Bedrock uniBTC

Contract Addresses

uniBTC Token Layer

Contract	Address	Role
uniBTC token proxy	0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568	User-facing uniBTC token, EIP-1967 transparent proxy
uniBTC token implementation	0xe0E6a124d500BE28BBdC47e6123E68B23b039cAD	Token implementation
uniBTC ProxyAdmin	0x029E4FbDAa31DE075dD74B2238222A08233978f6	Upgrade authority for uniBTC token, uniBTC Vault, and CCIPPeer

Bridge / Cross-Chain Mint Layer

Contract	Address	Role
Chainlink CCIP BurnMintTokenPool 1.5.1	0x1689C22eD5435e49071CFc208D1Ac6F2A2274490	Registered uniBTC pool in the CCIP TokenAdminRegistry; holds MINTER_ROLE; owner() = Bedrock admin Safe 0xAeE01705… (3/5)
Bedrock CCIPPeer	0x55a67cf07b8a9A09FB6D565279287cfE4Ab60eDc	Bedrock-custom CCIP messaging contract; holds MINTER_ROLE; upgradeable proxy under the uniBTC ProxyAdmin
Free Tunnel bridge proxy	0x70aF4743F85E5E74E3b6dDFa38926c0a762Ad21C	Third-party Free Tunnel (Free Protocol) bridge; holds MINTER_ROLE; not mentioned in Bedrock's uniBTC bridge docs

uniBTC Protocol Layer

Contract	Address	Role
uniBTC Vault proxy	0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da	Mint/redeem uniBTC against allowed wrapped BTC
uniBTC Vault implementation	0x01e9161D1621466eB086651FD514d3eFb8C3752E	VaultWithoutNative implementation
Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed	0xc590D9fb8eE78a0909dFF341ccf717000b7b7fF2	uniBTC reserve feed, 18 decimals, 2% deviation
uniBTC supply feeder	0xE542919E4b281f10b437F947c8Ba224DdfaBc716	Aggregates global uniBTC supply for PoR comparison

Governance Layer

Safe	Address	Threshold	Controls
uniBTC ops Safe	0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3	3/5	Owns uniBTC ProxyAdmin; holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on uniBTC Vault

Onchain verification on August 10, 2026 read Safe thresholds/owners via getThreshold() / getOwners(), ProxyAdmin ownership via owner(), Vault/token roles via hasRole(bytes32,address), and EIP-1967 implementation/admin slots. The uniBTC ops Safe has no modules and no guard configured (getModulesPaginated empty, guard storage slot zero).

Signer overlap: signer 0x09610d4239c8f3413509202DCcC7e27C6B0a47A3 appears in multiple Bedrock governance Safes, and signer 0x1fc76b7C6F092e0566Ce9Bbb9c6803Ba5e45Ba32 appears in both the uniBTC and brBTC Safe set. This reduces effective independence across Bedrock product lines.

How uniBTC Works

• Deposit assets accepted: WBTC, FBTC, cbBTC, M-BTC, and uniBTC itself for cross-chain routing.
• Mint flow: User deposits a permitted wrapped BTC asset into the Vault mint function and atomically receives uniBTC 1:1 in 8-decimal BTC units.
• PoR gate: Minting checks Chainlink PoR reserves against circulating supply reported by the uniBTC supply feeder. Onchain verification on August 10, 2026 read chainlinkReserveFeeder = 0xc590D9fb..., uniBTCSupplyFeeder = 0xE542919E..., feederHeartbeat = 86,400s, outOfService = false, and paused = false.
• Adequacy ratio: The Vault explicitly permits minting while PoR-reported reserves are at least 90% of supply. Onchain verification read adequacyRatio = 900, and source review found checkReserve requiring supply * adequacyRatio / 1000 <= reserves. This is not a strict 1:1 mint gate.
• Redeem flow: Bedrock docs describe claim-based unstaking with an 8-day delay, 0.5% redemption fee, and 2 WBTC/day Ethereum cap.
• Custody: TODO - Bedrock docs do not name the BTC custodian(s), signers, or full address-control model for the backing wallets monitored by Chainlink PoR.
• Cross-chain: Chainlink CCIP is the documented canonical bridge path (BurnMintTokenPool with 14 configured lanes). Onchain enumeration also found two additional live Ethereum mint paths: a Bedrock-custom CCIPPeer contract and a third-party Free Tunnel bridge that Bedrock's uniBTC bridge documentation does not mention. uniBTC is deployed across many chains; Ethereum is one slice of total supply.
• Freeze authority: The uniBTC token implements FREEZER_ROLE with a frozenUsers mapping and a freezeToRecipient address. The ops Safe holds FREEZER_ROLE, and freezeToRecipient is currently the deployer EOA 0x899c284A… (verified August 10, 2026). Token-level freezing of user balances is a governance-controlled loss/censorship path.

