Superstate USCC

Contract Addresses

Snapshot date: September 5, 2026.

Contract	Address
USCC Token (Proxy)	0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c
USCC Implementation (FundToken, VERSION "1.3.0")	0x7e906c0006d3F08bE94EF4685c59b5Cde4fb4feF
USCC ProxyAdmin	0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D
AllowList V3.1 (Proxy, shared with USTB)	0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B825611d8A38E5
AllowList Implementation (VERSION "3.1")	0x2f67d98bd20D9580F52Efa5FF70EDaEd9F2f316D
AllowList ProxyAdmin	0xb819692a58db9dd4d3b403a875439b6ca155c610
Chainlink USCC NAV Oracle (OffchainAggregator wrapper)	0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9
Chainlink USCC Aggregator (OCR-style)	0x5C00518D3d423EC59D553Af123Be8a63B11078CF
Aggregator owner (Chainlink-controlled)	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA

Owner Addresses

As of September 5, 2026, all Superstate-controlled admin keys are EOAs:

Onchain, these owners are plain EOAs. Superstate states that admin keys use Turnkey secure enclaves, but that is an offchain operational control and cannot be independently verified from Ethereum contract state. This report therefore scores the owner addresses as EOAs for governance purposes; any MPC / TEE / Turnkey protection is treated only as an offchain mitigation.

Role	Address
USCC Token Owner + USCC ProxyAdmin Owner (same EOA)	0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1
AllowList Owner (shared with USTB)	0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe
Chainlink USCC NAV Aggregator Owner (Chainlink, not Superstate)	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA

Note that the prior USCC owner was 0x8c7db8a96d39f76d9f456db23d591c2fdd0e2f8a; ownership was transferred on Oct 31, 2024 (tx 0xd2d1c711…) via the Ownable2StepUpgradeable flow.

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

USCC uses the source-verified FundToken v1.3.0 implementation and the same shared AllowList V3.1 contract as USTB. The Superstate Security page lists 11 numbered 0xMacro audits, plus ChainSecurity, Solana/AllowList reviews, and a Certora formal-verification report. Earlier 0xMacro scopes cover USCC/SuperstateToken, redemption, the shared token components, and AllowList V3; however, the published audit list does not map a report explicitly to the integrated FundToken v1.2.0/v1.3.0 implementation deployed in July 2026. A-10 and A-11 scope DIP/EquityToken rather than FundToken.

Audit scope limitation: no published audit report or hash-to-scope mapping explicitly covers the integrated FundToken v1.2.0/v1.3.0 deployment. The implementation is source-verified and much of its component surface has prior review coverage, but the deployed integration and storage migration cannot be tied to a public independent-review artifact.

Audit History

#	Firm	Approx. Date	Scope
A-1..6	0xMacro	2023–2025	SuperstateToken / USCC, oracle, subscription, and redemption iterations — see individual reports and the USTB report
A-7	0xMacro	2025	Solana AllowList program
A-8	0xMacro	2025	EquityToken plus shared AccountingPausable, Allowlistable, Bridgeable, Permittable, and SuperstateTokenCore components
A-9	0xMacro	2025	AllowList V3
A-10..11	0xMacro	Nov 2025 – Feb 2026	DIP / EquityToken scopes; not the current integrated FundToken (A-10, A-11)
--	ChainSecurity	2023	Compound SUPTB (original USTB token)
--	Certora	April 2025	Formal verification

Smart Contract Complexity: Moderate. Standard upgradeable EIP-1967 transparent proxy with canonical implementation/admin slots, ERC-7201 namespaced component storage in FundToken v1.3.0, AllowList-gated transfers, Ownable2StepUpgradeable access, EIP-2612 permit, and issuer-operated burn-and-mint bridging between the EVM deployments.

