BUCK (Bitcoin Dollar SavingsCoin)
Score
Overview
BUCK is a yield-bearing "savings coin" launched on January 5, 2026 by Buck Labs. It is designed to generate ~10% APY for holders through contractual dividends from STRC (Strategy Inc.'s Variable-Rate Series A Perpetual Preferred Stock, NASDAQ: STRC). Users deposit USDC to mint BUCK tokens, and the proceeds are used by the protocol to purchase STRC shares on the open market. STRC pays monthly cash dividends (initially 9% per year on $100 par value), which are distributed to BUCK holders as yield via the Rewards Engine contract.
BUCK is not a stablecoin — its price appreciates over time as yield accrues (e.g., $1.00 → $1.10 over 365 days at 10% APY). The protocol maintains overcollateralization through a reserve of USDC and STRC equity holdings.
Important: Strategy Inc. and Michael Saylor are NOT affiliated with BUCK and do not sponsor or endorse the token. Buck Assets Ltd. purchases STRC on the open market as an independent third party.
- Current Price: ~$1.00
- Total Supply: ~976,245 BUCK
- Total Holders: 199
- Total Reserves: ~$1.65M ($124K USDC + $1.52M STRC)
- Reserve Ratio: 1.69x
- Current APY: ~10% (raised from 7% in February 2026)
- Not listed on DeFiLlama
Links:
Risk Summary
Key Strengths
- Multiple audit coverage — 4 audits from 3 firms (Halborn, Cyfrin, 2× Spearbit), all publicly available. 155 total findings (2 Critical, 11 High). All critical/high findings reported as resolved.
- Overcollateralized — 1.69x reserve ratio with USDC + STRC backing
- Thoughtful band system — GREEN/YELLOW/RED bands with escalating fees and tightening refund caps provide structured reserve protection
- Real yield source — Yield derived from STRC contractual preferred dividends, not token emissions
- Monthly third-party attestation by The Network Firm under AICPA standards provides some reserve transparency
Key Risks
- Single EOA controls everything — One address owns all 8 contracts with no multisig, no timelock, and unlimited admin powers including instant upgrades, pausing, and module reconfiguration
- Extremely thin liquidity — Only ~$108K permissionless DEX liquidity, highly variable daily volume, no CEX listings
- Very early stage — 8 weeks in production, 199 holders, ~$1.6M reserves, not on DeFiLlama
- Offchain collateral — STRC holdings are offchain, verified only by monthly Network Firm attestations and single attestor EOA postings
- Founder's track record — Previous company (Bird) overstated revenue by $31.6M and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
Critical Risks
- Single EOA with no timelock can upgrade all proxy contracts instantly — if this private key is compromised, the entire protocol can be drained. This is the most severe governance risk possible. The documentation claims "48-hour timelock" for upgrades, but onchain verification shows no timelock exists.
- Liquidity Window redemption is not a contractual right — per Terms & Conditions, tokens "cannot be redeemed at the instruction of Token holders." The company operates the refund facility "in its sole discretion."
- Complete dependency on STRC/Strategy Inc. — if Strategy suspends dividends (e.g., severe BTC crash), the yield mechanism breaks entirely. Concentration in a single counterparty with no diversification.
- No bug bounty program — for a protocol holding ~$1.6M in reserves with upgradeable contracts, the absence of a bug bounty is a significant security gap.
- Discrepancy between documentation and onchain reality — docs claim "48-hour timelock and multi-sig for upgrades" but onchain verification shows single EOA owner with no timelock.