Token Mint Authority

Mint mechanism: Role-gated AccessControl. mint(address,uint256) on the uniBTC token is onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE); burn/burnFrom are standard permissionless holder burns. The role is not enumerable onchain, so holders were reconstructed from a full RoleGranted/RoleRevoked event scan on the token (from deployment to August 10, 2026) and each current holder confirmed via hasRole.

Mint requires backing: No — at the token level any MINTER_ROLE holder can issue unbacked uniBTC. Backing checks live in the callers: the Vault path is PoR-gated (to 90% adequacy); the bridge paths rely on burn/lock on the source chain.

Current Ethereum MINTER_ROLE holders (verified August 10, 2026):

Minter / Role Holder	Address	Notes
uniBTC Vault	0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da	Collateralized mint path for supported wrapped BTC deposits. Mint is PoR-gated but allows a 10% reserve shortfall via adequacyRatio = 900.
Chainlink CCIP BurnMintTokenPool 1.5.1	0x1689C22eD5435e49071CFc208D1Ac6F2A2274490	Registered in the CCIP TokenAdminRegistry (getPool(uniBTC) verified). Burn/mint model — the CCIP message path can mint native uniBTC supply. owner() = Bedrock admin Safe (3/5). Outbound rate limits enabled on all 14 configured lanes.
Bedrock CCIPPeer	0x55a67cf07b8a9A09FB6D565279287cfE4Ab60eDc	Bedrock-custom CCIP messaging contract predating the token pool. Upgradeable TransparentUpgradeableProxy administered by the uniBTC ProxyAdmin (i.e. the 3/5 ops Safe). Its message-authentication configuration is a distinct mint trust path.
Free Tunnel bridge	0x70aF4743F85E5E74E3b6dDFa38926c0a762Ad21C	Third-party Free Protocol bridge (TunnelContract behind DelayedERC1967Proxy). Mints require 3-of-4 executor signatures; admin is EOA 0x0014Eb4A…; executor rotation has a built-in 36h–5d delay. Not mentioned in Bedrock's uniBTC bridge docs. The same contract also holds MINTER_ROLE on Bedrock's brBTC.

Token admin / freeze authority: the ops Safe 0xC9dA980f… (3/5) holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (can grant MINTER_ROLE to any address with no timelock — an unbacked-mint escalation path) and FREEZER_ROLE (token-level user freezing; freezeToRecipient is the deployer EOA 0x899c284A…).

Historical grants (from the event scan): several temporary MINTER_ROLE grants have been made and revoked over the token's life, including grant-mint-revoke same-block patterns by the ops Safe and two temporary grants to the operational EOA 0x9251Fd3D… (revoked). This is evidence of manual, admin-driven supply operations outside the vault path.

Rate limits / supply caps: none at the token level; the CCIP pool enforces per-lane rate limits (bucket capacity 2 uniBTC, ≈200 uniBTC/day refill on the sampled lane). Free Tunnel and CCIPPeer limits: TODO.

Non-Ethereum deployments: complete mint/burn authority enumeration for every non-Ethereum uniBTC deployment (30+ chains) remains TODO.