A key observation onchain: USCC has a strict subset of the current FundToken's capabilities enabled:

• superstateOracle() = 0x0 — no Superstate Continuous Price Oracle attached
• redemptionContract() = 0x0 — no RedemptionIdle / atomic onchain redemption
• supportedStablecoins(USDC) = 0x0 — no onchain stablecoin subscribe config
• isChainIdSupported(0) = true — book-entry conversion is enabled
• isChainIdSupported(98866) = true — Plume is the only enabled onchain destination from Ethereum
• isChainIdSupported(900) = false — Solana is not an enabled destination; Superstate's documentation says SVM bridging is unsupported and requires redeeming/re-purchasing to change networks
• subscribe() - reverts with OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled() (selector 0xdbf0cc51)

So all USCC mint operations are admin-driven (mint/bulkMint by the owner EOA). On Ethereum, user actions are transfer (AllowList-gated), offchainRedeem (burn, settled offchain T+1/T+2), bridge to Plume, and bridgeToBookEntry. Solana USCC remains live, but movements to or from Solana use Superstate's offchain redemption/tokenization workflow rather than the EVM bridge() path.

Bug Bounty

• Platform: Self-hosted (security@superstate.co)
• Formal Rewards: None — "Superstate does not have a formal reward policy"
• Safe Harbor: CFAA and DMCA safe harbor language for good-faith researchers
• Note: Same weakness as USTB. Not on the SEAL Safe Harbor registry.

Historical Track Record

• Fund Launch: July 15, 2024 onchain (first mint at block 20312293, Unix ts 1721051099). DeFiLlama first records Sep 9, 2024 at ~$15.7M TVL. The fund has now operated for more than two years.
• Contract Upgrades: The token moved from the legacy V5 implementation to FundToken v1.2.0 on July 20, 2026 (upgrade, migration initialization), then to v1.3.0 on July 21, 2026 (upgrade). The migration enabled book-entry conversion and Plume bridging. No ownership, oracle, redemption, stablecoin-config, pause, accounting-pause, or AdminBurn events occurred from July 3 through September 5, 2026.
• Smart Contract Exploits: None reported.
• Ownership Changes: USCC token ownership was transferred Oct 31, 2024 from 0x8c7db8a9… to 0x8abC89D9… via the two-step Ownable flow (Etherscan tx); no subsequent transfer was observed.
• TVL History (DeFiLlama):
  • Sep 2024 (first record): ~$15.7M
  • Oct 2024: ~$27M
  • Nov 21, 2025 peak: ~$496.61M
  • Aug 8, 2026: ~$59.34M
  • Sep 5, 2026: ~$103.41M public TVL; Superstate reports $143.48M AUM including book-entry
• NAV History: NAV launched near $10.00 and is $11.725624 in the latest Chainlink round (updated September 4, 2026 13:18 UTC). Unlike USTB, NAV is not monotonic: mark-to-market gains and losses, including unrealized changes, flow through daily NAV.
• Incidents: None publicly reported.

Funds Management

Yield Sources

1. Crypto basis (cash-and-carry): Long spot/custodied crypto assets, short futures at CFTC-permitted Trading Venues. Current Bitwise public holdings identify BTC, ETH, SOL, and XRP exposure, with futures on CME and an XRP futures leg on Coinbase.
2. Staked crypto / liquid staking tokens: Current public holdings include staked SOL, weETH, and a small JitoSOL position; staking and liquid-staking losses can flow through NAV.
3. U.S. Treasury Bills: Idle cash and futures-margin reserves earn short-dated Treasury yield (federal-funds-rate-like).

The fund "will trade only those digital assets for which the CFTC has permitted exchange-listed futures contracts" (per Steakhouse overview). Bitwise's current public holdings identify CME and Coinbase futures exposure, but the public documents still do not fully disclose margin policy, counterparty concentration limits, or whether the displayed venues are exhaustive over time.

Public holdings snapshot: Bitwise publishes current USCC holdings on its USCC fund page. The table below uses the public holdings shown there as of September 4, 2026. Holdings are unaudited and may change at the investment manager's discretion.