Full Report
Contract Addresses
| Contract | Address |
|---|---|
| BUCK Token (UUPS Proxy) | 0xdb13997f4D83EF343845d0bAEb27d1173dF8c224 |
| Liquidity Window (UUPS Proxy) | 0x6E87adb23ac0e150Ca9F76C33Df2AdCae508548E |
| Liquidity Reserve (UUPS Proxy) | 0x1A426E3a87368a4851f7443Ff656A054Af872f66 |
| Policy Manager (UUPS Proxy) | 0x79f86b9E0ac84C7580575089E453431D77905E36 |
| Oracle Adapter | 0xa6c5f4D041192C2019E77f679eA02e9684235Fd9 |
| Rewards Engine (UUPS Proxy) | 0x159c1C0F796a02111334cC280eE001b091a9580C |
| Collateral Attestation (UUPS Proxy) | 0x1aEEEf99704258947A9ea77eF021d5e0551c0428 |
| Access Registry | 0xbCc6de2423B496cb36C3278dC487EfD9c5C550B6 |
| Admin/Owner (EOA) | 0x376269214bB78b3D4f31d17600499b439c1aCB4b |
| Deployer (EOA) | 0xfec7b585a6f14a8ab306fdf9006532d32fac24a4 |
| Treasury (EOA) | 0x5d105791469064cA0764cfaCfc577c286351CFAD |
| Attestor (EOA) | 0x6f31810c8e6bfaf3ba486b4b7ce651b023423fa3 |
Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures
BUCK has been audited by three firms (4 audits total). All reports are publicly available — Spearbit audits via Cantina, and Cyfrin + Halborn reports in the buck-v1 GitHub repo.
Halborn — Strong DAO Smart Contracts (Nov 17 – Dec 8, 2025)
- Findings: 12 total — 1 Critical, 0 High, 0 Medium, 3 Low, 8 Informational
- All findings addressed (100% per report)
- Key Critical Finding: Phantom unit accounting causes over-minting and reward misallocation
- Link: PDF in buck-v1 repo
Cyfrin — Strong Audit Report (Dec 19, 2025)
- Repo:
buck-labs/strong-smart-contracts-internal - Lead Auditors: Giovanni Di Siena, Blckhv, Slavcheww, BengalCatBalu
- Findings: 1 Critical, 6 High, 9 Medium, 22 Low, 7 Informational, 5 Gas
- Key Critical Finding: STRC rewards inflation results in risk of undercollateralization as more can be claimed than is distributed
- Link: PDF in buck-v1 repo
Spearbit Audit 1 — Initial Smart Contracts (Dec 18 – Jan 5, 2026)
- Repo:
buck-labs/strong-smart-contracts-internal - Researchers: R0bert, Sujith Somraaj, Chinmay Farkya
- Findings: 3 High, 6 Medium, 8 Low, 16 Informational, 6 Gas
- All critical/high findings resolved
- Key High Finding: ABI Struct Mismatch in Band Config —
LiquidityWindowused a mismatched struct definition forBandConfigcompared toPolicyManager, causing incorrect field decoding that could let refunds drain reserves below intended floor. - Link: Cantina Portfolio | PDF in buck-v1 repo
Spearbit Audit 2 — Follow-up (Jan 26 – Feb 2, 2026)
- Repo:
buck-labs/buck-smart-contracts-v1 - Researchers: T1MOH, Sujith S, r0bert
- Findings: 2 High, 14 Medium, 13 Low, 25 Informational
- All high findings resolved; 5 medium findings acknowledged (not fixed)
- Key High Findings:
- Oracle Validation Bypass in Mint Pricing — system allowed minting to bypass cross-oracle validation through a view-only path. Fixed via
OracleAdapterV5. - RewardsEngine V1.1 Implementation Incomplete — upgrade proxy lacked core V1 functions. Fixed with corrected contract inheritance.
- Oracle Validation Bypass in Mint Pricing — system allowed minting to bypass cross-oracle validation through a view-only path. Fixed via
- Link: Cantina Portfolio
Audit Findings Summary
| Firm | Date | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Info | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Halborn | Nov–Dec 2025 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 12 |
| Cyfrin | Dec 2025 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 22 | 12 | 50 |
| Spearbit #1 | Dec 2025–Jan 2026 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 8 | 22 | 39 |
| Spearbit #2 | Jan–Feb 2026 | 0 | 2 | 14 | 13 | 25 | 54 |
| Total | 2 | 11 | 29 | 46 | 67 | 155 |
Smart Contract Complexity: Moderate — UUPS upgradeable proxies, band state machine (Policy Manager), oracle integration (Pyth), access registry (Merkle tree), reward distribution system. 8 core contracts total.
Bug Bounty
No bug bounty program found on any major platform (Immunefi, Sherlock, Cantina contests, HackerOne, Bugcrowd).
