not apply.
Comparably weak path for direct fund loss:
- Morpho curation on Ethereum: the 2-of-3 curator Safe submits a cap for a malicious market, and after 3 days an allocator (one is an EOA) reallocates up to ~$4.15M (66% of TVL) into it. This path has the lowest signer threshold and the largest exposure, but it also has the most checks: a code-enforced 72-hour timelock that both the Origin Strategist Safe (guardian) and Yearn Security (owner) can revoke. The same structure applies on Base.
The lowest-threshold untimelocked path is the Base curator's management fee: a 2-of-3 Safe can set a 5%/yr fee with no delay, but only toward gate-whitelisted addresses it does not control. The loss rate is capped by code at ≈$146/day on the Base leg, which is the kind of rate limit the framework treats as bounding cumulative loss. It is listed and monitored but does not trigger the fewer-than-three-signers gate. The Ethereum fee setters are held by Yearn Security (4/7).
Both remote Timelocks were enumerated from deployment to the snapshot. For the Base Timelock that covers every RoleGranted / RoleRevoked event since deployment tx 0x2e2cbd5f5527b64e5bf33794ef09a908acfa75dceaed5bba811f7ecd22888a4e; for HyperEVM it was read via Etherscan V2. The Base Timelock has scheduled 91 calls and executed 88, with none cancelled. The three ready-but-unexecuted operations target other Origin Base contracts (0x98a0CbeF61bD2D21435f433bE4CD42B56B38CC93 removeStrategy, 0xF611cC500eEE7E4e4763A05FE623E2363c86d2Af setAllowedPoolWethShareInterval, 0x9cfcAF81600155e01c63e4D2993A8A81A8205829 setHarvesterAddress), not the OUSD remote strategy. The HyperEVM Timelock had no pending operations when re-read on November 17, 2026.
Programmability
- Standard minting and
requestWithdrawal/claimWithdrawalare fully programmatic and permissionless.allocate()andaddWithdrawalQueueLiquidity()are permissionless too. - Rebase is not automatic on user operations.
rebase()is restricted to the operator EOA, the strategist, or the governor. Yield is dripped rather than paid in full:_nextYield()smooths the surplus overdripDuration(604,800s = 7 days), caps it atrebasePerSecondMax(≈7.87% APR), and hard-caps any single rebase at 2% of rebasing supply. Supply only ever ratchets up and never abovetotalValue(). - Auto-allocation is triggered inside
mint()when a deposit exceedsautoAllocateThreshold(25,000 USDC) and routes todefaultStrategy(currently the Morpho V2 strategy). - AMO operations and inter-strategy rebalancing require strategist intervention.
- Cross-chain strategy management relies on manual bridging decisions plus operator-relayed CCTP messages; the mainnet accounting for the Base leg is a cached value refreshed by those messages.
- Reward harvesting: the CoW Harvester sells CRV/MORPHO → USDC via CoW Protocol (semi-automated, bot-triggered).
External Dependencies
USDC / Circle (Critical): Sole collateral asset on every chain. Circle can freeze/blacklist addresses holding USDC, which would impact the vault, the strategies, or the remote legs.
Morpho (Critical): ~82.9% of TVL ultimately sits in Morpho Blue markets, reached through four active intermediating vault contracts on two chains. Morpho Blue itself is immutable; the risk is concentrated in the curation layer above it and in the markets chosen.
Morpho curation: Yearn (not an external counterparty). Every OUSD Morpho vault on all three chains is curated by Yearn:
- Ethereum:
OUSD-V2andOUSD-V1are owned by the Yearn Security multisig (0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0, 4-of-7).OUSD-V1is curated by0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51(2-of-3) with a 3-day timelock. - Base:
OUSDb-V2/OUSDb-V1are owned by0xFEaE2F855250c36A77b8C68dB07C4dD9711fE36F(4-of-7, six signers shared with Yearn Security), with the same curator Safe and a 3-day timelock. - HyperEVM:
OUSDh-V2/OUSDh-V1are now owned by0x518C21DC88D9780c0A1Be566433c571461A70149(4-of-7, the Yearn Security signer set), curated by the same 2-of-3 Safe, with a 3-daytimelock(). The EOA owner, zero timelock, and missing guardian recorded in August 2026 are no longer in place.setReceiveAssetsGateandsetAdapterRegistryremain abdicated onOUSDh-V2. - Origin veto on every vault: the Origin Strategist Safe is guardian on all three MetaMorpho vaults (Ethereum since October 7, 2026) and sentinel on all three Vault V2s (Ethereum since September 14, 2026), so Origin can revoke any pending Yearn curator action.