Holding	Quantity	Implied Yield	Notional Value	Portfolio %	Notes
USD Collateral	57,540,700.00	1.84%	$57.54M	35.55%	Cash / margin collateral
USTB	681,058.68	3.47%	$7.63M	4.71%	Tokenized T-Bill exposure
Bitcoin Custody	267.20 BTC	0.00%	$21.32M	13.18%	Spot crypto custody
Bitcoin Collateral	65.00 BTC	0.00%	$0	0.00%	Reported collateral quantity; no notional assigned in the public table
Ether Custody	1,267.16 ETH	0.00%	$3.11M	1.92%	Spot crypto custody
Ether Collateral	0 ETH	0.00%	$0	0.00%	—
Solana Custody	-9,318.31 SOL	0.00%	-$0.95M	-0.59%	Negative custody balance as published
Solana Collateral	0 SOL	0.00%	$0	0.00%	—
Solana Staked	196,037.83 SOL	6.29%	$19.94M	12.32%	Staking / validator risk
EtherFi Wrapped eETH	13,501.49 weETH	2.47%	$36.58M	22.60%	Liquid-staking-token risk
Ripple Custody	11,921,438.36 XRP	0.00%	$16.68M	10.30%	Spot crypto custody
JitoSOL Custody	4.02 JitoSOL	5.53%	$532	0.00%	Small liquid-staking-token position
BTC Future SEP26 (Coinbase)	-265.00	6.66%	-$21.25M	-13.13%	Short futures hedge
ETH Future SEP26 (Coinbase)	-240.00	6.84%	-$0.59M	-0.37%	Short futures hedge
ETH Future SEP26 (CME)	-15,750.00	5.75%	-$38.81M	-23.98%	Short futures hedge
SOL Future SEP26 (CME)	-183,500.00	-0.88%	-$18.65M	-11.52%	Short futures hedge
XRP Future SEP26 (Coinbase)	-11,640,000.00	13.93%	-$16.41M	-10.14%	Short futures hedge

Accessibility

• KYC Required: Yes — Qualified Purchaser ($5M+ individuals, $25M+ institutions) AND Accredited Investor status. 29 supported jurisdictions including U.S., Cayman, BVI, Bermuda, UK, Canada, Singapore, UAE, etc.
• Minimum Investment: $100,000.
• Subscriptions (Minting):
  • Onchain atomic via subscribe(): DISABLED — verified onchain. Calling subscribe(...) reverts with OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled() (selector 0xdbf0cc51). supportedStablecoins(USDC) returns the zero address with zero fee. Subscriptions are processed offchain only (T+1).
  • Offchain: USD wire or USDC transfer. T+1 if received before 5pm ET on a Market Day; T+2 otherwise.
  • Per docs: "There is no minimum redemption amount" but a $100K minimum applies to subscriptions unless waived.
• Redemptions (Burning):
  • Onchain atomic: NOT AVAILABLE — redemptionContract() returns 0x0 onchain. There is no RedemptionIdle contract for USCC.
  • Offchain: Send tokens to a redemption address or call offchainRedeem(uint256) which burns USCC. Proceeds paid as USD wire or USDC on Ethereum/Solana. T+1 if request received before 5pm ET on a Market Day; T+2 otherwise.
  • No redemption fees per docs (investor pays gas).
• Geographic Restrictions: 29 jurisdictions per docs. Not available to sanctioned countries.
• Management Fee: 0.75% annually (waived until AUM exceeds $50M — now exceeded).

Token Mint Authority

Mint mechanism: Ownable — a single owner EOA controls minting.

Mint requires backing: No — mint(address,uint256) and bulkMint(address[],uint256[]) are gated by onlyOwner and do not check or pull collateral onchain. Backing exists offchain at Anchorage Digital / Trading Venues and is asserted by the operator. The onchain mint is a unilateral admin action.

Per-address mint authority (verified onchain September 5, 2026, USCC token 0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c):

Address	Can Mint	Can Burn	Role / Mechanism	Notes
0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1	✓	✓ (adminBurn)	owner() of USCC token (Ownable)	EOA (code size 0, nonce 624). Same EOA is owner() of USCC ProxyAdmin, so it can also upgrade() the implementation to a malicious one and effectively grant mint power to anyone.
(no other onchain minters)	—	—	—	The current FundToken contract has no AccessControl / MINTER_ROLE; minting remains owner-only.