Safe Harbor
BUCK is not listed on the SEAL Safe Harbor registry.
Historical Track Record
- Launch Date: January 5, 2026 (~8 weeks in production)
- Smart Contract Exploits: None to date
- TVL: ~$1.65M total reserves ($124K USDC + $1.52M STRC). Not listed on DeFiLlama.
- Holder Distribution: 199 holders. Very small holder base for a protocol managing ~$1.6M in reserves.
- Peg Behavior: BUCK is not pegged — it is designed to appreciate as yield accrues. Price started at $1.00, currently ~$1.00 (early in yield cycle, first distribution was February 2026).
- Incidents: None reported in the 8 weeks since launch.
- Rewards Engine Upgrades: The Rewards Engine has been upgraded 3 times (blocks 24169542, 24386223, 24427333), indicating active iteration on a critical component.
Funds Management
Yield Source
BUCK yield comes from STRC dividends — Strategy Inc.'s Variable-Rate Series A Perpetual Preferred Stock (NASDAQ: STRC):
- STRC pays monthly cash dividends at initially 9.0% per year on $100 par value
- Strategy Inc. holds 700,000+ BTC (~$60B+) on its balance sheet
- STRC has preferred creditor status — dividends must be paid before common dividends
- Yield is distributed to BUCK holders on the 4th business day of each month via the Rewards Engine contract
Current APY: ~10% (raised from 7% in February 2026)
Accessibility
- Minting: Users deposit USDC through the Liquidity Window contract. Requires access via the Access Registry (Merkle-based allowlist). Not open to US persons or 38+ restricted jurisdictions.
- Redemption ("Refund"): Users call
requestRefund()on the Liquidity Window to burn BUCK and receive USDC. Also restricted by the Access Registry. - Fees (band-dependent):
| Band | Reserve/Liability Ratio | Half-Spread | Mint Fee | Refund Fee | Daily Refund Cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GREEN | R/L >= 5% | 0.10% | 0.05% | 0.10% | 5.0% of supply |
| YELLOW | R/L < 5% | 0.15% | 0.10% | 0.15% | 2.5% of supply |
| RED | R/L < 2.5% | 0.20% | 0.15% | 0.20% | 1.0% of supply |
- Daily Refund Cap (GREEN): 48,812 BUCK/day (5% of 976K supply). Per-transaction limit: 50% of remaining daily capacity.
- Emergency: Triggered when R/L <= 1%.
- Current R/L Ratio: ~36.4% (solidly in GREEN band)
Critical legal caveat from Terms & Conditions: "Tokens cannot be redeemed at the instruction of Token holders. Token value can be realized only by selling Tokens on secondary markets or, where the Company elects in its sole discretion to operate any repurchase or liquidity facility." This means the Liquidity Window operates at the company's discretion, not as a contractual right.
Collateralization
- Total Reserves: ~$1.65M ($124K USDC + $1.52M STRC)
- BUCK in Circulation: 647K tokens (total supply 976K minus 329K in Treasury)
- Reserve Ratio: 1.69x (overcollateralized)
- Collateral Composition: STRC preferred equity (92%) + USDC (8%)
- Single-asset concentration: Entire yield strategy depends on STRC dividends and Strategy Inc. solvency
- STRC is a publicly traded equity — subject to market price volatility, trading hours (NASDAQ only ~32.5h/week vs crypto 24/7), and regulatory risk
- Assets are held in Fireblocks institutional MPC custody (SOC 2 Type II certified) — per documentation; not verifiable onchain (Fireblocks MPC wallets appear as regular EOAs)
Provability
- Onchain USDC reserves: The Liquidity Reserve contract holds USDC verifiable onchain (~$124K USDC at
0x1A426E3a87368a4851f7443Ff656A054Af872f66) - STRC holdings: Offchain. STRC is held in traditional brokerage/custodial accounts. Not verifiable onchain.
- Collateral Attestation contract:
0x1aEEEf99704258947A9ea77eF021d5e0551c0428— stores STRC valuation and collateral ratios, but values are posted by a single EOA attestor (0x6f31810c8e6bfaf3ba486b4b7ce651b023423fa3) - Third-party attestation: The Network Firm provides monthly independent attestation of treasury reserves under AICPA standards
- Exchange rate: Not computed onchain algorithmically. BUCK is a standard ERC-20 (not ERC-4626). Yield is distributed as additional BUCK tokens via the Rewards Engine, not through an exchange rate mechanism.