For a Yearn allocation decision this is an internal counterparty rather than a third-party trust assumption. It is recorded because it is a real concentration: Yearn curation sits under ~82.9% of OUSD's TVL.
- Ethereum:
Origin OETH / superOETHb (Critical): ~74.6% of TVL is lent against Origin's own LSTs, priced by oracles that assume a fixed 1:1 ETH peg. A sustained OETH depeg produces bad debt in the markets OUSD supplies without triggering liquidations first. One EOA borrower accounts for 72.5% of the Ethereum OETH market's debt. superOETHb's own backing also rests largely on OETH: the superOETHb vault
0x98a0CbeF61bD2D21435f433bE4CD42B56B38CC93holds ~63% of its ~11,357 WETH value in the OETHb V3 cross-chain strategy0xa03360b3f6d902F1b3334c0adBd5C6995d3513fe, whose Ethereum side0xa03360b3f6d902F1b3334c0adBd5C6995d3513feholds ~6,125 wOETH under the mainnet Timelock, and ~37% in the OETHb Curve AMO strategy0x9cfcAF81600155e01c63e4D2993A8A81A8205829(strategy names per Origin's deployment records).Curve (High): AMO yield generation (~17.1% of TVL) and the primary on-Ethereum DEX exit (~$1.08M pool TVL, ~$479K USDC side). 99.9% of that pool's LP is the AMO itself.
Circle CCTP (High): The Base cross-chain strategy uses Circle CCTP V2 to bridge USDC and to carry the balance and withdrawal messages the mainnet accounting depends on. ~17.0% of TVL is held on Base.
Chainlink (High): No longer read by the OUSD vault, but the ETH/USD and USDC/USD feeds price the OETH and superOETHb Morpho markets that hold ~74.6% of TVL.
CoW Protocol (Low): Used for reward token swaps (CRV, MORPHO → USDC). Not critical for core functionality.
No single dependency failure stops the protocol. The surface is still wider and deeper than the vault's "100% USDC-backed" description suggests. A Circle freeze, a Morpho curation failure, or an OETH depeg would each reach a large fraction of backing, and an OETH depeg now reaches about three-quarters of it.
Operational Risk
- Team: Origin Protocol since 2017, public team, known leadership (Josh Fraser, Matthew Liu, Rafael Ugolini), VC-backed (Pantera, Founders Fund)
- Documentation: Comprehensive. Public GitHub with active development, dedicated security repo with 30+ audits
- Legal: Established company (Origin Protocol)
- Incident Response: Learned from 2020 hack. $1M bug bounty on Immunefi with SEAL Safe Harbor offered. Full relaunch with multiple audits after the incident.