Rate limits / supply caps: None onchain. There is no maxMintPerBlock, no global supply cap, no per-minter quota.

Backing check at mint time: None onchain. Backing is settled offchain; minted USCC is asserted to be 100% backed by the offchain portfolio (Anchorage cash + crypto + futures collateral + T-Bills) but this is not enforced or verified by any onchain mechanism.

Collateralization

• Backing Model: Hybrid offchain — USCC tokens represent shares in a fund holding:
  • Spot / staked crypto assets at Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. and related custody / staking venues
  • Short futures positions and posted margin at Trading Venues (current public holdings identify CME and Coinbase exposure)
  • U.S. Treasury Bills / USTB, USD collateral, and other cash-equivalent reserves
• Collateral Quality:
  • T-Bills are the safest asset class globally
  • Spot / staked crypto custody carries crypto custody risk (key management, staking or liquid-staking losses, custodian operational risk)
  • Futures-leg margin posted at trading venues is the dominant counterparty risk — if a futures venue becomes insolvent or fails operationally, the margin and any unrealized P&L on that venue is at risk. CFTC-regulated futures clearinghouses (CME-style) significantly reduce this risk vs offshore venues, but Superstate still does not publicly disclose full counterparty concentration or margin policy.
  • Basis-trade losses flow through NAV. If futures basis widens, futures positions are forcibly unwound, or posted margin is impaired, USCC holders can realize losses on principal.
• Manager / Sub-Advisor:
  • Investment manager: Bitwise Investment Manager, LLC (per superstate.com/assets/uscc, accessed September 5, 2026)
  • Sub-advisor: Superstate Advisers LLC
  • This is a recent operational change from the prior Superstate self-managed setup and should continue to be monitored post-transition.
• Bankruptcy Remoteness: Fund is a series within Superstate Asset Trust (Delaware Statutory Trust) with inter-series liability protection — bankruptcy-remote from Superstate Inc.
• Verification: Ernst & Young annual audit. NAV Fund Services for independent NAV calculation. Daily NAV is mark-to-market, so unrealized losses on the futures leg do flow into the share price.

Provability

• NAV/Price Updates: Chainlink USCC NAV feed 0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9 — an OCR (off-chain reporting) aggregator wrapper around 0x5C00518D3d…. 16 Chainlink-operated transmitters reach consensus on the daily NAV from Superstate. The aggregator owner is 0x21f73D42…, a Chainlink-controlled contract (not Superstate). This is the only onchain NAV source for USCC — unlike USTB, USCC has no Superstate Continuous Price Oracle, so there is no linear-interpolation extrapolation between checkpoints; the price is the most recent OCR transmission only.
• Offchain Assets: Cash collateral, USTB / Treasury exposure, spot crypto, staked / liquid-staked crypto, and futures positions are all held offchain. Token holders cannot independently verify positions onchain. Independent verification layers:
  • NAV Fund Services (independent NAV agent)
  • Ernst & Young (annual audit)
  • Anchorage Digital (regulated digital-asset custody)
  • SEC regulatory framework (Reg D / Section 3(c)(7))
• Reserve Transparency: Bitwise publishes headline NAV/AUM/yield, network balances, DeFi integrations, and current holdings on bitwiseinvestments.com/crypto-funds/uscc. Public holdings now include asset quantities, implied yields, notional values, portfolio weights, and current futures venues, but margin balances, counterparty concentration policy, historical venue usage, and T-Bill / USTB look-through details are still not fully disclosed publicly.
• Share-Supply Reconciliation: The apparent 613,035.57-share gap is a cutoff difference: the AUM statement is effective September 3, while the realtime network total includes 613,035.402635 USCC minted on Ethereum on September 4. The residual is 0.167365 USCC.
• NAV Mark-to-Market Risk: Because the futures leg is mark-to-market daily, the share price reflects unrealized basis-trade P&L in real time. The protocol explicitly warns of "unrealized losses" during basis expansion. This is fundamentally different from USTB whose underlying T-Bills have a much smoother mark-to-market profile.