- Oracle: Uses Pyth oracle for STRC pricing (STRC/USD feed). The onchain Oracle Adapter currently operates in non-strict mode with
strictMode = false. Pyth IS configured (contract0x4305fb66699c3b2702d4d05cf36551390a4c69c6) with the STRC/USD price feed. The Pyth offchain feed is actively publishing prices, but Pyth is a pull oracle — prices must be pushed onchain by callingupdatePriceFeeds(). The onchain Pyth price on Ethereum has not been updated since January 15, 2026 (single ever update tx, 46+ days stale), causing the staleness check (pythStaleAfter = 86400s) to fail and the system to fall back to an admin-set internal price of $1.00 (set on deployment via0xccbbd3f3..., never updated). ThepriceUpdaterrole is set to0x0(not configured), meaning no keeper bot is pushing Pyth updates and only the owner EOA can update the internal price. Note: an earlier version (OracleAdapterV4) used RedStone + Pyth dual oracles, but RedStone was removed post-audit in OracleAdapterV5.
Liquidity Risk
All Paths from BUCK to USDC
Path 1: Liquidity Window Redemption (Protocol-Level)
- Contract:
0x6E87adb23ac0e150Ca9F76C33Df2AdCae508548E - Available USDC: ~$123,597 in Liquidity Reserve
- Access: RESTRICTED (Access Registry allowlist required)
- Speed: Subject to daily caps (~49K BUCK/day in GREEN band) + Liquidity Reserve uses
queueWithdrawalpattern (24h admin delay) - Cost: ~0.20% total (0.10% half-spread + 0.10% refund fee in GREEN band)
- Limitation: Access-gated, daily caps, per-transaction 50% cap, not a contractual right per terms
Path 2: Uniswap V2 Direct Swap (BUCK → USDC)
- Pool:
0xaab3e2a7908f557c2c28cadf7556353c9a08f82e - Reserves: 61,327 BUCK / 61,283 USDC ($122.6K TVL)
- Access: Permissionless
- Speed: Instant (single transaction)
- Volume: ~$534/day (extremely low; variable day-to-day, ranging from $8 to $6K)
- Created: January 5, 2026 by Buck deployer. Swaps occur primarily via DEX aggregator routers.
| Trade Size | Estimated Slippage | USDC Received |
|---|---|---|
| $1,000 | 1.6% | $983 |
| $5,000 | 7.5% | $4,625 |
| $10,000 | 14.0% | $8,600 |
Path 3: Curve StableSwap (BUCK → USDC)
- Pool:
0x42cb0274c6492e3991bde2ce75abf8cdf7f11d66 - Reserves: 53,855 BUCK / 46,573 USDC ($100.4K TVL)
- Access: Permissionless
- Speed: Instant (single transaction)
- Volume: $5,215/day (variable; ranged from $0 to $6K)
- Created: January 27, 2026 by Buck Treasury EOA
| Trade Size | Estimated Slippage |
|---|---|
| $1,000 | <0.5% |
| $5,000 | ~1-3% |
| $10,000 | ~3-8% |
Path 4: Multi-hop (BUCK → ETH → USDC)
- Uniswap V4 BUCK/ETH pools have $10-$12 TVL each. Not viable.
Liquidity Summary
| Source | Available USDC | Access | Speed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uniswap V2 Pool | ~$61,283 | Permissionless | Instant |
| Curve StableSwap Pool | ~$46,573 | Permissionless | Instant |
| Liquidity Reserve (via Window) | ~$123,597 | Restricted (allowlist) | Daily-capped |
| Total (permissionless) | ~$107,856 | — | — |
| Total (including restricted) | ~$231,453 | — | — |
Key concerns:
- Total permissionless DEX liquidity is only ~$108K
- Both DEX pools were deployed by Buck's own team (deployer + treasury) — protocol-managed liquidity, not organic
- 24h volume across all pools is highly variable ($500 to $6K) — extremely thin
- No CEX listings
- The Liquidity Window is the primary exit but is access-gated and operates at company discretion per terms
Centralization & Control Risks
Governance
CRITICAL: All contracts are owned by a single EOA (0x376269214bB78b3D4f31d17600499b439c1aCB4b) with NO multisig and NO timelock on governance actions.