Monitoring
- Morpho curation (all three chains): Track owner, curator, guardian, timelock, sentinel, allocator, cap submissions, and supply-queue changes on
OUSD-V2/OUSD-V1(Ethereum),OUSDb-V2/OUSDb-V1(Base), andOUSDh-V2/OUSDh-V1(HyperEVM). Alert on anysubmitCapfor a new market and on any change ofowner(),curator(),guardian(), ortimelock(). These are the 72-hour windows in which the Origin guardian can veto. - Governance: Monitor Timelock events (
CallScheduled,CallExecuted,Cancelled) on0x35918cDE7233F2dD33fA41ae3Cb6aE0e42E0e69F. Monitor EIP-1967 implementation slot changes on Vault and OUSD Token proxies. Monitor Origin DeFi Governance proposals. - Remote-chain timelocks: Monitor
CallScheduledon the Base Timelock0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f(48h) and the HyperEVM Timelock0x77121911A387c9e4Eae46345E0f831A6da8a1364(48h),MinDelayChangeon both, and implementation-slot changes on both remote strategy proxies. Keep these alerts active even while the HyperEVM leg holds dust: an upgraded remote can inflate mainnet accounting without holding any funds. A scheduled upgrade gives 48 hours' notice; pair the alert with a check of the nextRemoteStrategyBalanceUpdatedvalue after execution. - Morpho Vault V2 fees: Alert on
SetManagementFee,SetManagementFeeRecipient,SetPerformanceFee, andSetPerformanceFeeRecipienton all three OUSD Vault V2s. These selectors have no timelock, so detection is the only control. - Vault Parameters: Track
totalValue()on the vault (0xE75D77B1865Ae93c7eaa3040B038D7aA7BC02F70) andtotalSupply()on the OUSD token (0x2A8e1E676Ec238d8A992307B495b45B3fEAa5e86). Alert on >1% divergence. Note:totalValue()andcheckBalance(asset)already subtract the withdrawal-queue reserve (queued − claimed); reconstruct components from the per-strategycheckBalance()calls, the vault's raw USDC balance, andwithdrawalQueueMetadata()separately. MonitorrebasePaused()/capitalPaused(). TrackmaxSupplyDiff,vaultBuffer,defaultStrategy,dripDuration,rebasePerSecondMax,trusteeAddress, andoperatorAddrchanges. - AMO: Monitor
mintForStrategy()calls and the OUSD supply vs vault value ratio. Alert if solvency drops below 99.5%. TrackisMintWhitelistedStrategychanges (requires governance). - Strategy Allocation: Monitor strategy balances via
checkBalance()on each strategy. Alert on >20% TVL change in 24h, and on any deposit into the HyperEVM master strategy0xE0228DB13F8C4Eb00fD1e08e076b09eF5cD0EA1e(it holds dust). Track CCTP bridge transactions on both cross-chain legs. - Cross-chain balance freshness and size: The mainnet
checkBalance()for each remote leg returns the last acceptedremoteStrategyBalanceindefinitely;MAX_BALANCE_CHECK_AGEonly filters stale incoming messages and does not expire the stored value. Track the block time of the lastRemoteStrategyBalanceUpdatedevent on each master and alert when it is more than 24h old. Compare the stored value against the live remote-sidecheckBalance()and alert on divergence >1%. Alert on any update that moves a master's balance by more than the CCTP transfers in flight, since the master accepts reported balances without a cap. - Morpho market oracles and borrowers: The OETH/USDC (Ethereum) and superOETHb/USDC (Base) markets price collateral as Chainlink ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD with no LST-specific feed. Monitor OETH and superOETHb secondary-market prices against ETH directly, because those markets cannot see a depeg. Monitor Chainlink ETH/USD (
0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419) and USDC/USD (0x8fFfFfd4AfB6115b954Bd326cbe7B4BA576818f6) for staleness. Track the health factor of the dominant OETH-market borrower0xa122687285dc5012141055a801045f069112e7c6(~1.48 at snapshot). Track the superOETHb vault's strategy split, since ~63% of its backing is wOETH held on Ethereum through the OETHb V3 cross-chain strategy. - Morpho market liquidity: Track
totalSupplyAssets − totalBorrowAssetsfor the OETH/USDC and superOETHb/USDC markets, and OUSD's share of each market's supply. Alert when free liquidity in the Ethereum OETH market falls below the vault's likely redemption need, or when the Base superOETHb market's free liquidity stays near zero. - Liquidity: Monitor the Curve OUSD/USDC pool balance ratio; alert on imbalance beyond 60/40 (currently 56/44). Track the AMO's share of the pool's LP supply.
- Strategist: Monitor role changes on vault
strategistAddr(). Track AMO operation frequency and size. MonitorYieldDelegated/YieldUndelegatedevents on the OUSD token. MonitorwithdrawAllFromStrategies,setVaultBuffer,setDefaultStrategy,setDripDuration,setRebaseRateMaxcalls. - Withdrawal Queue: Track
withdrawalQueueMetadata()and compute the live backlog asqueued − claimed.queuedandclaimableon their own are lifetime cumulative totals and will look alarming if read as a depth. Alert when the backlog exceeds vault idle plus free Ethereum Morpho liquidity, or whenqueued − claimablestays non-zero for more than a day.