Liquidity Risk

• Primary Exit: Offchain redemption only — burn USCC via offchainRedeem(uint256) or send to a redemption address, then receive USDC/USD T+1 (before 5pm ET on Market Days) or T+2 (after 5pm or weekends/holidays).
• No Onchain Atomic Redemption: Verified onchain: redemptionContract() = 0x0. There is no USDC-backed RedemptionIdle contract like USTB has — USCC has zero instant onchain exit capacity at any size.
• No DEX Liquidity: $0 DEX volume by design. AllowList-gated transfers prevent secondary markets.
• Transfer Restrictions: All transfers require both sender and receiver to be on the AllowList (the same shared V3.1 contract as USTB). Removing an address from the AllowList freezes their tokens.
• DeFi Integrations: Smaller than USTB but live. Bitwise reports Aave on Ethereum (4.35M USCC / $51.01M), Kamino on Solana (378,573 USCC / $4.44M), and two de minimis Morpho positions on Ethereum as of September 5, 2026. See the active Morpho market. RWA.xyz reports 53 wallets holding USCC across networks; Etherscan reports 46 Ethereum holders.
• Stress Scenario: In a basis-blowup scenario (futures premium collapse, exchange counterparty event, staking / liquid-staking impairment, or simultaneous redemption surge), the fund's liquidity depends on (a) unwinding futures positions at potentially worse-than-market prices, (b) Anchorage's and related venues' ability to deliver spot / staked assets, and (c) the futures venues' ability to honor margin. T-Bills and USTB are highly liquid; major spot crypto is normally liquid but can gap during stress; futures positions can become illiquid during stress because basis spreads can widen materially before they converge. The mark-to-market NAV will reflect this stress in real time, potentially producing principal losses for holders and realized losses for users redeeming through the offchain settlement window.

AllowList Freeze Risk (Critical for DeFi Integrations)

Identical to USTB: if an address is removed from the shared AllowList, USCC tokens at that address are completely frozen with zero exit paths:

1. transfer / transferFrom revert (AllowList checks both sender and receiver)
2. offchainRedeem reverts (requires AllowList status)
3. bridge reverts (requires AllowList)
4. No DEX fallback ($0 liquidity + AllowList-gated DEX contracts would need permission too)

The only recovery is to be re-whitelisted by Superstate or have Superstate adminBurn and process an offchain payment manually.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

Governance Model: Fully centralized — Superstate Inc. controls all administrative functions. No onchain governance, no DAO, no community voting.

Key Privileged Roles (verified onchain, September 5, 2026):

Role	Address	Type	Powers
USCC Token Owner + USCC ProxyAdmin Owner	0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1	EOA	mint, bulkMint, adminBurn, pause/unpause, accountingPause/accountingUnpause, setOracle, setRedemptionContract, setStablecoinConfig, setChainIdSupport, setMaximumOracleDelay, setAllowlist, setIsPublicInstrument, setName, setSymbol, and upgrade()/upgradeAndCall() of the USCC implementation via ProxyAdmin. This single EOA controls both the token and its proxy admin, matching the USTB token/ProxyAdmin ownership pattern rather than improving on it.
AllowList Owner (shared with USTB)	0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe	EOA	setEntityIdForAddress, setProtocolAddressPermission, etc. Can also upgrade AllowList via its ProxyAdmin.
Chainlink USCC NAV Aggregator Owner	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA	Chainlink contract	Chainlink-side governance over the OCR feed; not Superstate-controlled.

Critical centralization concerns specific to USCC (in addition to USTB-style risks):

1. Single EOA controls both token and ProxyAdmin. This matches USTB's token/ProxyAdmin concentration (0xad309b… owns both on USTB). A compromise of 0x8abC89D9… lets the attacker mint unlimited USCC AND upgrade the implementation to embed any logic. There is no multisig and no timelock.
2. No timelock on any operation — proxy upgrades, parameter changes, and mint/burn execute immediately.
3. Unlimited admin mint with no onchain backing check — the owner can call mint(any_addr, any_amount) without depositing collateral. The backing-vs-supply relationship is enforced offchain only.
4. adminBurn confiscation — the owner can burn tokens from any holder. Documented as a regulatory-compliance tool.
5. NAV oracle is admin-set — although the Chainlink aggregator is Chainlink-controlled (16 OCR nodes), the NAV value itself is reported by Superstate to the OCR network. A malicious or compromised Superstate reporter could push an incorrect NAV — onchain there is no validation against the actual portfolio.
6. AllowList control (shared with USTB) — can freeze any holder; can revoke whitelisted DeFi protocol addresses unilaterally.