| Contract | Access Model | Admin/Owner |
|---|---|---|
| BUCK Token | Ownable2Step | EOA 0x3762... |
| Liquidity Window | Ownable2Step | EOA 0x3762... |
| Oracle Adapter | Ownable2Step | EOA 0x3762... |
| Access Registry | Ownable2Step | EOA 0x3762... |
| Policy Manager | AccessControl | EOA 0x3762... (DEFAULT_ADMIN) |
| Rewards Engine | AccessControl | EOA 0x3762... (DEFAULT_ADMIN) |
| Collateral Attestation | AccessControl | EOA 0x3762... (DEFAULT_ADMIN) |
| Liquidity Reserve | AccessControl | EOA 0x3762... (DEFAULT_ADMIN) |
Admin Powers (all executable instantly by single EOA):
| Function | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|
upgradeToAndCall() |
CRITICAL | Replace entire implementation of any proxy contract. No timelock. |
pause() / unpause() |
HIGH | Halt ALL transfers, mints, and burns instantly. |
configureModules() |
HIGH | Rewire all module addresses (minter, burner, fee routing, treasury, oracle). Can point to malicious contracts. |
revoke() on Access Registry |
HIGH | Freeze any address (cannot send or receive BUCK). |
setFeeSplit() / addDexPair() |
MEDIUM | Change fee parameters. |
Denylist/Freeze mechanism: The Access Registry's revoke() function denylists addresses, preventing ALL transfers to/from that address. This is checked on every token transfer via _update().
Positive notes:
- All Ownable contracts use Ownable2Step (2-step ownership transfer)
renounceOwnership()is overridden to revert on BUCK Token and Liquidity WindowenableProductionMode()is a one-way switch already enabled (prevents zeroing critical addresses)
The only delay in the system: Liquidity Reserve has adminDelaySeconds = 86,400s (24h) for queued admin withdrawals. This is operational, not governance.
No DAO governance exists in practice — despite marketing as having a "Buck Foundation" for governance, the Terms & Conditions explicitly state: "The Company retains sole discretionary authority" and tokens "do not provide Token holders with any governance, voting, or management rights."
Programmability
- BUCK is a standard ERC-20 (not ERC-4626). Yield is distributed as additional tokens via the Rewards Engine on the 4th business day of each month.
- Minting/refunding operates through the Liquidity Window with onchain band logic (Policy Manager)
- Collateral values are posted by a single attestor EOA (
0x6f31810c8e6bfaf3ba486b4b7ce651b023423fa3) — not computed onchain - Oracle Adapter in non-strict mode, falling back to admin-set $1.00 internal price (onchain Pyth data stale — no keeper pushing updates)
- Reward distribution decisions are offchain (Foundation approval), execution is onchain
- STRC purchase and custody are entirely offchain
External Dependencies
- Strategy Inc. / STRC (CRITICAL) — Entire yield model depends on STRC dividends. Strategy's 700K+ BTC provides backing, but BTC price crash could impact STRC value and dividends.
- Pyth Oracle (HIGH) — Configured for STRC/USD pricing via
0x4305fb66699c3b2702d4d05cf36551390a4c69c6. Pyth offchain feed is active, but onchain price on Ethereum not updated since Jan 15, 2026 (no keeper configured,priceUpdater = 0x0). System falls back to admin-set $1.00. When active, depends on NASDAQ feed availability (32.5h/week). - Fireblocks Custody (MEDIUM) — Offchain STRC assets claimed to be held in Fireblocks MPC custody (per documentation, not independently verifiable).
- The Network Firm (LOW) — Monthly attestation provider for reserve verification.
- NASDAQ Market Hours (MEDIUM) — STRC trades only during NASDAQ hours. Pricing gaps over weekends/holidays create risk for BUCK operations.