Reassessment Triggers
- Time-based: Quarterly (next: February 2027)
- Incident-based: Any security incident, AMO solvency anomaly, USDC depeg/freeze, OETH or superOETHb depeg, bad debt in any Morpho market OUSD supplies, liquidation of the dominant OETH-market borrower, or a CCTP outage
- Change-based:
- Any HyperEVM or Base Timelock operation targeting a remote strategy, any remote-strategy upgrade, or any
remoteStrategyBalancejump not explained by a CCTP transfer - Any change to the Base or HyperEVM Timelock delay, or a material deposit into the HyperEVM cross-chain strategy
- Any management or performance fee set on an OUSD Vault V2, or any change to a receive-shares gate whitelist
- Curator, owner, guardian, sentinel, or timelock changes on any of the six OUSD Morpho vaults. In particular, if Morpho curation passed out of Yearn's hands, an internal concentration would become a third-party dependency and warrant a re-score
- Role changes on the Base or HyperEVM Timelocks, or a remote-strategy upgrade
- Supply-queue or cap changes that move a Morpho leg into a new collateral type
- New strategy added to the mint whitelist, or a new cross-chain deployment
- Governance parameter changes on the vault (
setStrategistAddr,setOperatorAddr,setMaxSupplyDiff,setWithdrawalClaimDelay,setTrusteeAddress, proxy upgrades) - Significant TVL change (>50%), or Origin-LST collateral exposure moving materially away from ~75% of TVL
- Any HyperEVM or Base Timelock operation targeting a remote strategy, any remote-strategy upgrade, or any
Appendix: Contract Architecture
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GOVERNANCE (Ethereum) │
│ │
│ xOGN Token Holders (Staked OGN) │
│ (250K xOGN to propose, ~289M xOGN quorum) │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ Origin DeFi Governance (0x1D3f...) │
│ [PROPOSER + EXECUTOR + CANCELLER] │
│ (7,200 blocks voting delay + 14,416 blocks voting period) │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ Timelock Controller (0x3591...) GOV Multisig 5/8 │
│ [48h delay, self-administered] ◄────── (0xbe2A...) │
│ │ [CANCELLER only] │
│ │ governor │
│ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ ▼ ▼ │
│ OUSD Token (0x2A8e...) OUSD Vault (0xE75D│
│ [Rebasing ERC-20, proxy] [Proxy, impl: 0x82│
│ impl: 0xA7B7... │
│ │
│ REMOTE CHAINS: Origin 5/8 Safe (0x92A1..., GOV signer set) │
│ → Base Timelock (0xf817..., 48h) → Base remote strategy │
│ → HyperEVM Timelock (0x7712..., 48h) → HyperEVM remote strategy │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ OUSD VAULT (0xE75D...) │
│ │
│ Supported Asset: USDC only (0xA0b8...) No oracle, 1:1 mint/redeem │
│ (vault's price-provider slot is _deprecated_priceProvider) │
│ │
│ Roles: │
│ ├── governor: Timelock (0x3591...) [~5d timelock] │
│ │ approveStrategy, addStrategyToMintWhitelist, setTrusteeFeeBps, │
│ │ setAutoAllocateThreshold, setMaxSupplyDiff, setOperatorAddr, │
│ │ setWithdrawalClaimDelay, setStrategistAddr, upgradeTo │
│ ├── strategistAddr: 2-of-8 Safe (0x4FF1...) "Origin: Guardian" [none] │
│ │ Vault: depositToStrategy, withdrawFromStrategy, │
│ │ withdrawAllFromStrategy(ies), setDefaultStrategy, setVaultBuffer, │
│ │ setDripDuration, setRebaseRateMax, │
│ │ pauseCapital/Rebase, unpauseCapital/Rebase, rebase. │
│ │ AMO: mintAndAddOTokens, removeAndBurnOTokens, removeOnlyAssets. │
│ │ Remote strategies: deposit(All), withdraw(All). │
│ │ OUSD Token: delegateYield, undelegateYield (any account). │
│ │ Morpho: guardian/sentinel on all six OUSD vaults. │
│ ├── operatorAddr: EOA (0x7392...) [none]: rebase(), relay, balances │
│ ├── trusteeAddress: FeeSplitter (0xbbE5...) 20% fee → OGN buyback │