Mitigations (same shape as USTB):

• Superstate states it uses Turnkey secure enclaves for admin keys. This may reduce operational key-compromise risk, but it is not verifiable onchain and does not change the contract-level fact that the owner is a single EOA.
• Ownable2StepUpgradeable two-step transfer
• renounceOwnership disabled
• Regulatory accountability: Superstate Inc. is a U.S. corporation under SEC exemptions, SEC-registered transfer agent (Superstate Services LLC), Reg D / 3(c)(7) framework

Programmability

• NAV pricing: Chainlink OCR feed only. Updated as the Chainlink network transmits new rounds (cadence depends on heartbeat / deviation thresholds).
• Subscriptions: Admin-driven (mint/bulkMint only). Onchain user subscribe() is explicitly disabled (OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled()).
• Redemptions: User-initiated burn (offchainRedeem) is onchain and programmatic, but settlement is offchain (T+1/T+2). No atomic onchain payout.
• Transfers: AllowList enforcement on every transfer (onchain and programmatic).
• Bridging: The issuer-operated burn-and-mint path is enabled from Ethereum to Plume (chainId 98866). Book-entry conversion is also enabled. Solana has live supply, but Superstate documents SVM bridging as unsupported; changing between EVM and Solana requires offchain redemption and re-tokenization.

USCC is materially less programmatic than USTB: no atomic onchain subscribe, no atomic onchain redeem.

External Dependencies

1. Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. (Critical) — qualified custodian for spot crypto and cash. OCC-regulated. Operational failure or custodial breach is direct loss to fund holders.
2. Futures Trading Venues (Critical) — counterparties for short futures legs and margin. Current public holdings identify CME and Coinbase exposure, but concentration / margin policy is not fully public. Venue or clearing failure can be a direct loss.
3. Bitwise Investment Manager (Critical) — current investment manager. Daily portfolio management for the basis trades. Operational track record at Bitwise is strong (institutional crypto asset manager), but the recent transition still introduces post-handoff monitoring risk.
4. U.S. Treasury Market (Critical) — for T-Bill reserves, same as USTB.
5. Chainlink (Medium-High) — sole onchain NAV oracle. No fallback Superstate-run oracle, unlike USTB.
6. Circle (Medium) — USDC redemption rail.
7. Ernst & Young (Low) — annual audit.
8. NAV Fund Services (Low) — independent NAV calculator.
9. Turnkey (Medium) — admin key custody (same as USTB).
10. Staking / liquid-staking infrastructure (Medium) — current holdings include staked SOL, weETH, and JitoSOL exposure. Slashing, validator, liquid-staking-token, or staking-provider failures can flow through NAV; public materials do not fully describe provider concentration or risk controls.

Operational Risk

• Team: Same as USTB. Robert Leshner (CEO, Compound Finance co-founder), Reid Cuming (COO), Jim Hiltner (BD), Dean Swennumson (Ops). ~23 employees per public reporting.
• Funding: $100.5M total raised; Series B of $82.5M closed January 2026 (Bain Capital Crypto, Distributed Global, Brevan Howard Digital, Galaxy Digital, Haun Ventures).
• Documentation: Generally comprehensive, but USCC-specific operational documentation (counterparty concentration, leverage, staking / liquid-staking provider policy, margin policy) is noticeably thinner than USTB documentation. The fund Offering Documents (private) presumably cover this; the public docs do not.
• Legal Structure:
  • Superstate Inc. (Delaware corporation) — investment adviser
  • Superstate Asset Trust (Delaware Statutory Trust) — series-based, bankruptcy-remote
  • Superstate Advisers LLC — Exempt Reporting Adviser (SEC)
  • Superstate Services LLC — SEC-registered transfer agent
  • Reg D 506(c) / Section 3(c)(7) — Qualified Purchasers and Accredited Investors
• Manager Transition: Superstate Inc. → Bitwise Investment Manager LLC became effective June 1, 2026 — a recent material operational change. Continued post-transition monitoring is warranted.
• Incident Response: Same Turnkey TEE key management as USTB. No publicly documented USCC-specific incident playbook (e.g., what happens if a futures venue fails).
• License: BUSL 1.1.