Operational Risk
- Founder: Travis VanderZanden — fully doxxed (LinkedIn). Previously founder/CEO of Bird (electric scooter company). Bird overstated revenue by ~$31.6M (2020–2022 restatement per SEC filing), was delisted from NYSE, and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2023.
- VP Engineering: Brett Potter — previously Senior Blockchain Engineer at Binance.US, Head Developer at friesDAO.
- Head of Treasury: Dan Hillery — founding member of MSTR True North community.
- GitHub: Single pseudonymous contributor (CornBrother0x, 6 commits). "Full git history will be merged in after Buck Labs can properly sanitize the development repo." No updates since January 7, 2026. 2 stars, 0 forks.
- Documentation: Adequate. GitBook-based docs, transparency dashboard, MiCA whitepaper. Some gaps (minting/redeeming details hard to find).
- Legal Structure (source: MiCA Whitepaper Part A — link removed; Buck CDN no longer serves the PDF as of 2026-05-12):
- Buck Assets Ltd. (BVI, Company No. 2183723, registered 2025-08-07) — Token issuer. Explicitly "NOT licensed, registered or otherwise regulated" in BVI. Directors: Clint Johnson and Gareth Thomas.
- Buck Foundation (Cayman Islands, exempted limited guarantee foundation) — DAO/governance wrapper. Parent company of Buck Assets Ltd.
- Buck Labs Inc. (USA, Miami FL) — Technology company / service provider.
- Restricted jurisdictions: 38+ including US, Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Canada
- Structure: Regulation S exemption from U.S. securities registration
- Incident Response: No documented plan. Emergency pause capability exists. Circuit breaker activates on >25% STRC move in 24h or stale oracle >2h.
Monitoring
Key Contracts to Monitor
| Contract | Address | Key Events/Functions |
|---|---|---|
| BUCK Token | 0xdb13997f4D83EF343845d0bAEb27d1173dF8c224 |
Transfer, Paused, Unpaused, OwnershipTransferred, Upgraded, totalSupply() |
| Liquidity Window | 0x6E87adb23ac0e150Ca9F76C33Df2AdCae508548E |
Mint/Refund events, Upgraded, band state changes |
| Liquidity Reserve | 0x1A426E3a87368a4851f7443Ff656A054Af872f66 |
USDC balance changes, queueWithdrawal, executeWithdrawal, USDC balanceOf() |
| Policy Manager | 0x79f86b9E0ac84C7580575089E453431D77905E36 |
Band state transitions (GREEN→YELLOW→RED), parameter changes |
| Collateral Attestation | 0x1aEEEf99704258947A9ea77eF021d5e0551c0428 |
Attestation updates, collateral ratio changes |
| Access Registry | 0xbCc6de2423B496cb36C3278dC487EfD9c5C550B6 |
revoke() / revokeBatch() events (address freezing), setRoot() events |
| Rewards Engine | 0x159c1C0F796a02111334cC280eE001b091a9580C |
Distribution events, Upgraded events |
| Admin EOA | 0x376269214bB78b3D4f31d17600499b439c1aCB4b |
ALL outgoing transactions (single point of control) |
Critical Monitoring Points
- Admin EOA Activity: Monitor ALL transactions from
0x3762...— any upgrade, pause, or module reconfiguration should trigger immediate alert - USDC Reserve Level: Track Liquidity Reserve USDC balance. Alert if reserve ratio drops below 5% (YELLOW band trigger) or 2.5% (RED band trigger)
- Token Supply Changes: Monitor
totalSupply()for unexpected minting - Proxy Upgrades: Monitor
Upgradedevents on all proxy contracts — no timelock means upgrades are instant - Address Freezing: Monitor
revoke()calls on Access Registry - STRC Price: Monitor STRC market price (NASDAQ). Circuit breaker should activate on >25% 24h move.
- Recommended Frequency: Hourly for reserve levels and admin activity. Daily for attestation updates and governance.