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

Scope	Firm	Date	Link
uniBTC	BlockSec	Jun 12, 2024	PDF
uniBTC	PeckShield	Oct 1, 2024	PDF
uniBTC	BlockSec	Oct 30, 2024	PDF

The October 2024 audits are post-exploit re-engagements covering the patched uniBTC vault. All three published uniBTC audits are from 2024; no later independent review was found for subsequent production changes, dependency evolution, or the current cross-chain deployment. No top-tier audit engagement (Trail of Bits, OpenZeppelin, ChainSecurity, Spearbit, Cantina) was found for uniBTC.

The age of the reviews matters for two reasons. First, an audit is point-in-time evidence: it only supports the code, configuration, assumptions, and dependencies that were in scope when the work was performed. Even if the core vault bytecode remains unchanged, uniBTC's current security depends on live governance configuration, PoR inputs, cross-chain deployments, custody and Babylon operations, and the material M-BTC/Merlin exposure described below. The 2024 reports do not establish that this present system has been reviewed as one end-to-end trust boundary.

Second, the security-review capability available in 2026 is materially different. Modern engagements can supplement expert manual review with repository-wide AI agents, automated exploit construction, invariant testing, and repeated independent passes. The 2026 EVMbench research demonstrates that frontier agents can detect, patch, and execute high-severity smart-contract exploits end to end, while also showing that detection remains incomplete. This does not make the 2024 audits invalid or make AI a substitute for experienced human auditors; it means those reports did not benefit from today's additional review and adversarial-testing capabilities. A current re-audit should therefore be treated as materially stronger assurance than relying solely on the 2024 reports.

Bug Bounty

• No public Immunefi / Cantina / Sherlock / Code4rena bug bounty program found.
• SEAL Safe Harbor: NOT registered. A check of the onchain SafeHarborRegistry 0x8f72fcf695523A6FC7DD97EafDd7A083c386b7b6 adoption logs found no Bedrock-related entries.

Historical Track Record

• Time in production: uniBTC launched in 2024; DeFiLlama first records Bedrock uniBTC on Oct 29, 2024.
• TVL (DeFiLlama, August 10, 2026): Bedrock uniBTC reported $294.4M. Major slices: Bitcoin $111.4M, Ethereum $83.7M, Merlin $56.4M, BOB $26.1M, BNB Chain $16.1M.
• Peak TVL: Bedrock uniBTC peaked at $638.3M on July 15, 2025.
• Minimum after launch: $109.4M on Nov 2, 2024, shortly after the Sept 2024 exploit.
• Ethereum total supply: Onchain verification on August 10, 2026 read 2,984.38211771 uniBTC (298,438,211,771 sats).
• Global supply vs PoR reserves (August 10, 2026): the uniBTC supply feeder reported a global supply of 4,551.54515183 uniBTC, and the Chainlink PoR feed reported reserves of 4,642.877154987678460714 BTC (18 decimals, updated 2026-08-09T21:48Z) — reserves ≈ 102.0% of reported global supply at the snapshot.

Security Incident: September 27, 2024 - uniBTC Mint Exploit

• Loss: approximately $2M, reported as roughly 649.6 WETH by public incident analyses.
• Root cause: The uniBTC Vault mint flow did not properly validate the deposit asset's price/decimals against the uniBTC issuance rate. Public analyses describe an attacker depositing WETH and receiving uniBTC 1:1, then swapping uniBTC for WETH.
• Affected contract: uniBTC Vault 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da, the same proxy address still in use after the patch.
• Exploiter: EOA 0x2bFB373017349820dda2Da8230E6b66739BE9F96.
• Response: Bedrock paused the vault, upgraded the implementation, added Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve / Secure Mint checks, and re-audited with PeckShield and BlockSec in October 2024. Fuzzland publicly took responsibility because the attacker was reportedly a Fuzzland ex-employee; Fuzzland reimbursed Bedrock with company funds (Cointelegraph, June 2025; Cryptonews).
• Restitution txs: TODO - specific onchain Fuzzland-to-Bedrock reimbursement transaction hashes are not publicly disclosed.

The exploit occurred on the same vault proxy that remains in production. Post-exploit controls are materially stronger, but future upgrade or validation mistakes remain a high-impact path because there is no onchain timelock.