│ └── vaultBuffer: 0 (all funds deployed to strategies) │
│ │
│ Key Parameters: │
│ ├── autoAllocateThreshold: 25,000 USDC │
│ ├── dripDuration: 604,800s (7d) │
│ ├── rebasePerSecondMax: 2,496,362,574 (~7.87% APR) │
│ ├── maxSupplyDiff: 5% │
│ ├── withdrawalClaimDelay: 600s │
│ └── trusteeFeeBps: 2,000 (20%) │
│ │
│ Permissionless: mint, requestWithdrawal, claimWithdrawal(s), │
│ allocate, addWithdrawalQueueLiquidity │
│ Permissioned: rebase (operator / strategist / governor) │
│ │
└──────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────────────┘
│ │ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Curve USDC │ │ Morpho V2 │ │ Cross-Chain │ │ Cross-Chain │
│ AMO Strategy │ │ Strategy │ │ Master (Base)│ │ Master (HyperEVM) │
│ (0x26a0...) │ │ (0x3643...) │ │ (0xB1d6...) │ │ (0xE022...) │
│ $1.08M 17.1% │ │ $4.15M 65.9% │ │ $1.07M 17.0% │ │ ~$28 (wound down) │
│ │ │ │ │ cached bal │ │ still approved │
│ ┌──────────┐ │ │ ▼ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │Curve Pool│ │ │ OUSD-V2 │ │ CCTP V2 │ │ CCTP V2 │
│ │OUSD/USDC │ │ │ (0xFB15...) │ │ ▼ │ │ ▼ │
│ │(0x6d18..)│ │ │ Vault V2 │ │ Remote strat │ │ Remote strat │
│ │~$1.08M │ │ │ owner+curator│ │ (0xB1d6...) │ │ (0xE022...) │
│ │99.9% LP │ │ │ = Yearn Sec │ │ gov: 48h TL │ │ gov: 48h TL │
│ │ is AMO │ │ │ (4-of-7) │ │ ▼ │ │ ▼ │
│ └──────────┘ │ │ ▼ │ │ OUSDb-V2 → │ │ OUSDh-V2 → │
│ │ │ │ adapter → │ │ OUSDb-V1 │ │ OUSDh-V1 │
│ Gauge │ │ OUSD-V1 │ │ owner 4-of-7 │ │ owner 4-of-7 │
│ (0x1eF8..) │ │ (0x5B8b...) │ │ curator 2/3 │ │ curator 2/3 │
│ → CRV │ │ MetaMorpho │ │ timelock 3d │ │ timelock 3d │
│ rewards │ │ 3d timelock │ │ ▼ │ │ ▼ │
│ │ │ │ ▼ │ │ Morpho Blue │ │ Morpho Blue │
│ ▼ │ │ Morpho Blue │ │ superOETHb │ │ WHYPE / kHYPE │
│ Strategist │ │ OETH/USDC │ │ 77% ~$753K │ │ dust │
│ harvests │ │ 86% ~$3.95M │ │ cbXRP 62.5% │ │ │
│ │ │ 87.9% util │ │ ~$318K │ │ │
└──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ORIGIN-COLLATERAL CONCENTRATION (~75% of TVL) │
│ │
│ OETH/USDC market (Ethereum) ~$3.95M oracle: CL ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD│
│ superOETHb/USDC market (Base) ~$753K oracle: CL ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD│
│ │
│ Neither oracle reads an OETH/ETH or superOETHb/ETH price. A depeg of │
│ Origin's own LST does not trigger liquidation, it creates bad debt in │
│ the markets OUSD supplies. One EOA owes 73% of the OETH market's debt. │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ AMO MINTING FLOW │
│ │
│ Curve AMO Strategy → mintForStrategy() → OUSD Token mints new OUSD │
│ [Whitelisted by governor] [No vault-level cap] [99.8% solvency] │
│ │
│ OUSD enters Curve pool → only obtainable by swapping USDC → backed │
│ │
│ Constraints: │
│ ├── _solvencyAssert(): totalValue/totalSupply >= 99.8% │
│ ├── improvePoolBalance: must improve pool ratio │
│ ├── maxSlippage: 0.2% (governor-only setter) │
│ └── maxSupplyDiff: 5% (checked on requestWithdrawal) │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SECONDARY LIQUIDITY │
│ │
│ Curve Pool: OUSD/USDC (CurveStableSwapNG) │
│ (0x6d18...) ~$1.08M TVL (600,382 OUSD + 478,562 USDC) │
│ AMO holds 1,074,872 / 1,075,763 LP = 99.9%, not third-party depth │
│ │
│ Legacy: OUSD/3CRV Metapool (0x8765...) ~$28K TVL [deprecated] │
│ │
│ wOUSD (0xD2af...): ERC-4626 wrapper holding ~1.81M OUSD (~28.8%) │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Data flows:
Mint: User USDC → Vault → mint OUSD 1:1 → auto-allocate above 25K
Redeem: requestWithdrawal (burns OUSD, enqueues request) →
wait >=600s AND queue liquidity advances →