Reassessment Triggers
- Time-based: Reassess in 3 months (May 2026) or when governance is upgraded to multisig + timelock
- TVL-based: Reassess if total reserves exceed $10M
- Governance-based: Reassess if admin transfers from EOA to multisig with timelock
- Liquidity-based: Reassess if permissionless DEX liquidity exceeds $1M
- Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, pause event, admin key rotation, or proxy upgrade
- Bug bounty: Reassess if a bug bounty program is launched
Score Details
Scoring Guidelines:
- Be conservative: when uncertain between two scores, choose the higher (riskier) one
- Use decimals (e.g., 2.5) when a subcategory falls between scores
- Prioritize onchain evidence over documentation claims
Critical Risk Gates
- No audit → PASS (4 public audits from 3 firms: Halborn, Cyfrin, 2× Spearbit)
- Unverifiable reserves → PARTIAL CONCERN — USDC reserves verifiable onchain ($124K), but STRC holdings ($1.52M) are offchain with only monthly attestation. Onchain component is verifiable, so not an auto-fail, but a significant weakness. STRC now represents 92% of total reserves, increasing offchain dependency.
- Total centralization → TRIGGERED — All contracts controlled by single EOA (
0x376269214bB78b3D4f31d17600499b439c1aCB4b) with no multisig or governance. This meets the critical gate definition: "Controlled by a single EOA with no multisig or governance."
Critical gate is triggered. Per the template, this should result in an automatic score of 5. However, as mitigating factors exist (Ownable2Step, production mode enabled, 24h delay on reserve withdrawals), we proceed with category scoring but note the gate trigger.
Category Scores
Expand a category to see how it was scored.
Audits & Historical Track Record20%4.00
| Aspect | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Audits | 4 audits from 3 firms (Halborn, Cyfrin, 2× Spearbit), all publicly available. 2 Critical + 11 High findings across all audits (all resolved). |
| Bug Bounty | None — no program on any platform |
| Time in Production | ~8 weeks (launched Jan 5, 2026). Extremely early. |
| TVL | ~$1.6M total reserves. Small by DeFi standards. |
| Historical Track Record | No incidents, but extremely limited track record. Rewards Engine upgraded 3x in 8 weeks. |
8 weeks in production with ~$1.6M TVL places this firmly at score 4-5. Two Spearbit audits from a reputable firm prevent it from being a 5. No bug bounty is a significant negative.
Score: 4.0/5
Centralization & Control Risks30%4.83
Subcategory A: Governance — 5.0
- All contracts owned by single EOA — no multisig, no timelock
- EOA can: upgrade all proxies instantly, pause all transfers, rewire all modules, freeze any address
- Documentation claims "48-hour timelock and multi-sig" but onchain reality shows neither
- No onchain governance mechanism. Terms explicitly state company retains "sole discretionary authority"
- Ownable2Step provides marginal protection against accidental ownership transfer only
Subcategory B: Programmability — 4.5
- BUCK is standard ERC-20, not ERC-4626 — no onchain exchange rate
- Yield distributed as additional tokens via Rewards Engine (offchain decision, onchain execution)
- Collateral values posted by single attestor EOA — not computed onchain
- Oracle Adapter in non-strict mode, Pyth configured but onchain data stale (no keeper pushing updates), falling back to admin-set $1.00 internal price
- Band system logic is onchain (Policy Manager), but band parameters set by admin
- STRC purchase and custody entirely offchain
Subcategory C: External Dependencies — 5.0
- Single point of failure: Entire yield model depends on STRC dividends from Strategy Inc.