Funds Management

Accessibility

Token	Mint	Redeem	Fees	Permissioning
uniBTC	Atomic, PoR-gated	8-day queue, per docs	0.5% redemption fee; 2 WBTC/day Ethereum cap	Permissionless

Collateralization

• uniBTC is intended to be backed 1:1 by wrapped BTC assets and native/restaked BTC positions.
• Accepted deposit assets include WBTC, FBTC, cbBTC, and M-BTC. Counterparty quality is mixed: WBTC and cbBTC are more established; FBTC and M-BTC are newer issuer/custody dependencies.
• Chainlink PoR reported backing at ≈102.0% of global supply in the August 10, 2026 verification pass, but the mint gate permits up to 10% under-collateralization via adequacyRatio = 900.
• Only a small amount of WBTC is held directly in the Ethereum Vault (0.74418586 WBTC on August 10, 2026, plus 0.01 WBTC in the ops Safe). The majority of backing sits outside the Ethereum vault contract, including native BTC/restaking/custody arrangements monitored through PoR.

M-BTC / Merlin concentration

The Bedrock statistics dashboard reported 990.88378325 M-BTC within uniBTC reserves on August 8, 2026, equal to approximately 21.3% of total reported reserves (4,643.29 BTC). The linked Merlin explorer independently showed Bedrock's reserve address 0xF977...AB18 as the second-largest M-BTC holder, holding 17.38% of M-BTC supply.

M-BTC is not native BTC; Merlin documents it as a receipt minted against Bitcoin Layer 1 assets deposited through Merlin's bridge. This adds Merlin bridge custody, relayer, chain-liveness, and redemption risk beneath uniBTC. Merlin launched mainnet in February 2024 and M-BTC claims opened in March 2024, so the product is no longer brand new but remains materially younger and less trust-minimized than established wrapped-BTC rails. Merlin's official bridge documentation states that the bridge is upgradeable, multisig-managed, and has no timelock. Merlin's data-availability documentation also describes public DA as a "coming" solution, while the current design relies on its oracle/DAC layer and offchain proof-verification machinery rather than Bitcoin enforcing the full L2 state transition.

The M-BTC token source restricts mint and burn to its configured bridge, and the current main bridge exposes multiple authorized unlockTokenAdmin relayers. That is better than an unrestricted public mint, but correctness still depends on offchain Bitcoin-deposit observation, bridge administration, and custody/signing. No public user-controlled unilateral Bitcoin exit path was identified.

Provability

uniBTC has materially better reserve provability than brBTC because a Chainlink PoR feed is wired directly into the uniBTC Vault mint path. The Bedrock dashboard also exposes the constituent native-BTC addresses and wrapped-token reserve addresses; it is more than an unlinked aggregate chart. However, address visibility does not prove the full operational state:

• The feed depends on a Bedrock-supplied address set.
• PoR validates balances, not legal ownership, private-key control, liabilities, encumbrances, or the ability to redeem those assets promptly.
• The Vault allows minting if reserves are at least 90% of supply.
• The named custodian/signing setup remains undisclosed, and the dashboard does not map native-BTC UTXOs to Babylon staking state, finality providers, slashing exposure, or unbonding status.
• Approximately 21.3% of reserves are M-BTC, so proving that Bedrock holds the token does not independently prove the corresponding Bitcoin remains available behind Merlin's bridge.

Liquidity Risk

• Primary exit: Bedrock redemption queue. The documented 8-day delay, 0.5% fee, and 2 WBTC/day Ethereum cap materially limit large same-chain exits.
• Secondary exit: CoinGecko reported uniBTC 24h volume of only $7,243 across all listed venues on August 10, 2026 — effectively no secondary market for a ~$294M asset.
• Slippage (CoW Protocol quotes, August 10, 2026): a 15.46 uniBTC (~$1M) → WBTC quote returned 10.50 WBTC, ≈32% slippage; a 77.3 uniBTC (~$5M) quote returned 10.51 WBTC, ≈86% slippage. Onchain secondary exit is effectively unusable beyond trivial size; the capped, delayed redemption queue is the only real exit.
• Downstream integration: brBTC accepts uniBTC as an input asset. Stress in brBTC may create uniBTC flow pressure, and stress in uniBTC directly affects brBTC when uniBTC is used as backing.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