claimWithdrawal(s) pays USDC (no onchain upper bound on wait)
Rebase: Operator/strategist/governor calls rebase() → yield dripped over
7 days, capped at ~7.87% APR and 2% per rebase
AMO: Strategist → AMO Strategy → mintForStrategy → Curve pool
Yield: Morpho interest + CRV/MORPHO rewards → CoW Harvester → USDC → Vault
Fees: 20% of yield minted to FeeSplitter → harvester → OGN buyback
Bridge: Vault → Master strategy → CCTP → Remote strategy → Morpho V2 stack
Report: Remote strategy → CCTP message → master.remoteStrategyBalance
(stored until replaced; no expiry or cap)
Score Details
Critical Risk Gates
- Unverified contract source → PASS (vault, token, strategies, remote strategies, and every Morpho vault in the chain are source-verified)
- No audit → PASS (9 OUSD-specific audits including Trail of Bits, OpenZeppelin, Sigma Prime, Certora)
- Unverifiable reserves → PASS (fully onchain via
totalValue()and per-strategycheckBalance(), though the Base leg reads a CCTP-pushed cache) - Total centralization → PASS (xOGN governance + 48h Timelock on mainnet; the weakest material path is a 5-of-8 Safe behind a 48h Timelock (remote-strategy upgrade on Base or HyperEVM → that leg's funds and forged accounting); the only sub-3-signer untimelocked path is the rate-capped Base management fee; no EOA holds a material path)
Category Scores
Category 1: Audits & Historical Track Record (Weight: 20%): 1.5
Subcategory A: Audits & Security Reviews: 1.0
| Aspect | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Audits | 9 OUSD-specific audits by 5 top firms (OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits, Sigma Prime, Solidified, Certora) |
| Current architecture | The Feb 2026 Sigma Prime review scoped both the deployed vault implementation and the cross-chain CCTP strategies |
| Bug Bounty | $1M on Immunefi, OUSD token and vault explicitly in scope, SEAL Safe Harbor offered |
| Formal Verification | Certora formal verification (December 2024) |
| Continuous Review | OpenZeppelin reviews 100% of contract changes |
Subcategory B: Historical Track Record: 2.0
| Aspect | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Time in Production | ~6.1 years total, ~5.8 years since the secure relaunch |
| Past Incidents | $7.7M flash-loan reentrancy hack (Nov 2020) on pre-relaunch code; users fully compensated; different code since relaunch |
| TVL | ~$6.30M onchain, roughly flat over the last two months and ~98% below the $298M peak (Jan 2022) |
| Price Stability | Peg maintained within basis points of $1.00 since relaunch; Curve EMA marks OUSD at ~$0.9998 |
| Redemption pressure | 14 USDC outstanding in the queue across 216 lifetime requests |
Score: (1.0 + 2.0) / 2 = 1.5
Category 2: Centralization & Control Risks (Weight: 30%): 2.17
Subcategory A: Governance: 1.0
- Mainnet upgrades are DAO-gated end to end.
upgradeTo/upgradeToAndCallareonlyGovernoron the token and vault proxies, andgovernor()on the OUSD token, the vault, and all four mainnet strategies is the Timelock0x35918cDE7233F2dD33fA41ae3Cb6aE0e42E0e69F. PROPOSER and EXECUTOR are held solely by Origin DeFi Governance;getMinDelay()= 48h,votingDelay7,200 blocks +votingPeriod14,416 blocks give 5.00 days from proposal to execution. - The weakest material path sits outside the DAO. An Origin 5-of-8 Safe can upgrade either remote strategy after a 48h delay, without an xOGN vote, and use it to keep that leg's funds or report an uncapped forged balance into mainnet accounting. The Morpho curation path over ~66% of TVL is held back by a vetoable 72-hour timelock. The Base curator's untimelocked management fee is rate-capped at 5%/yr and gate-restricted.