- If Strategy suspends dividends, BUCK's value proposition collapses entirely
- Pyth oracle dependency for STRC pricing (offchain feed active, but no keeper pushing onchain updates)
- NASDAQ market hours limitation (32.5h/week vs 24/7 crypto)
- No fallback mechanism if Strategy fails
Score: (5.0 + 4.5 + 5.0) / 3 = 4.83/5
Funds Management30%3.75
Subcategory A: Collateralization — 3.5
- 1.69x overcollateralization ratio
- USDC component (~$124K) is onchain and verifiable
- STRC component (~$1.52M) is offchain — publicly traded equity held in traditional custody
- Single-asset concentration (STRC) — no diversification
- STRC is liquid (NASDAQ-traded) but subject to market volatility
- Fireblocks MPC custody claimed per documentation (not independently verifiable onchain)
- No onchain liquidation mechanism for STRC holdings
Subcategory B: Provability — 4.0
- USDC reserves verifiable onchain (~$124K in Liquidity Reserve)
- STRC holdings offchain, verified only by:
- Monthly Network Firm attestation (AICPA standards)
- Single attestor EOA posting values to Collateral Attestation contract
- No real-time onchain verification of STRC holdings
- Exchange rate not computed onchain (standard ERC-20, not ERC-4626)
- Oracle falls back to admin-set $1.00 internal price (onchain Pyth data stale 46+ days — no keeper configured)
- Transparency dashboard provides 24h reserve updates (per documentation)
Score: (3.5 + 4.0) / 2 = 3.75/5
Liquidity Risk15%4.50
- Total permissionless DEX liquidity: ~$108K across Uniswap V2 and Curve pools
- 24h trading volume: highly variable ($500 to $6K) — extremely thin
- $5K trade = 7.5% slippage on Uniswap V2, ~1-3% on Curve
- $10K trade = 14% slippage on Uniswap V2
- Liquidity Window provides best exit ($124K at 0.20% cost) but is access-gated and not a contractual right
- Daily refund cap: 49K BUCK/day ($49K). Exiting $500K position: 10+ days minimum.
- No CEX listings
- Both DEX pools deployed by Buck's own team (deployer + treasury) — not organic liquidity
- 199 holders total
- Throttle mechanism (+0.5): daily refund caps limit large exits
Score: 4.5/5
Operational Risk5%3.50
- Founder (Travis VanderZanden) is fully doxxed. Previous company Bird had $31.6M revenue overstatement and went bankrupt
- VP Engineering (Brett Potter) and Head of Treasury (Dan Hillery) are public
- GitHub repo has single pseudonymous contributor, no updates in 8+ weeks, sanitized history
- Documentation is adequate but not comprehensive (some pages return 404)
- Legal structure: BVI issuer explicitly "NOT regulated," Cayman Foundation, US technology entity
- Structured via Regulation S (excludes US persons)
- No documented incident response plan
- Monthly Network Firm attestation provides some operational transparency
Score: 3.5/5
Final Score Calculation
Final Score = (Audits × 0.20) + (Centralization × 0.30) + (Funds Mgmt × 0.30) + (Liquidity × 0.15) + (Operational × 0.05)
= (4.0 × 0.20) + (4.83 × 0.30) + (3.75 × 0.30) + (4.5 × 0.15) + (3.5 × 0.05)
= 0.80 + 1.449 + 1.125 + 0.675 + 0.175
= 4.224
≈ 4.22
Critical gate (single EOA control) was triggered. All contracts are controlled by a single EOA with no multisig or governance — this meets the "Total centralization" critical gate criteria. Per the scoring framework, a triggered critical gate results in an automatic score of 5.0 (High Risk).
The category-weighted score (shown below for reference) would have been 4.22, confirming the protocol is high-risk even without the gate override.
| Category | Score | Weight | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audits & Historical | 4.0 | 20% | 0.80 |
| Centralization & Control | 4.83 | 30% | 1.449 |
| Funds Management | 3.75 | 30% | 1.125 |
| Liquidity Risk | 4.5 | 15% | 0.675 |
| Operational Risk | 3.5 | 5% | 0.175 |
| Category-Weighted Score | 4.22 | ||
| Final Score (critical gate applied) | 5.0 / 5.0 |
Risk Tier
| Final Score | Risk Tier | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0-1.5 | Minimal Risk | Approved, high confidence |
| 1.5-2.5 | Low Risk | Approved with standard monitoring |
| 2.5-3.5 | Medium Risk | Approved with enhanced monitoring |
| 3.5-4.5 | Elevated Risk | Limited approval, strict limits |
| 4.5-5.0 | High Risk | Not recommended |
Final Risk Tier: HIGH RISK — Not recommended
The protocol's single EOA governance triggered the "Total centralization" critical gate, resulting in an automatic 5.0 score. Additionally, the extremely thin liquidity ($108K permissionless), very early stage (8 weeks), and offchain collateral dependency (92% STRC) independently confirm the high-risk assessment. Use as Morpho collateral is NOT recommended at this stage due to insufficient DEX liquidity for liquidations and critical governance centralization risks.
Assessment History
| Date | Score | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| March 3, 2026 | DEAD | Initial assessment |