• uniBTC token and uniBTC Vault are upgradeable transparent proxies.
• The uniBTC ops Safe is 3-of-5 and owns the ProxyAdmin.
• The same Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on the uniBTC Vault.
• No Safe Guard or Delay module is configured on the uniBTC ops Safe (verified August 10, 2026). A 3-of-5 signature can therefore upgrade implementations, grant MINTER_ROLE, or freeze user balances without an onchain delay.
• The ops Safe additionally holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and FREEZER_ROLE on the uniBTC token itself: it can grant mint authority to any address and freeze arbitrary user balances, with freezeToRecipient currently set to a deployer EOA.
• Two bridge contracts and one Bedrock messaging contract hold live MINTER_ROLE (CCIP token pool, CCIPPeer, Free Tunnel); the Free Tunnel path is absent from Bedrock's public documentation.
• Signer overlap across Bedrock Safes weakens practical separation between product lines.

Programmability

Minting is programmatic and PoR-gated, which is a major strength relative to opaque custody wrappers. The main residual programmability risks are upgradeability, role-controlled pausing/outflows, PoR address-set dependence, and the explicit 90% adequacy threshold.

External Dependencies

Dependency	Used by uniBTC	Criticality
Chainlink PoR feed	Mint reserve gate	High - stale/wrong data can halt or weaken mint safety
Chainlink CCIP	Cross-chain routing - BurnMintTokenPool + CCIPPeer both hold MINTER_ROLE; 14 lanes, per-lane rate limits enabled	High - bridge security affects multi-chain supply/peg, partially mitigated by rate limits
Free Tunnel (Free Protocol)	Cross-chain routing - bridge contract holds MINTER_ROLE, undocumented in Bedrock docs	High - third-party bridge with mint rights; 3-of-4 executor signatures, EOA admin
WBTC / FBTC / cbBTC	Accepted deposit assets	High - issuer/custody risk
M-BTC / Merlin bridge	~21.3% of reported reserves on Aug. 8, 2026	High - bridge custody, relayer, upgrade, no-timelock, chain-liveness and redemption risk
Bitcoin network / native BTC custody	Backing assets	Critical
Babylon Labs / BTC restaking venues	Yield / restaking exposure	High
Undisclosed custody/signing setup	BTC backing control	Critical unknown

Operational Risk

• Team transparency: Bedrock/RockX leadership is public. Zhuling Chen is CEO of Bedrock and RockX; Alex Lam is a RockX co-founder.
• Legal structure: Per Bedrock Terms of Use, the website and protocol are operated by Golden Bull Enterprises Limited, formed under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.
• Documentation: Public docs cover minting, unstaking, audits, and PoR at a high level. Custodian identity, full signing model, and restitution txs remain undisclosed.
• Incident handling: The Sept 2024 response was credible (pause, patch, re-audit, PoR hardening, users made whole through Fuzzland reimbursement), but the incident remains a meaningful historical risk marker because it affected the same vault proxy still in production.