Monitoring

Key Contracts to Monitor

Contract	Address	Purpose	Key Events / Functions
USCC Token	0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c	Token state	Mint, AdminBurn, OffchainRedeem, Bridge, BridgeToBookEntry, Paused/Unpaused, AccountingPaused/AccountingUnpaused, SetOracle, SetRedemptionContract, SetStablecoinConfig, SetChainIdSupport, OwnershipTransferStarted, totalSupply()
USCC ProxyAdmin	0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D	USCC proxy upgrades	Upgraded event on the USCC proxy; implementation slot; OwnershipTransferred on the ProxyAdmin
AllowList V3.1 (shared)	0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B825611d8A38E5	Permission changes	EntityIdSet, ProtocolAddressPermissionSet, PrivateInstrumentPermissionSet
Chainlink USCC NAV Oracle wrapper	0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9	NAV reporting	AnswerUpdated, latestRoundData()
Chainlink USCC Aggregator	0x5C00518D3d423EC59D553Af123Be8a63B11078CF	OCR transmission	NewTransmission, ConfigSet

Admin EOAs to Monitor

EOA	Role	Key Actions
0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1	USCC Token + ProxyAdmin Owner	mint, adminBurn, pause, upgrade() USCC impl
0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe	AllowList Owner (shared with USTB)	Add/remove addresses; revoke protocol permissions

Critical Monitoring Points

• NAV/Share: Read the Chainlink USCC feed every transmission. Unlike USTB, NAV may decrease during basis stress — alert on day-over-day declines >2% to investigate whether it reflects market mark-to-market or an attestation issue.
• Admin Burns: Monitor AdminBurn events — forced burns from holder addresses are critical.
• Pause Events: Monitor Paused/Unpaused and AccountingPaused/AccountingUnpaused on USCC token.
• Contract Upgrades: Monitor Upgraded events and the canonical EIP-1967 implementation slot on USCC. The July 20–21 migration changed the implementation twice without a timelock; upgrades are instant.
• AllowList Changes: Monitor ProtocolAddressPermissionSet events on the shared AllowList for revocation of any contract holding USCC.
• Ownership Transfers: Monitor OwnershipTransferStarted on USCC token and ProxyAdmin.
• Large Supply Changes: Alert on mints/burns >5% of total supply in 24h.
• Manager Transition (effective Jun 1, 2026): Track for any operational disruption after the Superstate → Bitwise handoff.
• Recommended Frequency: Per-transmission for NAV. Hourly for pause/admin events. Daily for AllowList changes.

Appendix: Contract Architecture

Verified onchain September 5, 2026. All Superstate-controlled owners are EOAs (code size 0). No multisig or timelock controls the token or AllowList upgrade paths.

GOVERNANCE LAYER
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  [EOA-USCC]  USCC Token owner + USCC ProxyAdmin owner
              0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1
              (single EOA, code size 0)

  [EOA-AL]    AllowList owner (shared with USTB)
              0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe

  [CL-OWN]    Chainlink USCC NAV Aggregator owner (Chainlink-controlled)
              0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA


PROXY ADMIN LAYER
═════════════════
  [PA-USCC]   USCC ProxyAdmin (owned by [EOA-USCC])
              0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D
              ── upgrade(USCC proxy) → impl 0x7e906c00…

  [PA-AL]     AllowList ProxyAdmin (separate; verified for USTB)
              0xb819692a58db9dd4d3b403a875439b6ca155c610