- No EOA or sub-3-signer holder has an uncapped path to material loss, so the critical gate does not apply. The weakest path is a 5-of-8 Safe behind a 48h timelock, which meets the rubric's score-1 row on signer threshold (above 3/5) and on delay (48h+). It skips the xOGN vote and has no independent canceller, so the 48 hours give users time to exit rather than a veto. That is recorded under Key Risks but does not move the score under the rubric. Governance: 1.0.
Subcategory B: Programmability: 2.5
- Minting,
requestWithdrawal,claimWithdrawal,allocate, andaddWithdrawalQueueLiquidityare permissionless; rebase is algorithmic, rate-capped, and can only ratchet supply upward withintotalValue() - Broad untimelocked strategist surface (2-of-8 multisig,
onlyGovernorOrStrategist): AMO mint/burn, strategy allocation (depositToStrategy,withdrawFromStrategy,withdrawAllFromStrategies,setDefaultStrategy), vault parameters (setVaultBuffer,setDripDuration,setRebaseRateMax), pause controls, remote-strategy deposits and withdrawals, and OUSD tokendelegateYield/undelegateYield, which can redirect any account's rebase yield without consent. Cumulative principal loss from these calls is bounded by code (approved-strategy list, forced recipients, AMO solvency state check). - An operator EOA calls
rebase()and relays cross-chain balance updates. Its power is bounded, but live accounting for the Base leg depends on an offchain keeper doing its job. - Cross-chain strategy management and AMO rebalancing require manual intervention; reward harvesting is semi-automated via CoW Protocol
Subcategory C: External Dependencies: 3.0
- Critical: USDC/Circle (sole asset); Morpho Blue (~82.9% of TVL); Origin's own OETH/superOETHb as the collateral behind ~74.6% of TVL
- The Morpho curation layer on all three chains is Yearn's own, so it is not scored as an external trust assumption
- High: Curve (AMO yield plus the only meaningful on-Ethereum DEX exit, 99.9% AMO-owned), Circle CCTP (asset transport and the accounting message bus for the Base leg), Chainlink (prices the OETH/superOETHb markets). Low: CoW Protocol (reward swaps)
- Winding down the HyperEVM leg removed RedStone and a third chain, but concentration in Origin-issued collateral rose from ~54% to ~75% of TVL, so the score stays at 3.0
Score: (1.0 + 2.5 + 3.0) / 3 = 2.17
Category 3: Funds Management (Weight: 30%): 2.25
Subcategory A: Collateralization: 2.5
- 100% onchain backing, ratio 100.14%, single high-quality asset (USDC)
- But the backing is deployed as lending claims rather than held: ~82.9% of TVL is USDC supplied to Morpho Blue and ~17.1% is an AMO LP position. The collateral behind those claims is concentrated in a single issuer: Origin's own OETH/superOETHb back ~74.6% of TVL at an assumed 1:1 ETH peg, and the remainder is mostly cbXRP (~5.0%) and cbBTC (~3.2%)
- Borrower concentration: one EOA holds 72.5% of the Ethereum OETH market's debt (health factor ~1.48); OUSD supplies 39% of that market and 95% of the Base superOETHb market
- AMO can create unbacked OUSD only up to the 99.8% solvency floor
vaultBuffer= 0; raw idle USDC only covers the queue reserve- Every loan is over-collateralized by LSTs or blue-chip assets, which sits in the rubric's score-2 collateral-quality row. Single-issuer concentration (~75% of TVL, against ~54% at the August assessment, after the HyperEVM funds moved into the Ethereum OETH market) and the hard-peg oracles keep the score at 2.5
Subcategory B: Provability: 2.0
- Everything is onchain and permissionlessly readable, with no offchain attestation anywhere
- Reconstruction is involved:
totalValue()nets out the queue reserve, and the cross-chain leg requires walking a master strategy, a remote strategy, two Morpho vault layers, and the underlying markets on Base - ~17.0% of reported TVL is a cached
remoteStrategyBalancerefreshed by CCTP messages. The stored value does not expire and is not capped; it was ~20 hours old and tracked the remote side to within ~$142 at the snapshot
Score: (2.5 + 2.0) / 2 = 2.25
Category 4: Liquidity Risk (Weight: 15%): 3.0
- Async withdrawal queue: 10-minute minimum delay (
withdrawalClaimDelay= 600s) plus queue liquidity catch-up; no onchain upper bound - Instantly reachable on Ethereum: ~$1.22M of free OETH-market liquidity (shared with other suppliers) + ~$204K cbBTC position + ~$479K Curve USDC side ≈ $1.90M, ~30% of TVL, against ~34% at the August assessment. The ~63%-of-TVL OETH position sits in an 87.9%-utilized market
- Curve OUSD/USDC pool ~$1.08M, 56/44 OUSD-heavy: −0.04% at 100K OUSD, −0.11% at 300K, −5.05% at 500K as the USDC side runs out; 99.9% of LP is Origin's own AMO
- Base leg (~$1.07M) needs a CCTP round trip, and ~$676K of its superOETHb position cannot be withdrawn until borrowers repay
- Same-value assets (USD stablecoins) mitigate waiting risk; no priority mechanism, first-come-first-served
- Scored 3.0 (2.5 at the August assessment): ~70% of TVL still depends on Morpho borrowers repaying or a bridge round trip, which matches the rubric's "3-7 days for full exit" row, and exits above the ~$479K Curve USDC side take more than 3% slippage
Category 5: Operational Risk (Weight: 5%): 1.0
- Established team (2017), public, VC-backed (Pantera, Founders Fund)
- Comprehensive security repo with 30+ audit reports
- $1M bug bounty, SEAL Safe Harbor offered
- Demonstrated incident response capability (2020 hack recovery and user compensation)
Final Score Calculation
Final Score = (Audits × 0.20) + (Centralization × 0.30) + (Funds Mgmt × 0.30) + (Liquidity × 0.15) + (Operational × 0.05)
= (1.5 × 0.20) + (2.17 × 0.30) + (2.25 × 0.30) + (3.0 × 0.15) + (1.0 × 0.05)
= 0.300 + 0.650 + 0.675 + 0.450 + 0.050
= 2.125
→ 2.12 (two decimals, rounded down)
| Category | Score | Weight | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audits & Historical | 1.5 | 20% | 0.300 |
| Centralization & Control | 2.17 | 30% | 0.650 |
| Funds Management | 2.25 | 30% | 0.675 |
| Liquidity Risk | 3.0 | 15% | 0.450 |
| Operational Risk | 1.0 | 5% | 0.050 |
| Final Score | 2.12 / 5.0 |
Risk Tier
| Final Score | Risk Tier | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| 1.00–1.49 | Minimal Risk | Approved, high confidence |
| 1.50–2.49 | Low Risk | Approved with standard monitoring |
| 2.50–3.49 | Medium Risk | Approved with enhanced monitoring |
| 3.50–4.49 | Elevated Risk | Limited approval, strict limits |
| 4.50–5.00 | High Risk | Not recommended |
Final Risk Tier: LOW RISK
Assessment History
| Date | Score | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| June 25, 2026 | 1.85 | Initial assessment |
| August 31, 2026 | 2.05 | TVL $6.24M (−16%); tracing the Morpho legs showed ~54% of TVL lent against Origin's own OETH / superOETHb under oracles that assume a 1:1 ETH peg. Corrected the withdrawal-queue reading (14 USDC outstanding, not ~$1.68M). Dependencies 2.5 → 3.0, Collateralization 2.0 → 2.5, Provability 1.5 → 2.0. |
| November 17, 2026 | 2.12 | TVL $6.30M; with the HyperEVM leg wound down, Origin-LST collateral rose to ~75% of TVL and instant liquidity fell to ~30%. Added Critical Permission Paths: the weakest path is a remote-strategy upgrade by an Origin 5/8 Safe, behind 48h on both chains after Origin raised the HyperEVM Timelock from 60 seconds (tx). Liquidity 2.5 → 3.0; Governance (1.0) and Collateralization (2.5) held. |