Monitoring

Critical

1. Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed 0xc590D9fb8eE78a0909dFF341ccf717000b7b7fF2:
   • latestAnswer() vs global uniBTC supply.
   • Feed staleness relative to the 24h heartbeat.
2. uniBTC Vault 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da:
   • outOfService().
   • paused().
   • Upgraded events.
   • Role grants/revocations and execute() target list changes.
3. uniBTC token 0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568:
   • totalSupply() changes.
   • Implementation upgrades.
   • RoleGranted / RoleRevoked for MINTER_ROLE, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, and FREEZER_ROLE — any new minter is a potential unbacked-mint path and should page immediately.
   • Freeze events / frozenUsers additions and freezeToRecipient changes.
   • Mints not originating from the Vault, CCIP token pool, CCIPPeer, or Free Tunnel bridge.
4. Bridge minters:
   • CCIP token pool 0x1689C22e…: rate-limit config changes, lane additions/removals, ownership transfer.
   • CCIPPeer 0x55a67cf0…: implementation upgrades, peer/sender configuration changes.
   • Free Tunnel 0x70aF4743…: executor-set updates, admin transfer, abnormal mint volume.
5. uniBTC ops Safe 0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3:
   • owner additions/removals and threshold changes.
6. Liquidity / peg:
   • uniBTC/WBTC ratio on Ethereum and major cross-chain venues.
   • DEX depth and 24h volume.
   • Redemption queue throughput versus the 2 WBTC/day Ethereum cap.
7. M-BTC / Merlin dependency:
   • Bedrock reserve address 0xF977...AB18 balance as a percentage of uniBTC reserves and total M-BTC supply.
   • M-BTC bridge mint/burn events, authorized unlockTokenAdmin changes, bridge upgrades, pauses, and Bitcoin redemption performance.

Recommended Frequency

• PoR feed: every block or keeper-style monitoring.
• Vault pause/outOfService/upgrades: every block.
• Governance Safe activity: daily.
• Supply reconciliation: daily.
• TVL / market liquidity: daily.

Appendix: Contract Architecture

Governance Layer
================
uniBTC Ops Safe 0xC9dA980f... (3/5)
  |-- owns ProxyAdmin 0x029e4fbd...
  |     |-- admin --> uniBTC token 0x004E9C...
  |     `-- admin --> uniBTC Vault 0x047D41...
  `-- DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE --> uniBTC Vault

Token / Vault Layer
===================
uniBTC token 0x004E9C...0568
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: uniBTC Vault 0x047D41...D6Da
  |     |-- accepts WBTC / FBTC / cbBTC / M-BTC
  |     |-- checks Chainlink PoR 0xc590D9fb...
  |     `-- checks global supply feeder 0xE542919E...
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: CCIP BurnMintTokenPool 0x1689C2... (owner: Bedrock admin Safe; 14 rate-limited lanes)
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: Bedrock CCIPPeer 0x55a67c... (proxy under ops-Safe ProxyAdmin)
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: Free Tunnel bridge 0x70aF47... (3/4 executors, EOA admin, undocumented)
  `-- FREEZER_ROLE + DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: ops Safe 0xC9dA98... (freeze users; grant minters; no timelock)

Backing / External Layer
========================
Wrapped BTC issuers
Native BTC custody / restaking
Babylon and BTC restaking venues
M-BTC / Merlin bridge and custody stack
Chainlink PoR + CCIP

Critical Unknowns
=================
Named BTC custodian/signers
Mint/burn authority map for non-Ethereum deployments
Public restitution txs for Sept 2024 exploit

---

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 3 months, or sooner on any event below.
• TVL / supply-based: Reassess if uniBTC TVL or supply changes by more than +/-40% from the August 10, 2026 baseline.
• Incident-based: Any exploit, depeg >2% sustained >1h, PoR reserve shortfall, redemption queue freeze, bridge failure, or governance compromise.
• Specific triggers:
  1. Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed reports backing below circulating supply.
  2. PoR feed stale beyond heartbeat.
  3. adequacyRatio is lowered or PoR feeder / supply feeder is changed.
  4. uniBTC token or Vault implementation upgrade.
  5. ProxyAdmin or Safe ownership transfer.
  6. Safe owner addition/removal or threshold change.
  7. Disclosure of BTC custodian/signers.
  8. Introduction of an onchain timelock / Safe Delay module.
  9. New top-tier audit or bug bounty publication.
  10. M-BTC exceeds 25% of uniBTC reserves, depegs, pauses redemption, changes bridge administrators, or changes its mint/burn implementation.
  11. Any RoleGranted for MINTER_ROLE, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, or FREEZER_ROLE on the uniBTC token, any freeze event, or any change to freezeToRecipient.
  12. Change of CCIP token pool, CCIPPeer upgrade, Free Tunnel executor/admin change, or a mint from an address outside the four known minters.