TOKEN LAYER
═══════════
  [USCC]   USCC Token (Proxy)
           0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c
           impl: 0x7e906c0006d3F08bE94EF4685c59b5Cde4fb4feF
           VERSION "1.3.0" (FundToken; ERC-7201 component storage)

           Admin (owner [EOA-USCC] only):
           ├── mint() / bulkMint()      ← no onchain backing check
           ├── adminBurn(address, amount)
           ├── pause() / unpause()
           ├── accountingPause() / accountingUnpause()
           ├── setOracle(newOracle)     ← currently 0x0 (no SuperstateOracle)
           ├── setRedemptionContract(newContract)
           │                            ← currently 0x0 (no RedemptionIdle)
           ├── setStablecoinConfig(stablecoin, dest, fee)
           │                            ← USDC currently unset
           ├── setChainIdSupport(chainId, supported)
           └── setMaximumOracleDelay(delay)
                                        ← currently 0

           User functions (AllowList-gated):
           ├── subscribe(...)           ← REVERTS: OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled
           ├── offchainRedeem(amount)   ← burn; settled offchain T+1
           ├── bridge(amount, dest, chainId, ...)
           ├── bridgeToBookEntry(amount)
           └── transfer / transferFrom


PROTOCOL LAYER
══════════════
  [AL] AllowList V3.1 (Proxy)            [CL] Chainlink USCC NAV Feed
       0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B…         0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561b…
       owner: [EOA-AL]                        wraps aggregator 0x5C00518D…
       (SHARED WITH USTB)                     owner: [CL-OWN] (Chainlink)

       Admin:                                 Mechanics:
       ├ setEntityIdForAddress()              ├ 16 OCR transmitters
       ├ setProtocolAddressPermission()       ├ NAV reported by Superstate
       ├ setEntityAllowedFor...()             └ No interpolation between rounds
       └ transferOwnership()

       Gating: isAllowed() onchain on
       every USCC transfer/burn/bridge


EXTERNAL / UNDERLYING LAYER
════════════════════════════
  Offchain:
  ├── Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. and related venues (spot / staked crypto + cash custody)
  ├── Trading Venues (futures + margin) — current holdings identify CME and Coinbase; margin policy not fully public
  ├── Bitwise Investment Manager (investment manager, effective Jun 1, 2026)
  ├── Ernst & Young (annual auditor)
  ├── NAV Fund Services (NAV calculation agent)
  └── U.S. Treasury Bills (reserves)

  Cross-chain state:
  ├── Plume mainnet via bridge(): 0x4c21b7577c8fe8b0b0669165ee7c8f67fa1454cf
  │   VERSION 1.3.0; same owner EOA; 1,440,926.89 USCC supply
  └── Solana Token-2022: BTRR3sj1Bn2ZjuemgbeQ6SCtf84iXS81CS7UDTSxUCaK
      808,371.22 USCC supply; not bridge-connected per current Superstate docs

Address Legend:

Label	Address
[EOA-USCC]	0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1
[EOA-AL]	0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe
[CL-OWN]	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA
[PA-USCC]	0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D
[PA-AL]	0xb819692a58db9dd4d3b403a875439b6ca155c610
[USCC] Token (Proxy)	0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c
USCC Implementation	0x7e906c0006d3F08bE94EF4685c59b5Cde4fb4feF
[AL] AllowList V3.1 (Proxy)	0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B825611d8A38E5
[CL] Chainlink USCC NAV	0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9
Chainlink USCC Aggregator	0x5C00518D3d423EC59D553Af123Be8a63B11078CF

---

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 3 months (December 2026) due to the FundToken migration, basis-trade NAV volatility, and the ongoing Bitwise post-handoff period.
• TVL-based: Reassess if AUM changes by more than 30% (more sensitive than USTB given thinner holder base).
• Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, admin key compromise, contract upgrade, AllowList policy change, manager transition issue, or any large NAV drawdown (>5% in a single day).
• Strategy-based: Reassess on any change to futures venues, staking / liquid-staking provider policy, leverage policy, or asset mix (e.g., addition of new basis pairs).
• Governance-based: Reassess if Superstate adopts multisig or timelock for USCC admin controls.