Open TODOs (Items Not Verifiable This Session)

• Custodian identity / signing setup for BTC backing uniBTC.
• Native-BTC/Babylon position reconciliation: mapping each published reserve address to custodian ownership, Babylon staking transaction, finality provider, slashing status and unbonding state.
• M-BTC bridge assurance: independently verified Bitcoin backing, custody/MPC quorum, complete mint-relayer set, upgrade authority, and a documented unilateral or emergency exit path.
• Mint/burn authority enumeration for non-Ethereum deployments - Ethereum mint authority is fully enumerated in this report (four minters plus token admin/freezer); the 30+ non-Ethereum deployments each have their own minter/bridge configuration that has not been individually verified.
• CCIPPeer message-authentication configuration and Free Tunnel per-lane limits - both hold MINTER_ROLE; their complete sender/limit configuration was not fully traced.
• September 2024 restitution transactions - onchain Fuzzland-to-Bedrock reimbursement tx hashes are not published.

Sources

• Bedrock docs: https://docs.bedrock.technology/
• Bedrock app: https://app.bedrock.technology/
• Bedrock statistics: https://app.bedrock.technology/statistics
• Bedrock audit reports: https://docs.bedrock.technology/security/audit-reports
• Bedrock GitHub org: https://github.com/Bedrock-Technology
• uniBTC GitHub: https://github.com/Bedrock-Technology/uniBTC
• DefiLlama Bedrock uniBTC: https://defillama.com/protocol/bedrock-unibtc
• DefiLlama Bedrock aggregate: https://defillama.com/protocol/bedrock
• Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed: https://data.chain.link/feeds/ethereum/mainnet/unibtc-por
• QuillAudits hack analysis: https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/bedrock-2million-exploit
• BlockApex hack analysis: https://blockapex.medium.com/unibtc-hack-analysis-bffd6cebd4a8
• Babylon Labs: https://babylonlabs.io/
• Bedrock live reserve composition and linked addresses: https://app.bedrock.technology/statistics
• Merlin M-BTC model and contract: https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/user-quick-start/how-to/m-token/what-is-m-token and https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/user-quick-start/how-to/m-token/m-token-contract-address
• Merlin bridge security disclosures: https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/user-quick-start/how-to/bridge/official-bridge
• Merlin data-availability status: https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/about-merlin/key-modules/data-availability
• Merlin bridge source: https://github.com/MerlinLayer2/BTCLayer2BridgeContract
• M-BTC holder distribution: https://scan.merlinchain.io/token/0xB880fd278198bd590252621d4CD071b1842E9Bcd
• Independent Merlin trust-model analysis: https://www.spark.money/research/merlin-chain-bitcoin-l2-analysis
• EVMbench smart-contract security agent research (2026): https://openai.com/index/introducing-evmbench/
• Onchain verification on August 10, 2026: totalSupply(), EIP-1967 implementation/admin slots, owner() on ProxyAdmin, getThreshold() / getOwners() / getModulesPaginated() and guard storage on the Safe, hasRole(bytes32,address) on Vault/token (including FREEZER_ROLE and freezeToRecipient()), full RoleGranted/RoleRevoked event scan on the token, chainlinkReserveFeeder(), uniBTCSupplyFeeder() + supply feeder totalSupply(), feederHeartbeat(), outOfService(), paused(), adequacyRatio(), WBTC balanceOf(address) on Vault and Safe, Chainlink PoR latestRoundData(), CCIP TokenAdminRegistry.getPool(uniBTC) + pool typeAndVersion() / owner() / getSupportedChains() / per-lane rate-limiter states, and Free Tunnel getAdmin() / getActiveExecutors().
• Market data on August 10, 2026: DeFiLlama protocol TVL and per-chain split; CoinGecko 24h volume; CoW Protocol swap quotes for ~$1M and ~$5M uniBTC → WBTC exits.
• Reserve/Merlin verification on August 8, 2026: Bedrock dashboard reserve composition and linked addresses; M-BTC totalSupply(), bridgeAddress(), Bedrock reserve balance and holder rank; main bridge version(), admin and mint-relayer reads; EIP-1967 implementation slots; and bytecode-presence checks via Merlin RPC.